H. Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1991.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....de Borda suggested the Borda Count algorithm for the French Academy of Sciences in Paris [18] Around the same time, the Marquis de Condorcet proposed his algorithm [19] and the two algorithms have been at the center of a large corpus of research in Social Choice in the past century. See [61, 52, 37] for good introductions to the eld. An election is an instance of a voting problem. The input is called a voting pro le. For example, consider the following pro le of a 5 candidate, 10 voter election: 3: a; b; c; d; e 3: b; e; c; a; d 2: c; a; d; e; b 2: d; b; e; a; c A slight variation ....

.... For instance, May s theorem shows that, in the case of a twocandidate election, majority voting is the only method that is anonymous (equal treatment of all voters) neutral (equal treatment of the candidates) and monotonic (more support for a candidate does not jeopardize its election) [52]. This lends support to the Condorcet al..gorithm, since the Condorcet winner wins (or ties in) 84 every possible pairwise majority contest. On the other hand, Saari has recently shown that only the Borda Count satis es all of the symmetry properties that one would expect of any reasonable ....

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Herve Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

....function would be swe (A) min u i (A) # A . An allocation A that maximises this function is an allocation that, from an egalitarian point of view, maximises social welfare. Other more sophisticated functions would also take into account the utility of other (unhappy) agents in the society [8]. Given the distributed character of multiagent systems, particularly when having in mind a commercial setting of some sort, intuitively, the utilitarian view on social welfare seems more appropriate than the egalitarian approach. We are going to make this intuition more precise later on. In the ....

H. Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

....the game induced by a mechanism prefer outcome (o # , p # ) to outcome (o, p) then (o, p) should not be the chosen outcome. In other words, if (o, p) is the chosen decision, it should be Pareto optimal : There should be no decision (o # , p # ) all the participants prefer to (o, p) Moulin [Mou91, pg. 14] calls the Pareto optimality 17 principle the single most important concept in welfare economics. A Pareto optimal outcome is also called an e#cient outcome, and a mechanism is said to be e#cient if it always gives a Pareto optimal outcome. When we are dealing with quasilinear ....

Herve Moulin. Axioms of cooperative decision making. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1991.

....granted in the multiagent systems literature. This is not the case in welfare economics and social choice theory though, where different notions of social welfare are being considered and compared with each other. Here, the concept of egalitarian social welfare takes a particularly prominent role [7, 13]. In an egalitarian system one would consider any differences in individual welfare unjust unless removing these differences would inevitably result in reducing the welfare of the agent who is currently worst off even further. This is Rawls so called difference principle [8] In other words, ....

....the consequences of which they are prepared to accept whatever their role in society may turn out to be. Rawls argues that under these circumstances the (egalitarian) principle of difference will be found to be just. Others have found similar arguments in defence of utilitarianism [4] Moulin [7] analyses these arguments as follows. Someone who would prefer the egalitarian so ciety is risk averse ; they fear to end up as the weakest member of society and consequently opt for a social order based on egalitarian principles. Those favouring the utilitarian society, on the other hand, may be ....

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Herv Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

....is expressed in terms of syncretic assignment (cf condition 8 below) The point is that we can improve the result for one of the member of the group only if it does not make the result worth for an other member. This kind of behaviour is very close to egalitarism in social choice theory (see e.g. Mou88] We will illustrate the (Arb) requirements on the following scenario: Example 2 Tom and David missed the soccer match yesterday between reds and yellows. So they don t know the result of the match. Tom listened in the morning that reds made a very good match. So he thinks that a win of reds ....

....not to pay the rent increase, the works will perhaps not carry on because of a lack of money. So if a decision requires the approval of all the members a more consensual, arbitration like, method seems more adequate. These kind of issues are highly related with social choice theory [Arr63, Kel78, Mou88] On this example, one can illustrate the use of the family, since with the operator 4 dH ; 2 we can see that the result (on this example) is the same as with the 4 operator. The reason is that the power used in the de nition of the operator allows to be more consensual while keeping ....

H. Moulin. Axioms of cooperative decision making. Monograph of the Econometric Society. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

....in [12] do not provide buyers with any means to declare and match their preferences or to calculate the division of the surplus in a stable manner. This may prevent buyers from forming a large coalition. Concepts of coalition formation and its stability have been investigated in game theory [4, 5]. Some research on multi agent systems [7, 8, 10, 9] has applied the concepts from game theory to multi agent cooperation, and developed algorithms to form stable and beneficial agent coalitions. Some of those algorithms are theoretically applicable to buyer coalition formation, but they cannot be ....

....In section 4 we describe the coalition formation scheme in detail. Section 5 analyzes the stability of the coalition formation scheme. Section 6 describes the experimental results. Finally, we conclude our discussion in section 7. 2. PRIOR WORK Works in game theory and microeconomics such as [4, 5] have provided concepts of coalition and its stability. A coalition is a set of agents which cooperate to achive a common goal, and the stability requirement is that the outcome of a coalition be immune to deviations by individual agents or subsets of agents. Those concepts are important as ....

