M. Hirt, U. Maurer, Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation, PODC 1997, pp. 25-34.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....For active adversaries we also require that the adversaries cannot change the outcome of the computation, ie all the honest members will get the same result. It has been shown that there exist protocols for multiparty computations that tolerate t n 2 passive and t n 3 active adversaries [3, 9, 19]. Distributed Stream Ciphers So far the tools needed to handle the problems, regarding constructing a distributed stream cipher, formulated in section 1.3 have been presented. The example in chapter 4 showed that it is possible to create a small working system when a simple stream cipher is ....

M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation. In Proc. 16th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), 1997. BIBLIOGRAPHY 65

....or updated without any additional communication or computation overhead. Here and in the following, optimal should be interpreted as: optimal under the replication paradigm . The notion of private computation with respect to general adversary structures was first introduced and studied in [14]. Exceptions are resources used for private modular addition (relative to any adversary structure) or (t; n) threshold secret sharing of zero when either t or n Gammat are constant. We finally note that while the main setting we consider when describing applications involves a trusted dealer, ....

M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation (extended abstract). In Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 25--34, 1997.

....Our work can be seen as generalizing this work that has been done for quorum systems in that we give replication requirements for dependent failures for another set of problems, namely Consensus. Hirt and Maurer generalize the # of # assumption in the context of secure multi party computation [7]. With collusion and adversary structures, they characterize subsets of players that may collaborate to either disrupt the execution of an algorithm or obtain private data of other players. Because our focus is not on malicious behavior, the abstractions we propose are defined differently and ....

M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete Characterization of Adversaries Tolerable in Secure Multi-Party Computation. In ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 25--34, Santa Barbara, California, 1997.

.... e#ort has been put into enhancing these results, and nowadays there is a wide range of literature treating issues like improving the communication complexity (e.g. 24, 25, 28] or the round complexity (e.g. 1, 5, 3, 30] and coping with more powerful (e.g. 37, 10, 9] or more general (e.g. [27, 20, 14]) adversaries. A common restriction on all these results is that the function f is always assumed to be represented by an arithmetic circuit over a finite field, and hence all computations take place in this field. Thus, it is natural to ask whether MPC can also be e#ciently implemented over a ....

....of A is multiplicative. As in the case of span programs over fields (see [14] for every adversary structure there exists a (strongly) multiplicative span program over # for if and only if is Q (Q ) meaning that no two (three) sets of cover the whole player set [27]. Furthermore, there exists an e#cient procedure to transform any span program over # for a Q into a multiplicative span program # (over #) for the same adversary structure A, such that the size of # is at most twice the size of M. Similarly to the field case, the ....

M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation (extended abstract). In Proc. of 16th PODC, 1997, pp. 25-34.

....paper we use our process calculus framework to characterize security requirements for several kinds of cryptographic protocols. The security requirements are expressed in the form that a real protocol emulates an ideal protocol. We focus on oblivious transfer (OT) 24] secure function evaluation [1, 10, 14], zero knowledge proofs [12] and secure channel implementations [7] The OT protocol is a particular case of secure function evaluation, which we present in some detail. We also derive a compositionality property from inherent structural properties of our process calculus. Basically, ....

M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation. Journal of Cryptology, 13(1):31-69, 2000.

....SECURE COMPUTATION IN A PROBABILISTIC POLYNOMIAL TIME PROCESS CALCULUS 1 Introduction Throughout the last years, designing secure protocols has been one of the most prolific areas in cryptography. The branch which deals with secure computation has not been an exception [AF90, Bea91, GM95, HM00] The overall goal of this cryptographic task is to evaluate publicly a function f , guaranteeing in the presence of adversary behavior of some part of the system, the secrecy of the arguments of f , which are hold by the participants. The fact that adversaries are part of the protocol ....

M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multiparty computation. Journal of Cryptology, 13(1):31--69,

....is also available. In that case active and passive cheaters can be tolerated if and only if , # . However, to attain these bounds an exponentially small probability of error was introduced. The result of [RBO] was first extended to more general adversary structures by Hirt and Maurer in [HM97] However, maintaining an exponentially small probability of error entailed a superpolynomial loss of efficiency. We present a more efficient version of their protocol using monotone span programs, following the ideas of [CDM98] The relevant definitions as well as a precise statement of our ....

