| Secure Electronic Payment Protocol, Draft Version 1.2. November 3, 1995. http://www.mastercard.com/Sepp/sepptoc.htm. |
....algorithms. Quite a number of cryptographic protocols for securing on line bankcard payment transactions on the Internet have been proposed. Published proposals include CyberCash [1] NetBill [10] NetCheque [8] NetChex [4] Open Market [5] iKP [6] Millicent [7] STT [3] and SEPP [2]. Each of these proposals has its own virtues and all contribute to a better understanding of the area of study. Among these proposals, STT and SEPP are two specifications published by two of today s largest operators of bankcard payment instruments: VISA and MasterCard, respectively. Apparent ....
.... Order and PI , the seller will find that Order is in good order but does not know that PI is a piece of replayed data and will forward it to the acquirer. It is not very difficult to achieve this in SEPP by sending Initiate which is in cleartext and free for the attacker to manufacture [2] and then feeding the seller with recorded PI . It is even easier to achieve this in STT because there is not an Initiate message sending from the buyer to the seller [3] and the seller should not perform replay detection on Order since a legitimate user should be allowed to replay that ....
Secure Electronic Payment Protocol, Draft Version 1.2. November 3, 1995. http://www.mastercard.com/Sepp/sepptoc.htm.
....cryptographic algorithms. Quite a number of cryptographic protocols for securing on line bankcard payment transactions on the Internet have been proposed. Published proposals include CyberCash [1] NetBill [10] NetCheque [8] NetChex [4] Open Market [5] iKP [6] Millicent [7] STT [3] and SEPP [2]. Each of these proposals has its own virtues and all contribute to a better understanding of the area of study. Among these proposals, STT and SEPP are two specifications published by two of today s largest operators of bankcard payment instruments: VISA and MasterCard, respectively. Apparent ....
.... Order and PI , the seller will find that Order is in good order but does not know that PI is a piece of replayed data and will forward it to the acquirer. It is not very difficult to achieve this in SEPP by sending Initiate which is in cleartext and free for the attacker to manufacture [2] and then feeding the seller with recorded PI . It is even easier to achieve this in STT because there is not an Initiate message sending from the buyer to the seller [3] and the seller should not perform replay detection on Order since a legitimate user should be allowed to replay that ....
Secure Electronic Payment Protocol, Draft Version 1.2. November 3, 1995. http://www.mastercard.com/Sepp/sepptoc.htm.
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