V.D. Gligor, "A Note on the Denial-of-Service Problem," Proc. of the IEEE Symposium on Computer Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, April 1983. (also in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, SE-10, No. 3, May 1984.)  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....Chapter 1. Introduction Users also tend to lose tokens. In some ways this is one of the advantages of a token, as the loss is easily detected and is more likely to be reported. It also can be a disadvantage as the loss can lead to a denial of service . Denial of service concepts are explained in [6, 39, 113, 76, 24]. 1.3 Notation The following notation is used within gures and protocol descriptions within this thesis. Table 1.1: Notation Notation Description EKey fXg Encrypt X with symmetric key Key MACKey fmessageg The Message Authentication Code (MAC) of message with key Key KeyA B session A ....

V D Gligor. A Note on the Denial-of-Service Problem. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 139-149. IEEE Press, 1983.

....of information security with a large number of intuitively appealing concepts, such as utility. 4 None of these , however, can answer the fundamental question of de ning constraints under which a system is operable, or the service is continuous. Utility remains especially vaguely de ned. Gligor [12, 13] has demonstrated that DoS in operating systems must be approached through resource allocation, not through access control. Gligor introduces inter user dependency and demonstrates that as a common cause of DoS problems. Yu and Gligor [40] further propose a model for dealing with DoS based on the ....

V. Gligor. A note on the denial-of-service problem. In IEEE S&P, 1983.

....to tie up our resources and disable our servers. Since these attacks occur before parties are authenticated to each other, it is not possible to rely upon enforcement of the appropriate access control policy for protection (as is recommended in the classic work of Gligor and Millen in [7, 18, 19]) Instead the defenses, as much as possible, must be built into the protocols themselves. One of the most common and devastating types of denial of service attack is the resource exhaustion attack, in which an attacker, by initiating a large number of instances of a protocol, causes a victim to ....

V. Gligor. A note on the denial-of-service problem. In Proceedings of the 1983 Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 139--149. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1983.

....problem. Glasgow et al. 7] suggest that temporal operators included in the integrity specifications could be applied to the specification of availability properties but do not study the issue further. An effective solution to denial of service must be based on the control of resource allocation [8]. Denial of service protection base (DPB) is a layer of trusted computing base (TCB) that controls allocation of resources [13] This paper proposes an efficient algorithm to implement a DPB that monitors allocated and available resources and, based on RAP, determines whether the resource ....

V. Gligor. A note on the denial-of-service problem. In 1983 IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, 1983.

....and modification of information makes such use rather worthless, unless one charges for services. Further, if it results in reduced services to others, then it comes under a denial of service attack anyhow. Lastly, we do not deal with denial of service attacks. This is a very complex issue (e.g. [3, 89]) and in many ways comes under the area of fault tolerant computing (e.g. 130] Attempting to incorporate this into our policy would be far too big an undertaking at this time. Thus, we really only have two possible results to be concerned with: ffl unauthorized release of information ffl ....

Gligor, V. A note on the denial-of-service problem. In Proc. 1983 Symposium on Security and Privacy (April 1983), IEEE Computer Society, pp. 139--149.

....and verify but whose difficulty for the solver can be adjusted to any level. The server should remain stateless and refuse to perform expensive cryptographic operations until it has verified the client s solution to a puzzle. 2 Related work Classical models of denial of service by Gligor and Yu [6,17], Amoroso [1] and Millen [13] concentrate the specification and design of fair multi user operating systems. They assume that all service requests are arbitrated by a trusted computing base (TCB) that enforces the policy set by a single security officer. Their ideas do not extend well to open ....

Virgil D. Gligor. A note on the denial-of-service problem. In Proc. 1983 IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pages 139--149, Oakland, CA USA, April 1983. IEEE Computer Society.

