TMA Lomas, MR Roe "Forging a Clipper Message", in Communications of the ACM v 37 no 12 (Dec 94) p 12  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   ACM   TOC   Related Articles   Check

....in tamperproof hardware, which has the property that device master keys are held in escrow by government bodies and released to law enforcement officers when a warrant for a wiretap has been issued. The protocols which were supposed to achieve this turned out to be flawed in various ways [4] [5] [6] The US government is not alone. A senior official from the Australian attorney general s office expressed the opinion that civilian users of cryptography should either use weak systems or escrow their keys [7] and most recently, the Council of Europe has apparently endorsed a report in ....

Lomas TMA, MR Roe, "Forging a Clipper Message", in Communications of the ACM v 37 no 12 (Dec 94) p 12

....Clipper was a failure. Not only did the chip arouse intense public hostility dooming the AT T secure telephone that was the first product to incorporate it but technical flaws emerged too. The key escrow protocol was broken by Blaze [13] while further attacks were found by Lomas and Roe [24] and by Frankel and Yung [21] At the same time, the tamper protection of the Clipper chip itself was broken by US chip makers and presumably by foreign laboratories too [11] Freedom of Information Act requests by US activists have dug out documents which show that the policy, which was ....

TMA Lomas, MR Roe, "Forging a Clipper Message", in Communications of the ACM v 37 no 12 (Dec 94) p 12

.... problem with Clipper was the discovery by an AT T researcher that the key forfeiture mechanism built into Clipper devices could be bypassed without too much difficulty [Blaze 1994] Markoff 1994a] Quittner 1994] Clipper messages can also be forged without a need to know the encryption key [Lomas 1994]. A final nail in the coffin was the release to the Electronic Privacy Information Centre in August 1995 of declassified FBI files which revealed plans to outlaw any encryption other than Clipper [FBI 1993] FBI Undated a] FBI Undated b] Although heavily censored, these documents still contain ....

Lomas, T., and Roe, M. "Forging a Clipper Message", Communications of the ACM Vol.37, No.12 (December 1994), p.12.

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TMA Lomas, MR Roe "Forging a Clipper Message", in Communications of the ACM v 37 no 12 (Dec 94) p 12

....a good description of the internals of an EES device in the unclassified literature. Attempts to reverse engineer these devices have led to a better description of their internal workings than has previously been available. This in turn led to some new observations on the security of the scheme [13]. 7.1 Forgery The telephone oriented EES devices only support Output Feedback Mode. This mode does not provide integrity or authentication, although someone who had not examined the scheme in detail might be fooled into thinking that it does. The fact that OFB mode is unsuitable for integrity or ....

M. Roe and M. Lomas. Forging a clipper message. Communications of the ACM, 37(12):12, December 1994.

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TMA Lomas, MR Roe, "Forging a Clipper Message", in Communications of the ACM v 37 no 12 (Dec 94) p 12

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TMA Lomas, MR Roe, "Forging a Clipper Message", in Communications of the ACM v 37 no 12 (Dec 94) p 12

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