| J.H. Lala and R.E. Harper. Architectural principles for safetycritical real-time applications. Proceedings of the IEEE, 82:25-- 40, January 1994. |
.... integrity is maintained as long as both modules do not produce identical erroneous outputs (assuming that the comparator is fault free) In any redundant system, common mode failures (CMFs) result from failures that affect more than one module at the same time, generally due to a single cause [Lala 94] These include operational failures that may be due to external (such as EMI, power supply disturbances and radiation) or internal causes. Common mode failures in redundant VLSI systems are surveyed in [Mitra 00a] Design diversity has been proposed in the past to protect redundant systems ....
Lala, J. H. and R. E. Harper, "Architectural principles for safety-critical real-time applications," Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 25-40, Jan. 1994.
....we plan to use design diversity while incorporating redundancy in the applications running on the multi threaded processor and the designs mapped to the configurable coprocessor. Design diversity has long been used to protect redundant systems against common mode failures [Avizienis 84] Lala 94] Common mode failures result from failures that affect more than one module of a redundant system at the same time, generally due to a common cause. The conventional notion of diversity relies on independent generation of different implementations. For the configurable coprocessor, the ....
Lala, J. H. and R. E. Harper, "Architectural principles for safety-critical real-time applications," Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 25-40, Jan. 1994.
....to produce correct outputs, at least two of the three modules must produce correct outputs. The classical reliability expression for TMR systems is optimistic because it does not consider common mode failures. Lala observed that we must pay attention to the problem of common mode failures (CMFs) Lala 94] CMFs result from failures that affect more than one module of the redundant system at the same time, generally due to a common cause. They can be design faults or operational faults due to external (such as EMI and radiation) or internal causes. For example, a radiation source causing ....
Lala, J. H. and R. E. Harper, "Architectural Principles for Safety-critical Real-time Applications," Proc. of the IEEE, Vol. 82, No. 1, pp. 25-40, Jan. 1994.
....hence, in a duplex system, the probability that both modules fail is very low for realistic failure rates. However, this assumption is not always true. In a duplex system, common mode failures (CMFs) result from failures that affect both modules at the same time, generally due to a common cause [Lala 94] These include operational failures due to external (such as EMI, powersupply disturbances, radiation) or internal causes and design mistakes. CMFs are surveyed in [Mitra 00a] Design diversity was proposed and used in the past to protect redundant systems against common mode failures ....
Lala, J. H. and R. E. Harper, "Architectural principles for safety-critical real-time applications," Proc. of 1EEE, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 25-40, January 1994.
.... as the independent generation of two or more different software or hardware elements to satisfy a given requirement [Avizienis 84] The main objective of design diversity is to protect redundant system from common mode failures, which are failures that affect more than one module at the same time [Lala 94] Design diversity also has been applied to software systems [Lyu 91] N version programming (NVP) Avizienis 77] Chen 78] Avizienis 85] is one example of diversity in software. Design diversity in N version 6 programming targets software design faults. In N version programming, different ....
Lala, J. H. and R. E. Harper, "Architectural principles for safety-critical real-time applications," Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 25-40, Jan. 1994. 36
....as long as both modules do not produce identical erroneous outputs. Module 1 Module 2 Comparator Error Figure 1.1. A Duplex System In a duplex system common mode failures (CMFs) result from failures that affect more than one element at the same time, generally due to a single cause [Lala 94] These include operational failures that may be due to external (such as EMI, power supply disturbances and radiation) or internal causes and design faults. Commonmode failures in redundant VLSI systems are surveyed in [Mitra 00a] Design diversity has been proposed in the past to protect ....
Lala, J. H. and R. E. Harper, "Architectural principles for safety-critical real-time applications," Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 25-40, January, 1994.
....about ten years later: FTPP [5] MAFT [6] and the architectural concepts of the AIRBUS flight control system [7] In 1992 the first paper on SAFEbus [8] the architecture that was later deployed in the Boeing 777 aircraft for flight control, became available. In excellent publications by Lala [9], Avizienis [10] and the books by Rechtin [11] and Laprie [12] the fundamental concepts and architectural principles for the design of dependable systems are clarified at about that time. For example, Lala states that field experience with approximate voting was not at all satisfying. At about ....
