R. Axelrod and D. Dion. The further evolution of cooperation. Science, 242(4884):1385--1390, 1988.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....are first randomly initialized as real numbers between 0 and 2. A condfidence table contains player confidences for all possible combinations of history. The training set for adjusting player confidences consists of several well known game player strategies, such as TFT, Trigger, CDCD, etc [6, 7]. During evolution, confidences performing well are selected from coalitions. Crossover mixes confidences between coalitions in the population. Mutation changes a specified confidence into a random real number between zero and two. 5 Experimental Results The first experiment is designed to ....

R. Axelrod and D. Dion, "The further evolution of cooperation, " Science, vol. 242, pp. 1385--1390, 9 December 1988.

....group task. The framework described above addresses scenarios similar to ones considered in the economics and game 5 theory literatures (e.g. 20, 22, 28] For example, honoring or defaulting on group commitments is comparable to cooperating or defecting in the classic prisoner s dilemma game [2, 3, 4]. However, many of the assumptions made in prior work are not valid in the environments that SPIRE is designed to consider. In the repeated prisoner s dilemma [29, 26, 35, 5] for example, agents face the same scenario at each decision point, whereas SPIRE agents generally play a different game ....

Axelrod, R. and Dion, D. 1988. The further evolution of cooperation. Science, 242:1385-1390.

....describes two contests that he announced in the beginning of the 80 s on what strategy would win an IPD, when the strategies were to meet each other in a round robin tournament. The only thing the contestants knew for sure was that the random strategy was added to the population of strategies [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. The results of the tournament showed that tit for tat, the simplest strategy of them all submitted by Anatol Rapoport, won both tournaments, and a debate started whether tit fortat was the optimal choice of strategy for prisoners dilemma or not. A description of tit for tat is given in table ....

....Noisy Games When players interact, their conception of what their opponent did and their ability to perform the action that their strategies define might be distorted. This is what we call noise and we can recognize two kinds of such distortions, the trembling hand noise and misinterpretations [7, 84]. In the former case, when a player make the wrong action, all players in the game observe the actual performed action. This means that they all agree on what actions that have been performed. In the latter case, the player may not have chosen the wrong action, yet it will be interpreted ....

R. Axelrod and D. Dion. The further evolution of cooperation. Nature, 242:1385-- 1390, 1988.

....populations of tag users emerged from non tag users at zero or low tag search costs, but at higher costs tag use could not be maintained. 1 INTRODUCTION The Iterated Prisoner s Dilemma (IPD) has proved to be a simple, yet extremely useful model of the evo lution of cooperation (see [Axelrod and Dion, 1988] for a review) The IPD game structure captures much of the tension between the temptation to not cooperate (and hope to get a high payoff) and the somewhat smaller individual benefit from cooperation found in many social and ecological systems, from arms races [Axelrod, 1984] to collective ....

....on move m if X defected on the previous move. Each player A and X calculates and accumulates its own payoff per move average for the entire IPD they play. When two individuals play, they play a fixed num ber of moves 2, N, 4, which corresponds to a short shadow of the future of w = 0. 75 [Axelrod and Dion, 1988]. Playing with this few moves makes it difficult for cooperation to emerge and be mMntMned. 3 The experiments described in this paper were carried out using a low number of plays (4) per IPD game in order to show that using tags to select partners can lead to cooperation in conditions that make it ....

Axelrod, Robert and Dion, Douglas. "The Further Evolution of Cooperation. " Science, 2d2, pp1385-1390.

....known result is that, when a succession of cooperation opportunities involves a small number of cooperators, cooperation naturally emerges as a consequence of reciprocity. A both theoretically and experimentally well studied model of this mechanism is the two player Iterated Prisoners Dilemma [1, 3, 5, 10, 7]. Unfortunately, as envisaged by Hardin [9] when the opportunity requires more than a handful of cooperating participants, the reciprocity mechanism that is responsible for the stability of the cooperative behavior is weakened, and cooperators are open to exploita tion [8, 4] Experimental ....

Robert M. Axelrod and Douglas Dion. The further evolution of cooperation. Science, 242:1385 1390, 1988.

....was provided by the University of Michigan Program for the Study of Complex Systems. 1 Introduction The Iterated Prisoner s Dilemma (IPD) has proved to be a simple, yet extremely useful model of the evolution of cooperation (see section 2 for description of the game used in this paper; see [Axelrod and Dion, 1988] for a review) The IPD game structure captures much of the tension between the temptation to not cooperate (and hope to get a high payoff) and the somewhat smaller individual benefit from cooperation found in many social and ecological systems, from arms races [Axelrod, 1984] to collective ....

