F. Tohme, `Negotiation and defeasible reasons for choice', in Proceedings of the Stanford Spring Symposium on Qualitative Preferences in Deliberation and Practical Reasoning, pp. 95--102, (1997).  Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Towards a Theory of Negotiation Strategy - Rahwan, McBurney, Sonenberg (2003) (1 citation) (Correct)
....fail to provide systematic means that allow participants to persuade one another to change their preferences and beliefs, or to reshape the negotiation object itself, and so on. As a result, new negotiation protocols are emerging, building on notions of persuasion and logical argumentation [17, 19, 11, 31, 30]. It is not clear yet whether the game theoretic characterisation of strategy is suitable for these frameworks. It is also not obvious that strategies which are optimal under assumptions of participant rationality and common knowledge of participant rationality will also be optimal when these ....
F. Tohme. Negotiation and defeasible reasons for choice. In Proc. Stanford Spring Symp. on Qualitative Preferences in Delbiberation and Practical Reasoning, pages 95--102, 1997.
Defeasible Logic for Automated Negotiation - Governatori, Hofstede, Oaks (2000) (4 citations) (Correct)
....negotiations can be described by additional rules. These rules could provide values for each issue, the relative importance of issues to one another and the preferred trade offs between issues. 4 RELATED AND FUTURE WORK There are several other logical approaches to two party negotiation (Tohme, 1997; Matos and Sierra, 1998; Parsons et al. 1998) The work by Tohme (1997) suggests defeasible reasoning can be used to evaluate and generate offers, however this paper concentrates on defining the negotiation process rather than the use of defeasible reasoning for evaluation. Matos and Sierra ....
....provide values for each issue, the relative importance of issues to one another and the preferred trade offs between issues. 4 RELATED AND FUTURE WORK There are several other logical approaches to two party negotiation (Tohme, 1997; Matos and Sierra, 1998; Parsons et al. 1998) The work by Tohme (1997) suggests defeasible reasoning can be used to evaluate and generate offers, however this paper concentrates on defining the negotiation process rather than the use of defeasible reasoning for evaluation. Matos and Sierra (1998) suggest Case Based or Fuzzy reasoning approaches. The use of Fuzzy ....
Tohme, F. (1997). Negotiation and defeasible reasons for choice. Presented at the AAAI Spring Symposium on Qualitative Preferences in Deliberation and Practical Reasoning, Stanford University, California.
Automated Negotiation: Prospects, Methods and Challenges - Jennings, Faratin.. (2000) (7 citations) (Correct)
.... have the potential to increase the likelihood and or the speed of agreements being reached; for example, if agents prefer arguments that are more likely to lead to an agreement (which requires some metric on the agreement space) it is possible to prove that argumentation leads to quicker agreement [42] 2 . In the former case, by persuading agents to accept deals that they may previously have rejected. In the latter case, by convincing agents to accept their opponent s position on a given issue (and to cease negotiating over it) 3. Game Theoretic Models Game theory is a branch of economics ....
F. Tohme (1997) "Negotiation and defeasible reasons for choice", Proc AAAI Spring Symposium on Qualitative preferences in deliberation and practical reasoning, 95-102.
On Argumentation-Based Negotiation - Jennings, Parsons, Noriega, Sierra (1998) (17 citations) (Correct)
....effects, and so it is not something specific to argumentationbased negotiation. 3. For example, if arguments are preferred if they are more likely to lead to an agreement (which requires some metric on the agreement space) it is possible to prove that argumentation leads to quicker agreement [12]. IWMAS98 Submission 6 object in accordance with the agent s acceptability region and its rating function; ii) determining which argument(s) should accompany the agreement (if any) in order to maximise the likelihood of it being accepted. The complexity of the former point is determined by the ....
F. Tohme (1997) "Negotiation and defeasible reasons for choice", Proc AAAI Spring Symposium on Qualitative preferences in deliberation and practical reasoning, 95-102.
Arguments, Dialogue, and Negotiation - Leila Amgoud And (2000) (Correct)
No context found.
F. Tohme, `Negotiation and defeasible reasons for choice', in Proceedings of the Stanford Spring Symposium on Qualitative Preferences in Deliberation and Practical Reasoning, pp. 95--102, (1997).
Modelling Dialogues Using Argumentation - Leila Amgoud Department (2000) (9 citations) (Correct)
No context found.
F. Tohme. Negotiation and defeasible reasons for choice. In Proceedings of the Stanford Spring Symposium on Qualitative Preferences in Deliberation and Practical Reasoning, pages 95--102, 1997.
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