J. Lala and R. Harper. Architectural Principles for Safety-Critical RealTime Applications. Proceedings of the IEEE, 82(1):25--40, 1994.
....cause different observers to see different symptoms, if any. Such asymmetrical faults can confuse and even defeat the diagnostic capability of computing systems with standard, active redundancy. Worst case, multiple faulty resources can seemingly collude to escape detection and corrupt the system [Dolev83, Shin87, Barborak93, Lala94]. This may develop into: incrimination of healthy system resources, Chapter 3 Faults, Errors, and Failures 1999 2001 Frank Drenberg 7 . total disagreement between processing nodes (system crash) or . agreement on the wrong conclusion; i.e. a system failure that is not contained and not ....
Lala, J.H., Harper, R.E.: "Architectural principles for safety-critical real-time applications", Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 82, No. 1, January 1994, pp. 25-40
....the analysis of redundant systems. It has been observed in the literature that Common Mode Failures (CMFs) is a significant source of failures in redundant systems. In a redundant system, CMFs result from failures that affect more than one module at the same time, generally due to a common cause [Lala 94] These include operational failures that appear during system operation and may be due to external (such as EMI, power supply disturbances and radiation) or internal causes. Design mistakes also constitute a significant source of CMFs [Avizienis 84] For a redundant system with identical ....
Lala, J. H. and R. E. Harper, "Architectural Principles for Safety-Critical RealTime Applications," Proc. of the IEEE, Vol. 82, No. 1, pp. 25-40, 1994. 56
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J.H. Lala and R.E. Harper. Architectural principles for safetycritical real-time applications. Proceedings of the IEEE, 82:25-- 40, January 1994.
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J. Lala and R. Harper. Architectural principles for safetycritical real-time applications. Proceedings of the IEEE, 82:25--40, 1994.
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Lala, J.H., and Harper, R.E., Architectural principles for safety-critical real-time applications. Proc. of the IEEE, 82:25--40. 1994.
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J. H. Lala and R. E. Harper. "Architectural Principles for Safety-Critical Real-Time Applications", Proceedings of the IEEE, 82(1):25---40, Jan. 1994.
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Lala J. H. and Harper R. E., Architectural Principles for Safety-Critical Real-Time Applications, Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 82, no. 1, Jan. 1994, pp. 25-40
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J.H. Lala and R.E. Harper. Architectural principles for safety-critical real-time applications. Proceedings of the IEEE, 82(1):25--40, Jan 1994.
No context found.
Lala, J. H. and R. E. Harper, "Architectural principles for safety-critical real-time applications," Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 25-40, January 1994.
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Lala, J. H. and R. E. Harper, "Architectural principles for safety-critical realtime applications," Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 25-40, Jan. 1994. 16
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Lala, J. H. and R. E. Harper, "Architectural principles for safety-critical real-time applications," Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 25-40, January, 1994.
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Lala, J. H. and R. E. Harper, "Architectural principles for safety-critical real-time applications," Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 25-40, January, 1994.
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Lala, J. H. and R. E. Harper, "Architectural principles for safety-critical realtime applications," Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 25-40, January, 1994.
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Lala, J. H. and R. E. Harper, "Architectural principles for safety-critical realtime applications," Proc. of the IEEE, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 25-40, January, 1994.
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J.H. Lala and R.E. Harper, "Architectural principles for safety-critical real-time applications," Proc. of IEEE, vol.82, no.1, pp.25-40, Jan. 1994.
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J.H. Lala and R.E. Harper, "Architectural principles for safety-critical real-time applications," Proc. IEEE, vol.82, no.1, pp.25-40, Jan. 1994.
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Lala J H, Harper R E, "Architectural Principles for Safety Critical Real-Time Applications", Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol 82, No 1, January 1994
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J.H. Lala and R.E. Harper, "Architectural Principles for Safety-Critical Real-Time Applications," Proc. IEEE, vol. 82, no. 1, pp. 25-40, Jan. 1994.
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