Paul Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Advances in Cryptology, pages 104--113, 1996.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....against network servers are practical and therefore security systems should defend against them. 1 Introduction Timing attacks enable an attacker to extract secrets maintained in a security system by observing the time it takes the system to respond to various queries. For example, Kocher [10] designed a timing attack to expose secret keys used for RSA decryption. Until now, these attacks were only applied in the context of hardware security tokens such as smartcards [4, 10, 18] It is generally believed that timing attacks cannot be used to attack general purpose servers, such as web ....

....in a security system by observing the time it takes the system to respond to various queries. For example, Kocher [10] designed a timing attack to expose secret keys used for RSA decryption. Until now, these attacks were only applied in the context of hardware security tokens such as smartcards [4, 10, 18]. It is generally believed that timing attacks cannot be used to attack general purpose servers, such as web servers, since decryption times are masked by many concurrent processes running on the system. It is also believed that common implementations of RSA (using Chinese Remainder and Montgomery ....

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Paul Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Advances in Cryptology, pages 104--113, 1996.

.... by : send( enc( ORDER,ACC) PKMERCHANT ) There are many other simple ways of building covert channels, including power and timing channels, for instance by introducing data dependent delays, either explicitly, or by exploiting timing properties of library functions (cf. Koc96] 2.2 A Declassifier The declassifier example involves three agents, a client (C) a declassifier (D) and the public (P ) The client asks the declassifier, accompanied with a nonce to ensure D : SECRET,NONCE K Message 2 D C : DECL,NONCE K P : SECRET if DECL = Y P : DUMMY ....

P. C. Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In Neal Koblitz, editor, Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO'96, volume 1109 of LNCS, pages 104--113. Springer, 1996.

....of the simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA) techniques. The difference between these two attacks is that DPA is more sophisticated and involves statistical analysis using a larger sample set. There have been prior attempts to address the SPA and DPA attacks [2,3,5,6,7,12]. These counter measures can be classified into three types as performed in [5] First, random timing shifts and noises can be added such that computed means for power consumption do not correspond to the same instruction. However, the difficulty in the protection process is to ensure such random ....

P. Kocher. Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS and other Systems, Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of Crypto'96, LNCS 1109, N.Koblitz, Ed., Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp.104-113.

....can read it, as if public, when leaked though the power based side channel. SPA and DPA are both non invasive attacks in that the processing device need not be altered or damaged in any way during the attack. Other side channel attacks which are progressively more intrusive include timing attacks [21], electro magnetic radiation analysis [13] and glitch and fault analysis based attacks [9] In their review of sidechannel cryptanalysis, Kelsey et al. state: 1 We believe attacks based on cache hit ratio in large S box ciphers like Blowfish, CAST and Khufu are possible. 14, Section 7] We ....

....S boxes as shown in Figure 4. We can see from this that the output of the S box transformation, given the sub set of bits we are interested in, is taken from the output of four different actual S box accesses. Hence we make the following specialisation S 0 (X) 26] SB1(X[41: 36] 02] 7) S 0 (X)[21] = SB2(X[35: 30] 01] S 0 (X) 28] SB0(X[47: 42] 00] 8 which we can insert into our expression thus I 0 = K 0 [05: 02] Phi R 0 [04: 01] 8) I 1 = K 1 [05: 02] Phi L 0 [04: 01] Phi Z Z = SB1( K 0 Phi E 0 (R 0 ) 41: 36] 02] SB0( K 0 Phi E 0 (R 0 ) 47: 42] 00] By rewriting all ....

P.C. Kocher. Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems. In 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO), volume 1109. Springer-Verlag, August 1996.

....can read it, as if public, when leaked though the power based side channel. SPA and DPA are both non invasive attacks in that the processing device need not be altered or damaged in any way during the attack. Other side channel attacks which are progressively more intrusive include timing attacks [12], electro magnetic radiation analysis [7] and glitch and fault analysis based attacks [5] In their review of sidechannel cryptanalysis, Kelsey et al. 8] state: We believe attacks based on cache hit ratio in large S box ciphers like Blowfish, CAST and Khufu are possible. 8, Section 7] 1 We ....

