F. Dignum and R. Conte. Intentional agents and goal formation. In Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages, pages 231--243, 1997.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....between our framework and languages such as the branching time temporal logic based languages advocated by Rao and Georgeff[76] In Section 6. 3, we provide a detailed comparison between our framework and the deontic logic based framework for agent based programming proposed by Meyer s group [48, 28, 98], and compare it in Section 6.4 to approaches in the area of deontic logic programming [83, 99, 68] Finally, in Section 6.5, we provide a comparison with other proposals for agent programming and outline directions for future work. 6.1 Shoham s AGENT 0 Shoham [91] was perhaps the first to ....

F. Dignum and R. Conte. Intentional Agents and Goal Formation. In Wooldridge and Jennings [107], pages 219--231.

....coping with joint intentions and goals, but also fault tolerant behaviour in the sense that if one agent fails to accomplish a task for some reason, another can take over or can at least take some compensatory action. Although already interesting work has been done on these issues (cf. e.g. [4, 7] 13 ) I believe that there is still a lot to be done here. Obviously a comprehensive and adequate treatment of these matters needs elements from game and decision theory (or theory of economics more in general) as well as the theory of distributed computing. On the other hand, since it is ....

F. Dignum & R. Conte, Intentional Agents and Goal Formation, in: Intelligent Agents IV (M.P. Singh, A. Rao & M.J. Wooldridge, eds.), Springer, Berlin, 1998, pp. 231--243.

....One is the relationship with group and individual rationality. The connection between rationality and social concepts remains especially under studied, although some conceptual and theoretical advances have been made [3, 5] A related issue is about how agents may form goals of mutual interest [7], or how the members of a team may collectively reason about their intentions. Some nice theories of argumentation and negotiation are being developed, e.g. 16] A closer investigation of these forms of negotiation and the creation and maintenance of teams and team intentions remains to be made. ....

Frank Dignum and Rosaria Conte, `Intentional agents and goal formation ', in Intelligent Agents IV: Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages (ATAL-97), pp. 231--244. Springer-Verlag, (1998).

....between our framework and languages such as the branching time temporal logic based languages advocated by Rao and Georgeff[76] In Section 6. 3, we provide a detailed comparison between our framework and the deontic logic based framework for agent based programming proposed by Meyer s group [48, 28, 98], and compare it in Section 6.4 to approaches in the area of deontic logic programming [83, 99, 68] Finally, in Section 6.5, we provide a comparison with other proposals for agent programming and outline directions for future work. 6.1 Shoham s AGENT 0 Shoham [91] was perhaps the first to ....

F. Dignum and R. Conte. Intentional Agents and Goal Formation. In Wooldridge and Jennings [107], pages 219--231.

....system. 11 Related Work During the last few years, there has been an explosion in the area of agent based research. Of this plethora of research, the work reported in this paper is perhaps closest to that of the group in CWI, Amsterdam, working on deontic logics for agent based programming [55, 31, 56] Below, we review the work on agents in a variety of arenas. 92 IFIG RR 9802 (a) Flight from San Francisco to Dallas (b) Truck route from Palo Alto to San Francisco (c) Truck route from Dallas to Forth Worth Figure 6: Maps Produced by Shipping Agent in Supply Chain Example IFIG RR 9802 93 ....

....obligations when the cannot be satisfied) can be incorporated. Precisely how various other deontic assumptions can be captured within our semantics remains to be worked out. The approach of Hindriks et al. 55] is based on such logics and has already been discussed earlier. Dignum and Conte [31] have used deontic logic extensively to develop methods for goal formation in our framework, goal formation is one of several actions that an agent can take. Thus, we can specifically gain from the work of Dignum and Conte [31] through explicitly plugging in such a framework as an action ....

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F. Dignum and R. Conte. Intentional Agents and Goal Formation, In: Proc. 1997 Intl. Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages, Providence, RI, pp 219--231, 1997.

....One is the relationship with group and individual rationality. The connection between rationality and social concepts remains especially under studied, although some conceptual and theoretical advances have been made [3, 5] A related issue is about how agents may form goals of mutual interest [7], or how the members of a team may collectively reason about their intentions. Some nice theories of argumentation and negotiation are being developed, e.g. 17] A closer investigation of these forms of negotiation and the creation and maintenance of teams and team intentions remains to be made. ....

Frank Dignum and Rosaria Conte. Intentional agents and goal formation. In Intelligent Agents IV: Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages, 1998.

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F. Dignum and R. Conte. Intentional agents and goal formation. In Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages, pages 231--243, 1997.

No context found.

F. Dignum and R. Conte. Intentional agents and goal formation. In: M. Singh et. al.(eds.), Intelligent Agents IV (LNAI 1365), Springer Verlag, 1998, pp. 231-244.

