R. Wilson. Incentive efficiency of double auctions. Econometrica, 53(5):1101-- 1115, September 1985. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Market Mechanisms for Network Resource Sharing - Semret (1999) (3 citations) (Correct)
....arose directly from experimentation with this platform, which also allows us to explore issues of beyond the scope of the analysis. 12 1.2. Contributions The Progressive Second Price auction mechanism is a new invention. While the theory of auctions for indivisible objects is well developed (see [93, 69, 100, 67] for a representative sample of the fundamental work) this appears to be the first auction for arbitrary size shares of an infinitely divisible resource. The design of an incentive compatible mechanism with a small (under dimensioned) message space, and an infinite dimensional user type space, is ....
R. Wilson. Incentive efficiency of double auctions. Econometrica, 53(5):1101-- 1115, September 1985.
A Model and Architecture for Conducting Hierarchically .. - Ezhilchelvan.. (2000) (Correct)
....to extend an implementation of this model for the general double auction model involving multiple bidders and multiple sellers. Though double auctions on Internet are not yet popular, they are known to be efficient in terms of incentives they offer to participants. The analysis of Wilson [8] indicates that a double auction is efficient in the sense that with a sufficiently large number of sellers and bidders (possible in the Internet set up) there is no other trade rule for which it is common knowledge that all participants are better off in expectation. 3. Protocol In this ....
R Wilson, `Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions', Econometrica, Vol. 53, 1985, pp. 1101-15.
\\server\name PSCRIPT Page Separator - Date Time Pm (Correct)
....to extend an implementation of this model for the general double auction model involving multiple bidders and multiple sellers. Though double auctions on Internet are not yet popular, they are known to be efficient in terms of incentives they offer to participants. The analysis of Wilson [11] indicates that a double auction is efficient in the sense that with a sufficiently large number of sellers and bidders (possible in the Internet set up) there is no other trade rule for which it is common knowledge that all participants are better off in expectation. 2.2. System architecture ....
R Wilson, `Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions', Econometrica, Vol. 53, 1985, pp. 1101-15.
Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently - Cramton, GIBBONS, KLEMPERER (1987) (1 citation) (Correct)
....the effect of the incomplete information to zero. An interesting special case is R(2 m) For m = 1, Myerson and Satterthwaite s result (and our Proposition 2 above) proves that the partnership cannot be dissolved efficiently. For larger values of m, R is much like the double auction studied by Wilson (1985) and Gresik and Satterthwaite (1985) although there each bidder wants only one unit of the good, whereas here each bidder may demand up to m units of the good. Think of each l m share of the partnership as one unit of the good. When each bidder wants one unit, Gresik and Satterthwaite show that ....
WILSON, ROBERT (1985): "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions," Econometrica, 53, 1101-1116.
A Resource Allocation Game with Application to Wireless Spectrum - Lazar, Semret (1996) (1 citation) (Correct)
....is, there is no other auction rule which achieves a higher W . 3 Another way of saying this is: An incentive efficient rule is] one for which it is false that it is common knowledge that another rule would improve some agents expected gains from trade without reducing others expected gains. [Wil85] For example, if a portion of the resource is left unallocated, and there is an unsatisfied demand for it from player j, the rule is inefficient because one could get a higher W by changing the rule so that the left overs are given to player j. In our game, since users are greedy in the sense that ....
Robert Wilson, "Incentive efficiency of double auctions," Econometrica, vol. 53, pp. 1101--1115, September 1985.
A Resource Allocation Game with Application to Wireless.. - Nemo Semret (1996) (1 citation) (Correct)
....by lying . This is a very strong requirement, and the result heavily depends on it. 2 By equivalent, it is meant that, at some equilibrium, all players get the same utility. There may be other, possibly ill behaved, equilibria. requirement (7) Efficiency is defined following the notion of [Wil85]. We will call our game incentive efficient if the rules and a resulting Nash equilibrium, s , are such that for some set of welfare weights (ff i ; ff I ) not all zero, the welfare measure W = I X i=1 ff i U i (s i ; s Gammai ) 8) is maximized. That is, there is no other ....
....That is, there is no other auction rule which achieves a higher W . Another way of saying this is: An incentive efficient rule is] one for which it is false that it is common knowledge that another rule would improve some agents expected gains from trade without reducing others expected gains. [Wil85] For example, if a portion of the resource is left unallocated, and there is an unsatisfied demand for it from player j, the rule is inefficient because one could get a higher W by changing the rule so that the left overs are given to player j. In our game, since users are greedy in the sense ....
Robert Wilson, "Incentive efficiency of double auctions," Econometrica, vol. 53, pp. 1101--1115, September 1985.
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