Maskin, E. (1985). The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium, in "Social Goals and Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner," pp. 173--204, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....Nash equilibria (or other notions of noncooperative behavior) rather than strategyproofness: That is, they assume that simultaneous selfish play leads to a self consistent equilibrium, called a Nash equilibrium, in which no agent can improve her lot by deviating. The Nash implementation approach [3, 19] involves designing resource allocation mechanisms with Nash equilibria that yield the socially desirable outcome (such as an e#cient and or budget balanced and or fair allocation) In contrast, strategyproofness ensures that no matter how other agents behave whether selfish, spiteful, or ....

Maskin, E. (1985). The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium, in "Social Goals and Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner," pp. 173--204, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK.

....to that of Maskin monotonicity (MM) since all Nash implementable S are Maskin monotonic. Definition 2 We say that S is Maskin monotonic (MM) if S( V ) S( U) whenever U i (x) U i (S i ( U ) V i (x) V i (S i ( U) for all allocations x and all i. The following result is from Maskin (1985). Lemma 1 [Maskin] If S is Nash implementable, then S is Maskin monotonic. As opposed to strategy proofness, the paradigm of Nash implementability does preclude the existence of other Nash outcomes. However, a strategy proof mechanism is truly decentralizable, in that each agent can choose to ....

....we investigate the implications of monotonic closure of the domain, and of continuity of the social choice function. 3 Monotonic Closure We now consider the property of monotonic closure (MC) a concept originally called rich domain in Dasgupta Hammond Maskin (1979) and then rechristened in Maskin (1985). Definition 4 [Maskin] A domain of utility functions U is monotonically closed (MC) if, for all pairs U; V 2 U , and all pairs x; y 2 B such that (1) U(x) U(y) V (x) V (y) and (2) U(x) U(y) V (x) V (y) there exists some W 2 U such that for all allocations z 2 B, 3) U(x) U(z) W ....

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E. Maskin (1985): "Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," in Social Goals and Social Organization, ed. by L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonnenschein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 173-204.

....2 U n there exists some j such that U j 6= V j and U j (S j ( V ) U j (S j ( U ) 3. S is coalitionally nonbossy (CNB) for any pair U ; V 2 U n , S( U) S( V ) whenever S i ( U) S i ( V ) for each i such that U i 6= V i . 4. S is Maskin monotonic (see Maskin (1985)) S( V ) S( U) whenever U i (x) U i (S i ( U) V i (x) V i (S i ( U) for all allocations x and all i. 5. The allocations are envy free but not mutually indifferent: for all i; j and all U 2 U n with S i ( U) 6= S j ( U ) U i (S i ( U ) U i (S j ( U) ....

E. Maskin (1985): "Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium," in Social Goals and Social Organization, ed. by L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonnenschein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 173-204.

....(efficient, fair, etc. but also how one can achieve these goals given that users are selfish. This notion of designing service disciplines and other more general mechanisms which give socially desirable Nash equilibria is borrowed directly from the economics and game theory literatures (see [19] for an overview) Ferguson et al. 7] developed network resource allocation mechanisms whose Nash equilibria are always Pareto efficient. In addition, Ferguson et al. address the iterative nature of the Nash equilibration process and presents simulation results on stability. However, their ....

E. Maskin, "The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium", in Social Goals and Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner, Hurwicz, Schmeidler, and Sonnenschein eds., Cambridge University Press, 1985.

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Maskin, E. (1985). The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium, in "Social Goals and Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner," pp. 173--204, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK.

No context found.

E. Maskin, The theory of implementation in Nash equilibrium, in "Social Goals and Organization: Essays in Memory of Elisha Pazner," pp. 173--204, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1985.

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