Searle, J.: Collective intentions and actions. In Intentions in Communication, eds. P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan and M. E. Pollack (1990) 401--416  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....some senses of group intentions that are needed for different DAI applications. In x6, I describe some of the logical consequences of the theory presented here. 2 Groups Traditional theories of multiagent intentions and action tend to ignore the structure of the group of agents being considered [6, 10, 13, 22], and assume that all agents are equally capable (in terms of the basic actions they can do they are usually allowed differing knowledge of facts and differences in capabilities that occur solely as a consequence of differences in knowledge of facts) Traditional theories also require the ....

John R. Searle. Collective intentions and actions. In P. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. Pollack, editors, SDF Benchmark Series: Intentions in Communication. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. 25

.... to change of a cognition is a function of the number and the importance of the elements with which it is coherent, also depending on 5With the individual qualifter in both, we mean that we do not re fer to notions of we intention or collective intentions such as those developed by Searle [26] or Tuomela [31] Here, intentions are classical private intentions. 6Although, we give a first account here, much more work should be done on this point. Intention to , i Action commitments from X to Y i [ Offer i Acti . itments from YtoX . i Request Intention that = i i ....

J.R. Searle. Collective intentions and actions. In P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. E. Pollack, editors, Intentions in Communication, pages 401-416. The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1990.

....system, which integrates a model of joint activity with an agent interaction model. Finally, we discuss some shortcomings in this area. Joint Activity Joint activity describes collaboration and action among agents. While much work has been done on formalizing joint activity and intention ([Searle, 1990; Levesque et al. 1990; Grosz and Kraus, 1996; Grosz and Kraus, 1999] the focus of this work has mostly been on formalization (an area in which our model is currently weak) and not on collaboration. We describe here several models of collaboration between agents: first, the SharedPlan theory ....

....problem solving state. Doing so involves action from all of the At the current time, it does not seem to matter to our model whether elements in a collaborative problem state are decomposable into individual problem solving state elements ( Grosz and Kraus, 1996] or if they are not ([Searle, 1990]) 20 agents involved. This means, in other words, that actions at the CPS level are not executable by a single agent. How is an agent to a#ect the CPS state then It must do so through interaction with the other collaborating agents. The interaction level contains individual actions which are ....

John R. Searle, "Collective Intentions and Actions," In P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. Pollack, editors, Intentions in Communication, pages 401--415. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.

....between plans, negotiation between agents in the case of conflictual situations. These aspects have already been studied in numerous papers. In coordination, the use of communication is a part of planning and action. It concerns the development of MAS where speech acts are often involved [15, 16, 3, 4, 9]. The second aspect comes from the study of interactions which have been of continuing interest in multi agent planning [5, 8, 17, 11, 14, 7] This mainly focuses on how planning agents can positively cooperate in distributed environments. The last aspect has been studied in [17, 6, 2] The main ....

J.R. Searle. Collective intentions and actions. In: PR Cohen, J. Morgan and ME Pollac (eds.), Intentions in Communication, pp 401-416. MIT Press, 1990.

....by the plan will occur, and agree that this outcome is favorable. These attitudes are described more precisely in [Cohen and Levesque, 1991, Grosz and Kraus, 1996] On this understanding, a joint intention simply reflects the coordination of agents individual commitments and deliberation (contra [Searle, 1990]) The actions that agents may have to take to carry out a joint project are significantly more involved than a single agent s commitment with an individual intention, however. These additions serve to ensure that agents achieve the most successful possible conclusion, in a coordinated way, even ....

Searle, J. R. (1990). Collective intentions and actions. In Cohen, P. R., Morgan, J., and Pollack, M. E., editors, Intentions in Communication, pages 401--416. MIT.

....Collaboration Theories of mental state for individual agents must be extended in importantways in order to model collaborations between agents. The problem is that a group s plan to collaborate on some task is not simply the sum of the agents individual plans (Grosz and Kraus 1996, Bratman 1992, Searle 1990). In particular, some notion of an individual s commitment to (parts of) the group activitymust be captured. One way of accomplishing this is byintroducing the idea of a jointintention (Levesque et al. 1990, Sonenberg et al. 1992) whichismeant to represent the group s commitmenttowards some group ....

J. Searle. Collective Intentions and Actions,pages 401-- 415. MIT Press, 1990.

....it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between actions that are coordinated, but which one would not be inclined to call cooperative, and actions that are truly cooperative, in that the participating agents have a collective goal. To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario [25]. A group of people are sitting in a park. As a result of a sudden downpour all of them run to a tree in the middle of the park because it is the only available source of shelter. This is not cooperative action. Each person has the intention of stopping themselves from becoming wet, and even if ....