....is varied. It is well known that as the probability of continuing play, w (which is related to Nm ) is lowered, it is increasingly difficult for Tit For Tat like strategies to invade all Defector dominated populations, and it is increasingly tempting for individuals to defect ( Axelrod, 1984] [Axelrod and Dion, 1988]) However, increasing the probability that individuals with TFT like strategies play each other should decrease the threshold at which TFT can become established and remain relatively stable. See [Axelrod and Dion, 1988] for a review; see [Oliphant, 1994] for an example of unstable cooperation ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Axelrod, Robert and Dion, Douglas. "The Further Evolution of Cooperation." Science, 242, pp1385-1390.

....was provided by the University of Michigan Program for the Study of Complex Systems. 1 Introduction The Iterated Prisoner s Dilemma (IPD) has proved to be a simple, yet extremely useful model of the evolution of cooperation (see section 2 for description of the game used in this paper; see [Axelrod and Dion, 1988] for a review) The IPD game structure captures much of the tension between the temptation to not cooperate (and hope to get a high payoff) and the somewhat smaller individual benefit from cooperation found in many social and ecological systems, from arms races [Axelrod, 1984] to collective ....

....is varied. It is well known that as the probability of continuing play, w (which is related to N. is lowered, it is increasingly difficult for Tit For Tat like strategies to invade all Defector dominated populations, and it is increasingly tempting for individuals to defect ( Axelrod, 1984] [Axelrod and Dion, 1988]) However, increasing the probability that individuals with TFT like strategies play each other should decrease the threshold at which TFT can become estab lished and remain relatively stable. See [Axelrod and Dion, 1988] for a review; see [Oliphant, 1994] for an example of unstable cooperation ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Axelrod, Robert and Dion, Douglas. "The Further Evolution of Cooperation." Science, 2d2, pp1385-1390.

....known result is that, when a succession of cooperation opportunities involves a small number of cooperators, cooperation naturally emerges as a consequence of reciprocity. A both theoretically and experimentally well studied model of this mechanism is the two player Iterated Prisoners Dilemma [1, 3, 7, 5, 6, 18, 10]. Unfortunately, as envisaged by Hardin [14] when the opportunity requires more than a handful of cooperating participants, the reciprocity mechanism that is responsible for the stability of the cooperative behavior is weakened, and cooperators are open to exploitation [13, 4] Experimental ....

R. M. Axelrod and D. Dion. The further evolution of cooperation. Science, 242:1385-1390, 1988.

....dences in a coalition are randomly initialized as real numbers from zero to two. The con dence table contains all the con dences of agents for possible combination of history. The training set for adjusting con dences consists of several well known strategies such as TFT, Trigger, CDCD, and so on [3]. In the evolution, the con dences leading to good result are selected among population of coalitions. Crossover exchanges the con dences between coalitions selected from the population, and mutation changes a speci ed con dence into a random real number from zero to two. 5 Fig. 2. The ....

R. Axelrod and D. Dion, \The further evolution of cooperation," Science, vol. 242, pp. 1385-1390, December 1988.

....known result is that, when a succession of cooperation opportunities involves a small number of cooperators, cooperation naturally emerges as a consequence of reciprocity. A both theoretically and experimentally well studied model of this mechanism is the two player Iterated Prisoners Dilemma [1, 3, 5, 10, 7]. Unfortunately, as envisaged by Hardin [9] when the opportunity requires more than a handful of cooperating participants, the reciprocity mechanism that is responsible for the stability of the cooperative behavior is weakened, and cooperators are open to exploitation [8, 4] Experimental ....

Robert M. Axelrod and Douglas Dion. The further evolution of cooperation. Science, 242:1385-1390, 1988.

....because interactions in a society usually involve more than two individuals. Therefore, the necessity of game models with more than twoplayers has been recognized. For example, R. Axelrod and D. Dion argued that the social dilemma should be formulated as an n person Prisoners Dilemma with n 2[4]. R. Boyd and P. Richerson [5] and N. Joshi [13] have analyzed the n person Prisoners Dilemma using evolutionary games, and proved that the condition for (the n person version) TIT FOR TAT to be evolutionary stable is harder to be satisfied as n increases. Let us call this the effect of the ....