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H. Moulin. Axioms of cooperative decision making. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

....fair syncretic assignment) that maps each knowledge set to a total pre order such that mod(4 ( min(mod( As pointed out by D. Makinson (personal communication) this de nition of merging operators from such assignments can be compared to the framework of Social Choice Theory [2, 10, 17]. The aim of Social Choice Theory is to aggregate individual choices into a social choice, i.e. to nd, for a given set of agents (corresponding to our knowledge sets) with individual preference relations, a social preference relation which re ects the preferences of the set of agents. It turns ....

H. Moulin. Axioms of cooperative decision making. Monograph of the Econometric Society. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

....such rules as described below. Other work has been done regarding single peaked preferences on graphs. Hansen and Thisse [15] and Demange [13] restrict attention to graphs that are trees, and derive existence results for that model concerning Condorcet winners and the core, respectively. Moulin [18] discusses welfarism on more general graphs. Ching and Thomson [11] and Vohra [23] examine fairness criteria for graphs that are trees, while Gordon and Pequeux [14] do so when the graph consists of exactly one cycle. Our results arrive with two distinct flavors. In particular, the flavor of the ....

H. Moulin, "Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making" Econometric Society Monograph, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988.

....is decreasing. Here, we consider only valuations: monotone, positive submodular functions. In the literature, submodular functions have been generally been considered in a wider setting. Many equivalent characterizations of decreasing marginal utilities are well known. Theorem 1. see for example [13, 14]) A valuation v is submodular if and only if any one of the following equivalent propositions holds. For any x; y 2 X and S X: v(x j S) v(x j S[fyg) For any S; T; V X, such that S T : v(V j S) v(V j T ) For any A; B X: v(A) v(B) v(A [ B) v(A B) It follows, in ....

H. Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K., 1988.

....endure. In this case neither b 1 nor b 2 can win their bids without coalition. But when both of the mechanisms are applied, then both b 1 and b 2 can win their bids and furthermore have 10 profit together. Although economists have provided much insight into the stability analysis of coalitions [2, 4] and mechanism design of combinatorial auctions [40, 41, 25] both the determination 1 of optimal coalition structure and stable payoff division in coalition formation problems, and winner determination in combinatorial auction problems are computationally intractable. There is some research ....

....of cooperative games If we regard each buyer as a player this problem defines a cooperative game (B; v) where B is the set of players and v(C) the value of a coalition C ae B is the characteristic function defined on every subset C of B. The following definitions and theorems are noted in [2] In a convex game the marginal contribution of a buyer b n to a coalition not including b n increases with expansion of the coalition. Definition 5 (Convex Game) A cooperative game (B; v) is convex if it satisfies one of the two following equivalent properties for all b n 2 B: for all S; T ae B ....

Herv'e Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, 1988.

....But we conclude that the main hypothesis is not generally valid under simple preferences, where taste are likely to be more homogeneous. In the latter case the validity of the hypothesis depends on whether or not the subjects are provided with detailed information about the voting rule. 4 See Moulin [1988; Ch. 10] for an excellent exposition. If we place some restrictions on preferences then we can find many voting rules that are strategy proof. Having a strategy proof voting rule would make matters much easier: we could just announce the properties of the rule to agents, behaviorally encouraging ....

....There is no assurance, without very restrictive assumptions on preferences, that a CW exists for all possible preference profiles. 6 So much for the bad news. The good news, however, is that if a CW exists and the number of agents is odd then a voting rule which selects it is strategy proof (see Moulin [1988; Lemma 10.3, p.263] Moreover, it is also known that in such a setting no coalition of the group can jointly misrepresent their preferences and make every coalition member better off. Coalition formation may not be a serious problem for large and decentralized surveys, but could be for smaller ....

Moulin, Herve, Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

....solutions that coincide with the nucleolus and value of the corresponding bankruptcy game, respectively. O Neill s bankruptcy model has been applied to a wide array of economic problems, e.g. taxation problems (Young (1988) surplus sharing problems (Moulin (1987) cost sharing problems (Moulin (1988)) apportionment of indivisible good(s) problems (Young (1994) and priority problems (Moulin (2000) and Young (1994) The bankruptcy model relates to a particular kind of allocation problem. An allocation problem arises whenever a bundle of goods (resources, rights, costs, burdens) is held in ....

Moulin, H. (1988). Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Econometric Society Monographs.

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H. Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1991.

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H. Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1991.

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H. Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1991.

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Herve Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

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H. Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

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Moulin, H. (1988). Axioms of cooperative decision making, Cambridge University Press.

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H. Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making.Cam- bridge University Press, 1988.

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H. Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

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H. Moulin (1988). Axioms for Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press.

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H. Moulin, Axioms of Cooperative Decision-Making," Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, UK, 1988.

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H. Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

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H. Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

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Herve Moulin. Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making. Cambridge University Press, 1988.

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