....tolerate without losing security: as long as the set of cheating players is in 0 , the cheaters cannot breach the security of the protocol. Classically, protocols such as those of [RBO] have tolerated threshold structures, which are of the form 0 9 1 7 BA C 1 C DE GF for some . However, HM97] extends several of these results to more general structures, using the following definition: Definition 1 An adversary structure 0 over is said to be HJI if no K sets in 0 add up to the whole set , that is L M 1 ) 1ON 1QP63 04A 1 SR 1ON RUT T T R 1OP 9V Hirt ....

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M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in general multiparty computations. In Proc. ACM PODC'97, pages 25--34, 1997.

....cannot stop the computation. We refer to [Can97,Can98] for a precise definition of security in multi party computation. The types of tolerable adversaries have recently been generalized in a number of directions (adaptive adversaries [CFGN96] uncoercibility [CG96] non threshold adversaries [HM97]) and some authors have investigated multi party computation for various minimality and complexity criteria [FKN94,CGT95,FY92,Kus89] Security can also be classified according to the adversary s computational resources (limited, hence cryptographic security, e.g. CDG87,GMW87] or unlimited, ....

M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation. In Proc. 16th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), pages 25--34, Aug. 1997. 16

....and observe that already an arbitrarily small linear gap between t and n=2 allows to reduce the communication complexity of the reconstruction by a factor of n. Using methods from [5] we also show how to generalize our schemes to provide security against any (non threshold) Q 2 adversary (see [9]) improving known results by a factor of at least n. Finally, we look at the case where the reconstruction is allowed to use more than one round of interaction and observe, using results from [7] that the amount of information sent by the honest dealer can be brought down to n(n k) bits, at the ....

M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation (extended abstract). In 16th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 25--34, 1997.

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Martin Hirt and Ueli Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation. In Proc. 16th PODC, pp. 25{ 34. ACM 1997. Full version in Journal of Cryptology, 13(1):31-60, 2000.

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M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation. Proc. 16th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), pp. 25--34, Aug. 1997.

....pair A 1 ; A 2 2 A the set Q = P n (A 1 [ A 2 ) is in Gamma , which is equivalent to P 62 Gamma t A t A. Note that in the literature A typically coincides with Delta and, as already mentioned, Delta with Gamma , in which case P 62 Gamma tAtA coincides with the Q property of [10] which states that no three sets in A cover P , which itself generalizes the classical bound t n=3. However, we consider this more general case because it gives deeper insight but also because it makes perfect sense to separate the privacy from the adversary structure, i.e. to consider curious ....

M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation (extended abstract). In 16th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, 1997. Final version appeared in Journal of Cryptology 2000.

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M. Hirt, U. Maurer, Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation, PODC 1997, pp. 25-34.

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M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation. In ACM PODC, pages 25--34, Santa Barbara, California, 1997.

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M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation. Proc. 16th Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing PODC '97 (1997) 25--34.

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M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multiparty computation (extended abstract). In Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 25--34, Santa Barbara, California, 21--24 Aug. 1997.

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M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multiparty computation (extended abstract). In Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 25--34, Santa Barbara, California, 21--24 Aug. 1997.

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M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation. Proc. 16th Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing PODC '97 (1997) 25--34.

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Martin Hirt and Ueli Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation (extended abstract). In Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 25--34, Santa Barbara, California, 21--24 August 1997.

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M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multiparty computation. Journal of Cryptology, Vol. 13, No. 1, pages 31-60, 2000.

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3 M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete Characterization of Adversaries Tolerable in Secure Multy-Party Computation. In ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 25-34, Santa Barbara, California, 1997.

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Martin Hirt and Ueli Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in general multiparty computations. In Proc. ACM PODC'97, pages 2534, 1997.

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Martin Hirt and Ueli Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation (extended abstract). In 16th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC). ACM Press, 1997. Final version appeared in Journal of Cryptology 2000.

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M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in general multiparty computations. In Proc. ACM PODC'97, pages 25--34, 1997.

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M. Hirt and U. Maurer. Complete characterization of adversaries tolerable in secure multi-party computation (extended abstract). In Proc. of 16th PODC, 1997, pp. 25-34.

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