Axelrod, R. and D. Dion., The further evolution of cooperation, Science (Washington, D. C.), 242 (1988) 1385-1390

....cooperates again) Further strategies include stochastic ones ( 11] the Pavlov strategy ( 13] that cooperates when it has played the same move as its opponent etc. In the literature we may also find studies in an evolutionary perspective ( 6] theoretical or applied biological studies ([3][5] 10] and studies of modified IPD versions ( 14] We have designed an adaptive tit for tat strategy that is analyzed in detailed elsewhere ( 15] and is shown to score better than pure tit for tat and most of the other known strategies. Our initial motivation for this work was to find a ....

Axelrod, R., and Dion, D.: The further evolution of cooperation, Science 242 (1988) 1385-90

....No. of Cooperators 0 1 X N 1 Cooperate C 0 C 1 C x CN 1 Defect D 0 D 1 D x DN 1 There are a number of issues in the NIPD game which can in uence the evolution of gameplaying strategies and the nal evolved strategies, such as the payo function [6] noise [7], population structure [8] localization [9] the history length [10, 7, 3] the number of players [3] and so on. Most of the work did not use the evolutionary approach. The strategies used by players were largely xed. Yao and Darwen studied the NIPD game with N being up to 16 [3, 4, 5] Using ....

.... C x CN 1 Defect D 0 D 1 D x DN 1 There are a number of issues in the NIPD game which can in uence the evolution of gameplaying strategies and the nal evolved strategies, such as the payo function [6] noise [7] population structure [8] localization [9] the history length [10, 7, 3], the number of players [3] and so on. Most of the work did not use the evolutionary approach. The strategies used by players were largely xed. Yao and Darwen studied the NIPD game with N being up to 16 [3, 4, 5] Using the payo matrix given by Figure 1 [3] they showed that the evolution of ....

R. Axelrod and D. Dion, \The further evolution of cooperation," Science, vol. 242, pp. 1385{ 1390, 9 December 1988.

....include stochastic ones (Nowak Sigmund 1992) the Pavlov strategy (Nowak Sigmund 1993) that cooperates when it has played the same move as its opponent etc. In the literature we may also find studies in an evolutionary perspective (Fogel 1993) theoretical or applied biological studies (Axelrod Dion 1988, Feldman Thomas 1987, Milinski 1987) and studies of modified IPD versions (Stanley et al. 1994) The best designed behavior found so far in the literature is GRADUAL (Beaufils et al. 1996) which manages to achieve the highest scores against virtually all other designed behaviors. This behavior ....

Axelrod, R., and Dion, D. (1988) The further evolution of cooperation. Science 242:1385-90.

.... parameters: S = 0 P = 1 R = 3 T = 5 which verify: S P R T and (S T ) 2 R This game has been found to be a very good way of studying cooperation and evolution of cooperation and thus a sort of theory of cooperation based upon reciprocity has been set in a wide literature, such as in [1, 3, 4]. The experimental studies of the IPD and its strategies need a lot of time computation and thus with the progress of computers, a lot of computer scientists and mathematicians have studied it as they have been able to use specific methods, like genetic algorithms, on it, see [2, 5, 9, 15, 16, 21, ....

R. Axelrod and D. Dion. The further evolution of cooperation. Science, 242:1385--1390, 1988.

....for higher order organizations to be truly emergent, that is for emergent organizations to be relatively unpredictable. Such a social autonomy will show as robustness to perturbations and can only be achieved whenever there is enough diversity. 1 In this sense, participation corresponds to what Axelrod and Dion (1988) called a behavior dependent context of play. It is also consistent with Becker s (1976) operational analysis which suggested that altruism (cooperation) has selective advantage in contexts involving generalized physical or social interaction. De Sousa (1990) argued that such sociobiological ....

....the satisfaction state of the agents. From this it might be deduced that the present rigid interaction scheme by itself causes already very bad behavior for perturbation to make any difference. Note that the variations may be seen as the genetic cause of misimplementation and misperception, to use Axelrod Dion s (1988) terminology, while the perturbations correspond to changes in the rules of the game . Experiment 2 : Adaptive agents. Given the low satisfaction rates of agents in the previous experiment, we added adaptive mechanisms that modify those internal T, a and b parameters. 6 We differentiate ....

Axelrod, R., D. Dion (1988). The further evolution of cooperation, Science, 242:1385-1390, 1988.

....evolutional dynamics can simulate similar situations to real biological situations [12] First, we describe evolution of cooperation in the study of game theory. 4.3. 1 Prisoner s Dilemma Problem and Evolution of Cooperation The game of prisoner s dilemma has been studied for many years [1, 3, 2, 17, 37, 55, 26, 75, 51]. It is a two player, non zero sum game, and each player has to choose between two actions: Cooperate (C) and Defect (D) The pay off matrix is shown in the Table 4.1. Iterative prisoner s dilemma is that a player plays prisoner s dilemma multiple times in a row with the same opponent. Axelrod ....

