R.A. Kemmerer. Formal Verification of an Operating System Security Kernel. UMI Research Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1982. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Design, Verification and Implementation of an Authentication.. - Woo, Lam (1994) (Correct)
....and implementation phases. We explore the main issues, and their relationships, encountered in each of these phases. Our work is in the same spirit as a number of previous studies where a realistic system is formally specified and verified, except that our study is for a different problem domain [5, 8]. Additionally, this paper has several other contributions. First, it presents a stepwise refinement process for deriving authentication protocols. The process, albeit informal, is useful in developing new protocols. Second, the authentication protocol presented in this paper is interesting in its ....
R.A. Kemmerer. Formal Verification of an Operating System Security Kernel. UMI Research Press, 1982.
Kit: A Study in Operating System Verification - Bevier (1989) (23 citations) (Correct)
....work of Milner, Hoare and others who have suggested similar approaches to verification. The methodology for designing operating system software proposed by Robinson and his co workers [Robinson 77] calls for a sequence of abstract machines, each 21 related by an implements relation. Kemmerer [Kemmerer 82] acknowledges a debt to Milner and Hoare in the verification of a portion of the security kernel of UCLA Secure Unix. Rushby [Rushby 81a] described an approach to kernel verification similar to ours. Several other research efforts have used the Boyer Moore logic and theorem prover to specify and ....
R.A. Kemmerer. Formal Verification of an Operating System Security Kernel. UMI Research Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1982.
Specifying and Checking Unix Security Constraints - Heydon, Tygar (1992) (6 citations) (Correct)
....be applied to operating systems other than Unix. Also, as opposed to security systems like COPS [4] or U Kuang [1] the power of the Mir o system derives from the ease by which it allows users to express and check new security constraints. Since textual specifications are often plagued by errors [3, 12], we have attempted to develop specification languages that are more intuitive to use so that errors will be less likely. Our languages are primarily graphical, but they mix graphical and textual notations where each is appropriate. For example, we use nested boxes to represent group membership ....
Richard A. Kemmerer. Formal Verification of an Operating System Security Kernel. Computer Science: Systems Programming, No. 2. UMI Research Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1982.
A Verified Operating System Kernel - Bevier (1987) (12 citations) (Correct)
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R.A. Kemmerer. Formal Verification of an Operating System Security Kernel. UMI Research Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1982.
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