Mark A. Brown. Action and ability. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 19:95--114, 1990.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... included abilities, but not at the present level of detail [41] Independently, Meyer and associates studied capabilities from a perspective that included other concepts captured as modal operators [38] Some philosophical work on this subject carried out over roughly the same time frame by Brown [6], Belnap Perloff [2] Chellas [8] and Segerberg [31] Although we take the notion of know how seriously, we confess that in developing formal theories of it, we shall not be supporting all of the associated philosophical positions. In particular, the very definition of know how has not much to ....

....that his intention should play some causal role in the performance of that action. Another interesting theory is the STIT approach, due to Belnap Perloff, which states that the actions of an agent are what he has seen to [2] In a similar vein, Brown argues that actions are exercised abilities [6]. Both of the latter approaches are discussed below. Somewhat in sympathy with these approaches, the theories of most interest to computer science simply assume that the basic actions are given in the model. We follow this approach in our treatment below. We assume that basic actions can be ....

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Mark A. Brown. Action and ability. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 19:95--114, 1990.

....a modal reduction principle. 6 Most of the theses in this section have been considered earlier either by Belnap and Perloff or by Chellas [13] and many of the thesis labels are derived from Chellas. 7 Principles analogous to 4 fail, for example, in the accounts of both Chellas [11] and Brown [10]. Chellas s theory is described later in Section 3.2, and Brown s in Section 4.5. 14 B B B B B B B B B B B Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta Theta m ....

Mark Brown. Action and ability. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 19:95--114, 1990.

....can be thought of as being implicit in the nondeterminism of the given agent s actions. Broadly put, there are two main classes of approaches to know how, discussed at length in [27] One class follows traditional philosophical intuitions in separating ability from opportunity, for example, Brown [6] and van der Hoek et al. 29] This class of approaches preserves the natural language meaning of knowing how to do something even if one cannot actually do it. However, this naturalness comes at the price of defining know how based on counterfactual situations. In contrast, the second class is ....

Mark A. Brown. Action and ability. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 19:95--114, 1990.

.... in two ways, as operations on actions ( can do ) or as operations on propositions ( can achieve ) these terms are used, for example, by Davis [20] and Thomas [62] Singh uses a related term, knowhow [61] Within philosophy some recent references include work by Elgesem [24] and by Brown [10, 11]; that work has so far not had an impact on AI. 4.4 Doing, bringing about An essential element of agency, perhaps its defining ingredient, is the causal relation between an agent and occurrences in the world. An agent is said to be the one doing the action, bringing about the fact, or ....

M. Brown. Action and ability. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 19:95--114, 1990.

....,we would find that the combination O1D a p would not obey the rule RM (or its converse RM c ) either, and hence the composite deontic modality O1D a 91 conditional obligation would not be of Type 1. But the closely related cstit a operator devised by Chellas (1964) independently reinvented in Brown 1990, and also discussed in Horty and Belnap 1995, is of Type 1 and can serve nicely as an outcome operator in tandem with the action operator dstit a . 4. Explicit Prohibition and Tacit Permission Another aspect of the logic of action is relevant for deontic logic. A sensitive treatment of the ....

....of our system, but is not needed for our immediate purposes. 7.5. Basic Action Operator bYd a p i (ZAC(a, b)5bA) YcA) cYp] agent a s chosen action entails the truth of p ; i.e. cstit a p. This operator d a is just the cstit a operator mentioned earlier and studied in Chellas 1964, Brown 1990, and Horty and Belnap 1995. I choose the notation used here, rather than the cstit a notation, for compactness of expression, while preserving the sense of connection to the general action operator D a to be defined shortly. 7.6. Defined Temporal and Action Operators We can now define some ....

Brown, M. A. 1990. Action and ability. Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 19, 95--114.

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