No context found.

F. Dignum and R. Conte. Intentional agents and goal formation. In: M. Singh et. al.(eds.), Intelligent Agents IV (LNAI 1365), Springer Verlag, 1998, pp. 231--244.

....also with respect to doing this as a team with the other agents (INT(i; M INTG ( To this end, the initiator exploits the theory of intention formation. Intentions are formed on the basis of beliefs and previously formed intentions of a higher abstraction level by a number of formal rules (see [4]) For example, the builtin intention can be to obey the law, or avoid punishment. The (instrumental) belief is that driving slower than the speed limit is instrumental for obeying the law, and is its preferred way to do so. Together with the rule the new intention of driving slower than the speed ....

F. Dignum and R. Conte. Intentional agents and goal formation. In: M. Singh et. al.(eds.), Intelligent Agents IV (LNAI 1365), Springer Verlag, 1998, pp. 231--244.

....will be violated for one reason or another. In section 4, we will sketch a first (primitive) attempt to describe some rules on the basis of which agents might decide not to fulfill an obligation. A first step towards a more general framework to describe this decision process is given in [5]. The use of deontic logic gives the opportunity to specify explicitly what should happen in these cases of violation of the obligations. We illustrate this with a small part of a contract between an airline and a passenger. After a flight reservation an obligation exists for the airline to ....

....and preferences of the agent might look as follows: 8i; jPref i (OEjO ij (OE) i.e. in situations where an agent i has an obligation O ij (OE) it prefers OE to be true. In general one might wish more elaborate rules to generate the preferences from obligations. Some of these are explored in [5]. Of course this does not mean that the agent will not violate this obligation. e.g. if an agent is obliged to pay for a flight that it reserved, it will prefer a situation where the flight is payed. However, it might be that the agent does not have enough money yet and does not pay anyway. ....

F. Dignum and R. Conte. Intentional agents and goal formation. In M. Singh et.al., editor, ATAL-97, Providence, USA, pages 219-231, 1997.

....also with respect to doing this as a team with the other agents (INT(i; M INTG ( To this end, the initiator exploits the theory of intention formation. Intentions are formed on the basis of beliefs and previously formed intentions of a higher abstraction level by a number of formal rules (see [4]) For example, the builtin intention can be to obey the law, or avoid punishment. The (instrumental) belief is that driving slower than the speed limit is instrumental for obeying the law, and is its preferred way to do so. Together with the rule the new intention of driving slower than the speed ....

F. Dignum and R. Conte. Intentional agents and goal formation. In: M. Singh et. al.(eds.), Intelligent Agents IV (LNAI 1365), Springer Verlag, 1998, pp. 231--244.

.... for goals and a KDn system for intentions) Also we assume that for each intention there is a goal that generated it and thus we have: INT(x; GOAL(x; Intentions are formed on the basis of beliefs and previously formed goals of a higher abstraction level by a number of formal rules (see [2]) e.g. the built in goal can be to obey the law, or avoid the punishment. The (instrumental) belief is that driving slower than the speed limit is instrumental for obeying the law. Together with the rule the new goal of driving slower than the speed limit is derived. The general intention ....

F. Dignum and R. Conte. Intentional agents and goal formation. In M. Singh et.al., editor, Intelligent Agents IV (LNAI 1365), Springer Verlag, 1998, pp. 231-244.

....such that the agents either have a collective belief and or intention or they know that they di er in opinion. 8 4.2. 3 Goal formation through speech acts Intentions are formed on the basis of beliefs and previously formed goals of a higher abstraction level by a number of formal rules (see [2]) e.g. the built in goal can be to obey the law, or avoid the punishment. The (instrumental) belief is that driving slower than the speed limit is instrumental for obeying the law. Together with the rule the new goal of driving slower than the speed limit is derived. The general intention ....

F. Dignum and R. Conte. Intentional agents and goal formation. In M. Singh et.al., editor, Intelligent Agents IV (LNAI 1365), pages 231-244, Springer Verlag, 1998.

....also with respect to doing this as a team with the other agents (###### # #######) To this end, the initiator exploits the theory of intention formation. Intentions are formed on the basis of beliefs and previously formed intentions of a higher abstraction level by a number of formal rules (see [3]) For example, the built in intention can be to obey the law, or avoid punishment. The (instrumental) belief is that driving slower than the speed limit is instrumental for obeying the law, and is its preferred way to do so. Together with the rule the new intention of driving slower than the ....

F. Dignum and R. Conte. Intentional agents and goal formation. In: M. Singh et. al.(eds.), Intelligent Agents IV (LNAI 1365), Springer Verlag, 1998, pp. 231--244.

No context found.

F. Dignum and R. Conte, Intentional agents and goal formation, in: ATAL, 1999.

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