J. R. Searle. Collective intentions and actions. In P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. E. Pollack, editors, Intentions in Communication, pages 401--416. The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1990. 33

....it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between actions that are coordinated, but which one would not be inclined to call cooperative, and actions that are truly cooperative, in that the participating agents have a collective goal. To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario [25]. A group of people are sitting in a park. As a result of a sudden downpour all of them run to a tree in the middle of the park because it is the only available source of shelter. This is not cooperative action. Each person has the intention of stopping themselves from becoming wet, and even if ....

J. R. Searle. Collective intentions and actions. In Intentions in Communication, P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. E. Pollack, eds. pp. 401--416. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.

....were available in the literature, although no one model was sufficient to be used directly in this work. Jennings presents a detailed review and comparison of the prominent models [39] and notes that the following points were made about cooperative problem solving: agents must have a joint goal [18, 51, 52, 61, 65, 74] 13 . agents must agree they wish to cooperate to achieve their joint goal [18, 51, 65, 74] agents must agree a common recipe for attaining their joint goal [52] actions performed by different agents, in the context of the joint action, are interdependent [52, 61] agents must have ....

....Jennings presents a detailed review and comparison of the prominent models [39] and notes that the following points were made about cooperative problem solving: agents must have a joint goal [18, 51, 52, 61, 65, 74] 13 . agents must agree they wish to cooperate to achieve their joint goal [18, 51, 65, 74] . agents must agree a common recipe for attaining their joint goal [52] actions performed by different agents, in the context of the joint action, are interdependent [52, 61] agents must have conventions for monitoring the viability of their commitments [51] Almost all of the ....

J. Searle, Collective Intentions and Actions, in: P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan and M. E. Pollack, eds., Intentions in Communication (MIT Press, 1990) 401-416.

....beliefs) about what the current plan is composed of, and a belief that the current plan is coherent. 9 For expository reasons, we refer to the plan that is the parameter of an mgoal as a mutual plan. 8 We are purposely avoiding the issue of whether the participants have a mutual intention. See (Searle, 1990) for a discussion of this issue. 9 Our set of beliefs about the current plan is similar to Pollack s EPLAN (1990, p.93) However, since the actions have already been performed, we do not have to consider if the actions of the plan 57 Now that we have proposed that the collaboration results from ....

Searle, J. R. (1990). Collective intentions and actions. In Cohen, P. R., Morgan, J., and Pollack, M. E., editors, Intentions in Communication, SDF Benchmark Series, pages 401--415. MIT Press.

....it is sometimes di cult to distinguish between actions that are coordinated, but which one would not be inclined to call cooperative, and actions that are truly cooperative, in that the participating agents have a collective goal. To illustrate this point, consider the following scenario [25]. A group of people are sitting in a park. As a result of a sudden downpour all of them run to a tree in the middle of the park because it is the only available source of shelter. This is not cooperative action. Each person has the intention of stopping themselves from becoming wet, and even if ....

J. R. Searle. Collective intentions and actions. In P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. E. Pollack, editors, Intentions in Communication, pages 401-416. The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1990.

....of a group of agents that accounts for its internal structure. Since even individual agents can be treated as groups of subagents [8] this theory also applies in areas such as real time AI systems and robotics. It also helps clarify the question of the joint intentions of a group of agents [4, 12, 24, 26]. A longer term research interest that this paper is a step towards is to formulate a logically well founded methodology for the design of systems of intelligent agents. Traditional formal theories of knowledge and action [17, 20, 21] stress the conception of knowledge corresponding to know that, ....

.... Common knowledge is impossible to achieve in most realistic scenarios; e.g. where communication is not (known to be) guaranteed with only a finite delay [9, 13] 2 Groups Traditional theories of multiagent intentions and action tend to ignore the structure of the group of agents being considered [4, 8, 12, 24], and assume that agents are equally capable and perfectly cooperative. However, the knowledge and skills of a group depend greatly on its structure, and on the knowledge and skills of its members. e.g. consider a football team that includes a pass thrower (i.e. a quarterback) and a ....

John R. Searle. Collective intentions and actions. In P. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. Pollack, editors, SDF Benchmark Series: Intentions in Communication. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.

....the executability of actions and the intentions of particular agents to perform parts of that action. They also present some conversational default rules based on cooperativeness to use communication to add to the shared beliefs. The shared plan formalism is further developed in [48, 49] Searle [89] starts with the intuition that collective intention is not just a summation of individual intentions. He wants to distinguish between just following a convention and actual cooperative activity. He postulates that we intentions are a primitive form of intentionality, not reducible to individual ....

John R. Searle. Collective intentions and actions. In P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. E. Pollack, editors, Intentions in Communication. MIT Press, 1990.

....1990) In soccer, two teammates together can execute a wall pass to dodge an opponent; however, no individual can execute a wall pass in isolation. While such examples are illustrative of teamwork, its precise nature is very much a topic of active debate(Cohen Levesque 1991; Grosz Sidner 1990; Searle 1990; Kinny et al. 1992; Jennings 1995) Indeed, in much work on dynamic, multi agent domains, a strong distinction between teamwork and ordinary coordinated activity does not necessarily exist. Individual agents are often provided individual plans to achieve individual goals, with detailed ....