....On the technical layer, where threats are logical attacks against the system, not many formal models have been suggested. Recommendations of (Keus 1994) and (Keus and Ullman 1994) also focus on corrective rather than preventive actions. Technical measures must enforce a maximum waiting time policy (Gligor 1983), where each process is attached with a maximum acceptable delay until termination. Millen (1992) has proposed a Denial of Service Protection Base (DPB) to enforce acceptable response times within the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) Before studying different layers in detail, the nature of threats ....

....(1976) access control list (ACL) based prevention of denial of service is an undecidable problem and a different approach is required. From the technical point of view, an assumption is made that data is available if the response to an authorised request is provided within a given time constraint (Gligor 1983). This approach has lead to the identification of a key concept within this section, a Denial of service Protection Base (DPB) Millen 1992) DPB enforces an acceptable resource allocation rather than resource access scheme. Violation of availability can be seen as an undesirable event that ....

Gligor, V. A Note on the Denial-of-Service Problem. In Proceedings of the 1983 IEEE Symposium on Research on Security and Privacy, 1983.

....which, nevertheless, violate integrity and availability requirements of user applications. Clearly, if the recovered state differs from either the secure input or secure output states of the transition during which the failure occurred, then both lost updates and dirty reads are possible [13,14]. However, options (3) and (4) are still acceptable for systems evaluated under the TCSEC because the TCSEC does not include application integrity and availability requirements. If user applications require higher degrees of integrity and availability than those supported by the TCB, they could ....

Gligor, V. D., "A Note on the Denial-of-Service Problem," Proceedings of the 1983 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, April 1983, pp. 5101-5111.

....of information, availability prohibits the unauthorized withholding of information. It s concern is not that low level users can read high level files, but that they can prevent high level users from accessing these files. There has been a fair amount of formal work in this area, first by Gligor[Gli83] and then by Yu and Gligor [YG90] and by Millen [Mil92] The latter two models present resource allocators. The model of Yu and Gligor uses temporal logic to specify constraints on such an allocator, and the one by Millen uses a finite state machine framework. When we turn to integrity, which ....

V. Gligor. A note on the denial-of-service problem. In Proceedings of the 1983 IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1983.

....of communication to tie up our resources and disable our servers. Since these attacks occur before parties are authenticated to each other, we cannot rely upon enforcement of the appropriate access control policy to protect us (as is recommended in the classic work of Gligor and Millen in [5, 18, 19]) Instead we must build our defenses, as much as possible, into the protocols themselves. This paper shows how some principles that have already been used to make protocols more resistant to denial of service can be formalized, and indicates the ways in which existing cryptographic protocol ....

....of communication to tie up our resources and disable our servers. Since these attacks occur before parties are authenticated to each other, we cannot rely upon enforcement of the appropriate access control policy to protect us (as is recommended in the classic work of Gligor and Millen in [5, 18, 19]) Instead we must build our defenses, as much as possible, into the protocols themselves. The SYN attack on TCP (see [24] for a more complete discussion) is a classic example of this type of attack. In TCP, a source host initiates the protocol by sending a SYN (synchronization start) message to ....

V. Gligor. A note on the denial-of-service problem. In Proceedings of the 1983 Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 139--149. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1983.

No context found.

V.D. Gligor, "A Note on the Denial-of-Service Problem," Proc. of the IEEE Symposium on Computer Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, April 1983. (also in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, SE-10, No. 3, May 1984.)

No context found.

V.D. Gligor, "A Note on the Denial-of-Service Problem," Proc. of the IEEE Symposium on Computer Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, April 1983. (also in IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, SE-10, No. 3, May 1984.)

No context found.

Gligor V. A Note on the Denial of Service Problem. Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, May 1983, pp 139--149.

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V. Gligor. A note on the denial-of-service problem. In Proceedings of the 1983.

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Gligor, V. (1983). A Note on the Denial of Service Problem. Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA, May, pp 139--149.

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V. D. Gligor. A note on the denial of service problem. In Proc. of 1983.

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