P.C. Kocher. Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems. In 16th Annual International Cryptology Conference (CRYPTO), volume 1109. Springer-Verlag, August 1996.

....observations on a system as it cryptographically processes a piece of data. Power and timing analysis allow secrets such as keys to be obtained from many smartcards by measuring the amount of power 96 used by the card [Kocher99] or the time it takes to perform each of a series of related tasks [Kocher96]. Even the private keys of Web servers running SSL are vulnerable to these timing attacks. These results would be extremely helpful in developing attacks on even highly secure active service nodes that required access to the plaintext of data being processed. This further research will no doubt be ....

Paul C. Kocher. Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems. Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 96, Santa Barbara, August

....to mint untraceable electronic cash. See Brands [15, Section 6.2.2] for a further discussion of the drawbacks of Chaum s wallet with observer techniques. Since in many applications it is completely unacceptable to rely solely on the tamper resistance of consumer devices (see, for instance, Kocher [46], Anderson and Kuhn [1, 2] Boneh, DeMillo, and Lipton [6] Biham and Shamir [4, 5] and Kocher, Jaffe, and Jun [47] we will resort to other 31 techniques to prevent subliminal channels. The improved techniques originate from Brands [10, 11, 13] Secure integration of smartcards Our first ....

Paul C. Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS and other systems. In N. Koblitz, editor, Advances in Cryptology--CRYPTO '96, volume 1109 of Lecture

....things the attacker can do, depending on the timings he gathered. If some routes clearly differ by their latency timings, it is easy to determine which route Alice was using. Statistical methods can be used to remove noise in order to obtain extra precision, similarly to the methods proposed in [19] (in a different context) If the attacker notices spikes on a graph of latency versus time for Alice s route, he can match those with spikes on the graphs of routes whose latency he has been measuring. This attack reveals what seems to be a fallacy in theoretical definitions of security. For ....

KOCHER, P. C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO ' 96 (1996), N. Koblitz, Ed., Lecture Notes in Computer Science, International Association for Cryptologic Research, SpringerVerlag, Berlin Germany, pp. 104--113.

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Paul Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of diffie-hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Advances in Cryptology, pages 104--113, 1996.

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P. C. Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO '96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1109:104--113, 1996.

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P. Kocher. Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems. In http://www.cryptography.com/resources/whitepapers/TimingAttacks.pdf, Dec. 1995. 180

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P. C. Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of diffiehellman, rsa, dss, and other systems. In N. Koblitz, editor, Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO'96, volume 1109 of LNCS, pages 104--113. Springer-Verlag, 1996.

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Kocher, P.C.: Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1109 (1996) 104--113

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P. Kocher. Timings attacks on implementations of Diffie--Hellman, RSA, DSS and other systems. In Advances in Cryptology -- Crypto 1996.

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Paul C. Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1109:104--113, 1996.

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C. Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of DiffieHellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. In CRYPTO '96, volume 1109 of LNCS, pages 104--113, 1996.

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Kocher, P.C.: Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1109 (1996) 104--113

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P. C. Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of DiffieHellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Advances in Cryptology, Crypto '96, LNCS 1109, pages 104 -- 113, 1996.

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Kocher, P.C.: Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1109 (1996) 104--113

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P. C. Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1109:104--113, 1996.

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Kocher, P. C. Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems. In Proceedings of Crypto'96. (1997). 104-113.

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P. Kocher. Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS and other Systems, Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of Crypto'96, LNCS 1109, N.Koblitz, Ed., Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp.104-113.

No context found.

P. C. Kocher. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO '96, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1109:104--113, 1996.

No context found.

Kocher, P.C.: Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and other systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1109 (1996) 104--113

No context found.

P. Kocher, Timing attacks in implementations of DiffieHellman, RSA, DSS and other systems, Advances in Cryptology Crypto'96, Santa Barbara, Lectures Notes in Computer Science , pp. 104-113, Springer-Verlag, 1996.

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