D.S.Wallach,D.Balfanz,D.Dean,E.W.Felten. Extensible Security Architectures for Java.16 th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (Saint-Malo, France), October 1997. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
Out of the Sandbox: Third Party Validation for Java.. - Jermyn, Monrose, Wyckoff (Correct)
....BigDeveloper s software development kit. Unfortunately Bob has no reason to trust Alice, and refuses to grant her code the necessary privileges. Due to the nature of Java s extended stack introspection, in which the security model assigns runtime privileges based on the consensus voting rule [6], Alice s parallel processing code is never correctly executed. Alice cannot obtain higher privileges for her code since these privileges are assigned by Bob on the basis of the principal responsible for the code source, and Alice runs a small operation that is virtually unknown. This scenario is ....
.... resources are represented by targets, and the privileges associated with a principal represent the authorization for a principal to access a specific target [4] These signatures represent endorsements of the code by the signer, asserting that the code is not malicious and behaves as advertised [6]. The extended stack introspection mechanism implemented by both Netscape and Microsoft uses digital signatures to match pieces of incoming byte code to principals, and consults a policy engine to determine which system targets should be enabled for a particular principal. Microsoft s approach to ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Dan S. Wallach, Dirk Balfanz, Drew Dean, and Edward Felton. Extensible Security Architectures for Java. 16th Symposium on Operating System Principles, 1997.
Out of the Sandbox: Third Party Validation for Java.. - Jermyn, Monrose, Wyckoff (1998) (Correct)
....BigDeveloper s software development kit. Unfortunately Bob has no reason to trust Alice, and refuses to grant her code the necessary privileges. Due to the nature of Java s extended stack introspection, in which the security model assigns runtime privileges based on the consensus voting rule [6], Alice s parallel processing code is never correctly executed. Alice cannot obtain higher privileges for her code since these privileges are assigned by Bob on the basis of the principal responsible for the code source, and Alice runs a small operation that is virtually unknown. This scenario is ....
.... resources are represented by targets, and the privileges associated with a principal represent the authorization for a principal to access a specific target [4] These signatures represent endorsements of the code by the signer, asserting that the code is not malicious and behaves as advertised [6]. The extended stack introspection mechanism implemented by both Netscape and Microsoft uses digital signatures to match pieces of incoming byte code to principals, and consults a policy engine to determine which system targets should be enabled for a particular principal. Microsoft s approach to ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Dan S. Wallach, Dirk Balfanz, Drew Dean, and Edward Felton. Extensible Security Architectures for Java. 16th Symposium on Operating System Principles, 1997.
Mobile Code Security - Rubin, Geer (1998) (3 citations) (Correct)
....of operations; this is known as the sandbox model. The second technique is to obtain assurance that the source of the executable is trusted; this is the code signing approach. A hybrid approach that combines these two techniques has been implemented in JDK 1. 2 [4] and Netscape s Communicator [13]. The final approach to securing clients from mobile code is to examine executables as they enter a trusted domain and make a decision about whether or how to run them on the client based on specific properties of the executables; this is the firewalling approach. Besides these currently used ....
Dan S. Wallach, Dirk Balfanz, Drew Dean, and Edward W. Felten. Extensible security architectures for Java. 16th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles, pages 116--128, 1997.
Access Rights Analysis for Java - Larry Koved Box (2002) (13 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
D.S.Wallach,D.Balfanz,D.Dean,E.W.Felten. Extensible Security Architectures for Java.16 th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (Saint-Malo, France), October 1997.
Safe Termination of Java Classes - Jiangchun Frank Luo (Correct)
No context found.
Dan S. Wallach, Dirk Balfanz, Drew Dean, and Edward W. Felten. Extensible Security Architectures for Java. 16th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles (Saint-Malo, France), October 1997. http://www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/pub/sosp97.html 13
Safe Termination of Java Classes - Jiangchun Frank Luo (Correct)
No context found.
Dan S. Wallach, Dirk Balfanz, Drew Dean, and Edward W. Felten. Extensible Security Architectures for Java. 16th Symposium on Operating Systems Principles. Saint-Malo, France, October 1997. http://www.cs.princeton.edu/sip/pub/sosp97.html.
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