Searle, J. R. 1990. Collective intention and action. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 401--415.

....that are understandable and thus easier to integrate as partners for human users. Talking about what happens inside human agents, many researchers believe that mental states, like intentions and commitments are the central notion here. Intentions and commitments have been studied for example in [7, 4, 34]. These studies uncovered a number of essential properties of intentions. Intentions must be consistent with each other and with the beliefs of the agent, the latter meaning that if the intended actions are executed and the agent s beliefs hold in the world, then the desired state of affairs ....

J. Searle. Collective Intentions and Actions. In P. R. Coehn, J. Morgan and M. E. Pollak, (eds) Intentions in Communication, MIT Press 1991, pp 401-416.

....that are understandable and thus easier to integrate as partners for human users. Talking about what happens inside human agents, many researchers believe that mental states, like intentions and commitments are the central notion here. Intentions and commitments have been studied for example in [12, 8, 49]. These studies uncovered a number of essential properties of intentions. Intentions must be consistent with each other and with the beliefs of the agent, the latter meaning that if the intended actions are executed and the agent s beliefs hold in the world, then the desired state of affairs ....

J. Searle. Collective Intentions and Actions. In P. R. Coehn, J. Morgan and M. E. Pollak, (eds) Intentions in Communication, MIT Press 1991, pp 401-416.

....joint attitudes is reduced to individual attitudes. For example, joint intention towards a plan is defined in terms of the conjunction of individual intentions, together with (mutual) beliefs about the intentions of others and about the relationship between the role plans and the joint plan, cf. Searle, 1990; Tuomela and Miller, 1988 ] Related work in progress seeks to extend the plan representation language to allow for explicit representation and reasoning about team skills and resources, and studies the problems of team formation, plan selection, and role assignment [ Sonenberg et al. 1992 ] ....

J. R. Searle. Collective intentions and actions. In P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. E. Pollack, editors, Intentions in Communication. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.

....RESC team does not assume that all subteams are aware of a subteam s deviation from its role(more in Section 4.2) 3.2 Team Mind Team models appear to track a team mind . However, the notion of a team mind is controversial, given that the external world consists only of individual minds[30]. Team models are neutral in this controversy, and can also be reconciled with the view of individual minds. In particular, a dynamic team model may be considered a result of combining (partial) team models attributed to team members. For instance, in tracking a pincer, each subteam may be ....

J. R. Searle. Collective intention and action, pages 401--415. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.

....and the corresponding deduction. Hence although not every member believes that the goal is achievable, the whole team does not yet believe that the goal is unachievable. 2. 3 Joint Intentions To overcome the limitations of individual intentions, researchers started investigating joint intentions [23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30] indeed it has been argued that the basic premises of commitments and conventions which are central to the joint intention work are the basis of all coordination mechanisms [22] Joint intentions can be intuitively defined as a joint commitment to perform a collective action while in a certain ....

....the other not. Previous work has addressed various aspects of this shared mental state; although no individual formulation is anything like complete. A comprehensive review of these extant models highlighted the list of important features given below [22] agents must: agree on a common goal [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30] . agree they wish to collaborate to achieve their shared aim [24, 25, 28, 30] agree a common means (plan) of reaching their objective [25, 26] acknowledge that actions performed by different agents are related [25, 26, 29] have criteria for tracking the rationality of their commitments ....

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J. Searle, Collective Intentions and Actions, in Intentions in Communication, eds. P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan and M. E. Pollack (MIT Press, 1990) 401-416.

....collaboration joint action is more than just the sum of individual actions even if they are coordinated. Also group commitment differs from individual commitment because a team can diverge in its beliefs (Cohen and Levesque 1991) Existing models of joint intentions (Lochbaum et al. 1990; Searle 1990) provide only a partial description of the process of collaboration. Most importantly, from the perspective of industrial applications, they do not describe how joint actions may falter and how individuals and the group should behave in such circumstances. Also as the existing models were ....

Searle, J. 1990. Collective Intentions and Actions. In Intentions in Communication, eds. P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan and M. E. Pollack, 401-416. MIT Press.

No context found.

Searle, J.: Collective intentions and actions. In Intentions in Communication, eds. P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan and M. E. Pollack (1990) 401--416

No context found.

J. R. Searle. Collective intentions and actions. In P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. E. Pollack, editors, Intentions in Communication, chapter 19, pages 401--416. MIT Press, Camridge, MA, 1990.

No context found.

Searle, J. Collective Intentions and Actions. In Cohen, Morgan and Pollack (eds.) Intentions in communication, MIT Press (1990), Chapter 19.

No context found.

John R. Searle, \Collective Intentions and Actions," In P. R. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M. Pollack, editors, Intentions in Communication, pages 401-415. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.

No context found.

John R. Searle. Collective intentions and actions. In Intentions in Communication, chapter 19. The MIT Press, 1990.

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