J. Green, E. Kohlberg, and J. J. Laffont. Partial equilibrium approach to the free rider problem. Journal of Public Economics, 6:375--394, 1976.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... In fact, the Clarke mechanism is just one member of the family of Groves mechanisms [40] It has been proven in Economics that any decision mechanism that chooses a state with the same properties as the CTm does, and that also has telling the truth as a dominant strategy, belongs to this family [36]. However, the CTm requires the least amount of tax to be paid, from among the members of this decision mechanism family [54] It guarantees the best minimal utility level for each of the participants, and is the only mechanism within this family that has no free rider problem [63] i.e. an agent ....

J. Green, E. Kohlberg, and J. J. Laffont. Partial equilibrium approach to the free rider problem. Journal of Public Economics, 6:375--394, 1976.

....algorithmic mechanism design approach, which augments a game theoretic perspective with distributed computational concerns. In this paper, we extend the results of [FPS01] by considering a more general computational model and approximate solutions. We also extend a classic impossibility [GKL76, Rob79] result by showing that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approximately ecient and approximately budget balanced. Before providing a detailed technical statement of our results, we introduce distributed algorithmic mechanism design and our model of multicast cost sharing. 1.1 Distributed ....

....could expect a cost sharing mechanism to possess. A cost sharing mechanism is said to be ecient if it maximizes the overall welfare, and it is said to be budget balanced if the revenue raised from the receivers covers the cost of the transmission exactly. It is a classical result in game theory [GKL76, Rob79] that a strategyproof cost sharing mechanism that satis es NPT, VP, and CS cannot be both budget balanced and ecient. Moulin and Shenker [MS01] have shown that there is only one strategyproof, ecient mechanism, called marginal cost (MC) de ned in Section 4 below, that satis es NPT, VP, and CS. ....

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Green, J., Kohlberg, E., and Laont, J. (1976). \Partial equilibrium approach to the free rider problem," Journal of Public Economics 6, pp. 375-394.

....can achieve nonstrategyproof SCFs with direct mechanisms by invoking different solution concepts. For example, one can achieve e# ciency and budget balance using the Bayesian Nash equilibrium solution concept [7, 14] something that is impossible using the dominant strategy solution concept [27, 58]. It is important to note that, although the mechanism is chosen by the system designer, the solution concept is supposed to reflect reality. The solution concept thus depends greatly on the context (e.g. is it a repeated game or a single shot game, do agents collude, do they know about the ....

....receiver set chosen by the mechanism. SH assigns cost shares x i by dividing the cost c(l) of each link l in T (R) equally among all members of i R that are downstream of l. The SH receiver set is the largest R P such that v i x i , for all i R. A classical result in mechanism design [27, 58] shows that no strategyproof mechanism can be both e#cient and budget balanced. The MC mechanism has good network complexity: In [20] a distributed algorithm is given that computes the MC receiver set and cost shares by sending just two modest sized messages over each l L and doing two very ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

J. Green, E. Kohlberg, J. and La#ont, "Partial equilibrium approach to the free rider problem," Journal of Public Economics 6 (1976), pages 375--394.

....one could expect a cost sharing mechanism to possess. A cost sharing mechanism is termed e#cient if it maximizes the overall welfare, and it is said to be budget balanced if the revenue raised from the receivers covers the cost of the transmission exactly. It is a classical result in game theory [GKL76, Rob79] that a strategyproof cost sharing mechanism cannot be both budget balanced and e#cient. Moulin and Shenker [MS97] have shown that there is only one strategyproof mechanism, marginal cost (MC) that satisfies the basic requirements and is e#cient. They have also shown that, while there are many ....

J. Green, E. Kohlberg, and J. J. La#ont. Partial equilibrium approach to the free rider problem. Journal of Public Economics 6, pp. 375--394, 1976.

....raised from the receivers cover the cost of the transmission exactly. E#ciency: NW (R(u) # NW (R) for all R # P . This requires that the receiver set maximize the overall benefit of the network. A set that maximizes NW (R) is called an e#cient set. It is a classical result in game theory [9, 28] that, in this context, these two requirements are mutually exclusive; there are no strategyproof cost sharing mechanisms that are both budget balanced and e#cient. It is easy to see, and is shown in [22] that there is essentially only one strategyproof cost sharing mechanism that both satisfies ....

Green, J., E. Kohlberg, and J. J. La#ont (1976). Partial equilibrium approach to the free rider problem, Journal of Public Economics 6, 375--394.

.... In fact, the Clarke mechanism is just one member of the family of Groves mechanisms [9] It has been proven in Economics that any decision mechanism that chooses a schedule with the same properties as the CTm does, and that also has telling the truth as a dominant strategy, belongs to this family [8]. However, the CTm requires the least amount of tax to be paid, from among the members of this decision mechanism family [12] It guarantees the best minimal utility level for each of the participants, and is the only mechanism within this family that has no free rider problem [15] i.e. a user ....

J. Green, E. Kohlberg, and J. J. Laffont. Partial equilibrium approach to the free rider problem. Journal of Public Economics, 6:375--394, 1976.

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J. Green, E. Kohlberg, and J. J. Laffont. Partial equilibrium approach to the free rider problem. Journal of Public Economics, 6:375--394, 1976.

No context found.

Green, J., E. Kohlberg, and J. J. La#ont (1976). Partial equilibrium approach to the free rider problem, Journal of Public Economics 6, 375--394.

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J. Green, E. Kohlberg, and J.J. La#ont. Partial equilibrium approach to the free rider problem. Journal of Public Econmics, 6:375--394, 1976.

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J. Green, E. Kohlberg, and J. J. Laffont, Partial equilibrium approach to the free rider problem, Journal of Public Economics 6 (1976), 375--394.

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