Fudenberg, D.,D.Levine, and J. Tirole, "Infinite Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," in A. Roth (Ed.), GameTheoretic Models ofBargaining, Cambridge University Press, 1985.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....have only incomplete information about their opponent. To this end, game theoretic models have already been proposed for bargaining with incomplete information. For instance, Rubinstein [34] developed a model in which agents have incomplete information about time preferences. Fudenberg et al. [12] analyse buyer seller negotiation in which reservation prices are uncertain. Sandholm and Vulkan [37] consider uncertainty over agent deadlines. All these models are built on the assumption that information about the uncertain parameter (in the form of possible values and a probability ....

....information have also been formulated for different environments and the strategic behavior of agents is studied. Fudenberg and Tirole [13] analyse an infinite horizon bargaining game by taking the players valuations, and a probability distribution over them, as common knowledge. Fudenberg et al. [12] subsequently analysed buyer seller infinite horizon bargaining games in which reservation prices are uncertain, but time preferences are known. Sandholm and Vulkan [37] consider uncertainty over agent deadlines. However, a common feature of all these models is that they treat the information ....

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, and J. Tirole. Infinite horizon models of bargaining with one sided incomplete information. In A. Roth, editor, Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining. University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 1985.

....In practice, agents have private information. In such settings, the alternating o#ers model leads to multiple equilibria, including some where the true types are revealed after long delays, or never. The length of the delay depends on the number of types. See e.g. Fudenberg Tirole, 1983 ] Fudenberg, Levine, Tirole, 1985 ] and [ Rubinstein, 1985 ] Cramton constructs a sequential equilibrium in a bargaining model with twosided uncertainty, where types are revealed after a maximum of two rounds, but where the delay is directly related to the types of the players [ Cramton, 1992 ] However, there is a continuum ....

Fudenberg, D.; Levine, D.; and Tirole, J. 1985. Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information. In Roth, A. E., ed., Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge University Press. 73--98.

....In the former setting, agents know everything about each other s characteristics, as well as their own [3] In the latter setting, agents lack information on some specific parameters about their opponent. For instance there could be uncertainty over their discounting factor [13] reservation price [4], or deadline [14] Given such uncertainty, these models study the impact on the strategic behavior of the agents. Our objective here is not the same. Thus we do not address the issue of uncertainty per se, but rather we analyse the impact on the negotiation outcome of knowing various pieces of ....

....goes to the agent with the longer deadline. Turning now to the incomplete information models: 7, 6] is a study of the strategic behaviour of agents when there is incomplete information about each other s utility functions. 13] models uncertainty over the player s discounting factors. [4] analyses bargaining in which reservation prices are uncertain, 14] considers uncertainty over agent deadlines and [2] addresses uncertainty over both deadlines and reservation prices. These existing models study the strategic behavior of agents by considering a particular scenario in which there ....

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, and J. Tirole. Infinite horizon models of bargaining with one sided incomplete information. In A. Roth, editor, Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining. University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 1985.

....In practice, agents have private information. In such settings, the alternating offers model leads to multiple equilibria, including some where the true types are revealed after long delays, or never. The length of the delay depends on the number of types. See e.g. Fudenberg Tirole 1983) (Fudenberg, Levine, Tirole 1985), and (Rubinstein 1988) The usefulness of the model as a blueprint for designing agents and protocols is questionable when it allows for such qualitatively different outcomes. Still, the tools of game theory and mechanism design can be used to study new types of bargaining models, inspired by ....

Fudenberg, D.; Levine, D.; and Tirole, J. 1985. Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information. In Roth, ed., Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge U. Press. 73--98.

....of two sided uncertainty. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987) restrict the players types and offers to come 1 More recently, several authors have studied related models involving incomplete information. For models with one sided uncertainty and one sided offers, see Ausubel and Deneckere (1989a, b) Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1985), Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) Hart (1988) Sobel and Takahashi (1983) and Vincent (1989) for models with one sided uncertainty and alternating offers, see Admati and Perry (1987) Bikhchandani (1988) Cramton (1991) Cramton and Tracy (1990) Grossman and Perry (1986) Gul and ....

FUDENBERG, D., LEVINE, D. and TIROLE, J. (1985), "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information", in Roth, A. E. (ed.), Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

....In practice, agents have private information. In such settings, the alternating offers model leads to multiple equilibria, including some where the true types are revealed after long delays, or never. The length of the delay depends on the number of types. See e.g. Fudenberg Tirole, 1983] [Fudenberg, Levine, Tirole, 1985], and [Rubinstein, 1988] The usefulness of the model as a blueprint for designing agents and protocols is questionable when it allows for such qualitatively different outcomes. Still, the tools of game theory and mechanism design can be used to study new types of bargaining models, inspired by ....

Fudenberg, D.; Levine, D.; and Tirole, J. 1985. Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information. In Roth, A. E., ed., Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining. Cambridge University Press. 73--98.

No context found.

Fudenberg, D.,D.Levine, and J. Tirole, "Infinite Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," in A. Roth (Ed.), GameTheoretic Models ofBargaining, Cambridge University Press, 1985.

No context found.

D. Fudenberg, D. Levine, J. Tirole, Infinite horizon models of bargaining with one sided incomplete information, in: A. Roth (Ed.), Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining, University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, 1985.

No context found.

Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and J. Tirole (1985), "Infinite-horizon Models of Bargaining with One-sided Incomplete Information," in A. Roth (ed.) Game-theoretic Models of Bargaining, Cambridge University Press.

No context found.

Fudenberg, Drew, David K. Levine and Jean Tirole (1985), "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information", in Roth (ed.), Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, Cambridge University Press. 73-98.

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