....two actions: Cooperate (C) and Defect (D) The pay off matrix is shown in the Table 4.1. Iterative prisoner s dilemma is that a player plays prisoner s dilemma multiple times in a row with the same opponent. Axelrod organized tournaments of iterative prisoner s dilemma in 1981 [1, 3] and 1988 [2]. The most successful strategy used in the tournaments is known as TIT FOR TAT. This strategy is to cooperate as long as the opponent cooperates, but to retaliate by defecting in the following round if the opponent defects. This retaliation discourages the opponent from defecting, and a higher ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

R. Axelrod and D. Dion. The further evolution of cooperation. Science, Vol. 242, pp. 1385--1390, 9 Dec 1988.

....[c,d] the cooperative strategy obtains S points and the other T points. In the classical version of the Prisoner s Dilemma the parameters are: S = 0 P = 1 R = 3 T = 5 and they verify: S P R T and (S T ) 2 R We study the question of what becomes the previous analysis of Axelrod and others [2, 5, 10, 12, 11] when we change the second inequality in: S T ) 2 R In our experimentations we will use the parameters S = 0 P = 1 R = 3 T = 8. 1 L.I.F.L. CNRS U.R.A. 369, USTL batiment M3, 59655 Villeneuve d Ascq Cedex France, e mail : fdelahaye,mathieug lifl.fr This new iterated game is called ....

R. Axelrod and D. Dion, `The further evolution of cooperation', Science, 242, 1385--1390, (1988).

....one obtains an evolutionarily stable strategy (called Prudent Pavlov) which is immune against both mis perception and mis implementation. 1 Introduction Tit For Tat has an Achilles heel: it is vulnerable to errors (see Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) Axelrod (1984) Molander (1985) Muller (1987) Axelrod and Dion (1988), Bendor et al. (1991) Bendor (1993) Kollock (1993) Nowak and Sigmund (1993b) Nowak et al. (1995a) If a TFT player erroneously plays Defect against another TFT player, this leads to a long vendetta. There are several ways to overcome this problem. One can, for instance, play Generous Tit For ....

Axelrod, R. and Dion, D. (1988), The further evolution of cooperation, Science 242, 1385-90.

....in Game Theory, which is used as a way of modelling interactions between individuals. This game has been found to be a very good way of studying cooperation and evolution of cooperation and thus a sort of theory of cooperation based upon reciprocity has been set in a wide literature, such as in [1, 3, 4]. The experimental studies of the IPD and its strategies need a lot of time computation and thus with the progress of computers, a lot of computer scientists and mathematicians have studied it as they have been able to use specific methods, like genetic algorithms, on it, see [9, 2, 5, 8, 19, 21, ....

....known about it. One more reason, if needed, to make those researches, is that good strategies in the CIPD, are still good in a lot of variants of the game. 2 Gradual, a good strategy for the CIPD 2. 1 Behavior of gradual During our researches we have been led to test and verify classical results [1, 3]. Thus, in order to do so, we tried to create a lot of strategies to look at their behaviors and to check if they had the qualities of tit for tat. At this time we were trying to increase the efficiency of strategies by modifying their parameters little by little, and looking at the effect of the ....

R. Axelrod and D. Dion. The further evolution of cooperation. Science, 242:1385--1390, 1988.

.... tricky , and very simple cooperative strategies, like TFT, are not very successful. Noise could either disturb the actions so that the performed action is opposite to the intended one (trembling hand) or the information telling a player about the opponent s action is disturbed (noisy channels) [Axelrod and Dion 1988]. In any case, the complication is sufficient to give rise to interesting evolutionary behaviour. In the first interaction model, there is no noise, but a dilemma is introduced by iterating the game a fixed (known) number of rounds. In that case, the final round is an ordinary Prisoner s Dilemma, ....

Axelrod, R., and Dion, D. (1988). "The further evolution of cooperation," Science 242, 1385-1390.

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R. Axelrod and D. Dion. The further evolution of cooperation. Science, 242(4884):1385--1390, 1988.

No context found.

R. Axelrod and D. Dion. The further evolution of cooperation. Science, 242:1385-1390, 9 December 1988.

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Axelrod, R. and Dion, D. 1988. The further evolution of cooperation. Science, 242:1385-1390.

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R. Axelrod, D. Dion, "The Further Evolution of Cooperation," Science, 242 pp. 1385-1390, December 1988.

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