G. J. Simmons. The subliminal channel and digital signature. In Proc. of Eurocrypt '84, LNCS 209, SpringerVerlag, 1996. pp. 364--378.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....inflow, since outflow can reveal her smartcard s identifier, access control code, communication and transaction history, attributes, data from other applications, and so on. Inflow and outflow are examples of subliminal channels, first studied in the context of publickey cryptography by Simmons [54, 55] and Desmedt, Goutier, and Bengio [40, Section 5] They introduced the idea of using randomization to destroy subliminal channels. In 1988, Chaum [28] proposed very similar randomization techniques to prevent inflow and outflow in the setting of consumer transactions, particularly electronic ....

Gustavus J. Simmons. The subliminal channel and digital signature. In T. Beth, N. Cot, and I. Ingemarsson, editors, Advances in Cryptology--EUROCRYPT '84, volume 209 of Lecture

....the communication channel has and how many bits can be transmitted with how much error rate. In this paper, we clarify that, and also consider methods to try to maximize the information bits being transmitted when the error rate is kept under a certain value. I Introduction Subliminal channels[1] [8] can hide the existence of secret messages, and then they are divided into broadband ones and narrowband ones[3] While a large amount of information can be transmitted over a broadband one, only a small amount can be done over a narrowband one. It is easy to show that a channel can only be ....

G. J. Simmons. "The subliminal channel and digital signatures". Proc. of EUROCRYPT '84, LNCS 209, pages 364--378, 1985.

....algorithm is needed to map the subliminal information to a valid subliminal plaintext or not and 1 ffl all subliminal messages or just some of them can be decoded by the special receiver. Later Simmons showed that subliminal channels can be established in the ElGamal signature scheme [ElGa85, Simm84] and the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) proposed by NIST [NIST91, Sim193, Sim293] We review these channels briefly in section 2 and discuss the properties of these channels. In section 3 we review the Meta ElGamal signature scheme (MEG) HMP194] in section 4 the MetaMessage recovery ....

....and solves the congruence m j xA r ks (mod p Gamma 1) 1) for the parameter s. The triple (m; r; s) is the signed message. It can be verified by checking the congruence ff m j y r A r s (mod p) 2) The idea how to establish a subliminal broadband channel in this scheme is quite simple [Simm84, Sim193]: Alice colluding with the special receiver Carol reveals her secret key xA to Carol and uses the parameter k for the subliminal message. If s and p Gamma 1 are relatively prime, then Carol can compute the subliminal message by k : s Gamma1 (m Gamma xA r) mod p Gamma 1) As k and p ....

G.J.Simmons, "The subliminal channel and digital signatures", Lecture Notes in Computer Science 209, Advances in Cryptology: Proc. Eurocrypt'84, Berlin: Springer Verlag, (1985), pp. 364--78.

....Showing Results to Someone Else If Alice is making a submission whose result she must show Dave, then she gets R 0 from Dave. In this way, she is able to prove that there is no replay going on. Preventing Signaling by Dave If Alice is concerned that Dave might pass use R 0 as a subliminal channel [Sim85, Sim94] to pass intormation to Carol, they can mutually agree on R 0 . The simplest way is probably as follows: 1. Alice generates random R 1 , and sends Dave hash(R 1 ) 2. Dave sends Alice R 2 . 3. Alice generates R 0 = R 1 #R 2 . 4. Alice makes her submission, and receives her answer back. 5. ....

G. Simmons, "The Subliminal Channel and Digital Signatures," Advances in Cryptography --- EUROCRYPT '84 Proceedings, SpringerVerlag, 1985, pp. 51-57.

....of external verifiability. Perhaps the closest prior work to uncoercible communication is the body of work exploring subliminal channels and the abuses they can allow. This idea was introduced in [Simm83] and methods of both exploiting and preventing these abuses are described in work including [Simm84], Simm85] Desm88a] Desm88b] and [Desm89] The problem examined in this body of prior work is that of a sender transmitting a message to a recipient in the presence of an observer who is to be allowed to restrict the contents of the message. The problem of uncoercible communication is, in ....

Simmons, G. "The Subliminal Channel and Digital Signatures." EuroCrypt '84, Paris, France (Apr. 1984), 364--378.

.... 1994 Signature schemes Subl. Chann. Blind signatures Encryption Authentication Key exchange Message recovery 1994 by Pe te rsen 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1990 1991 1993 1994 1992 1988 HoP94a, HoP94b HMP94b, HMP94d NIST91 AgMV90 ElG85a ElG84a, ElG84b Har94a, Har94b Knob94 YeLa93, Boyd94, Nybe94 Simm84 HMP94l Simm93 NyR93a NyR93b,NyRu94 HMP94c, HMP94f Sch91b Schn89, Sch91a ChEG87 FiSh86 Pive93 Pinc94 BrMc91 HoKn91 HoP94c HMP94i Chau82 CaPS94 HMP94g, HMP94h Okam92 HMP94k HMP94m SuHw91 HMP94a Sary90 HMP94h, HMP94j Pete93 Pete93 Gunt89 Gira91 BaKn89 Beth88 HMP94h, HMP94j HMP94h, HMP94j ....

G.J.Simmons, "The Subliminal Channel and Digital Signatures", Lecture Notes in Computer Science 209, Advances in Cryptology: Proc. Eurocrypt'84, Berlin: Springer Verlag, (1985), pp. 364 -- 377.

.... a useful task, and covert channels are available for leaking information [Lam73] A potential for this leakage in the setting of world wide web safe applets has been recently noted in [DFW96] Subliminal channels for leaking information in the context of cryptosystems were initiated by Simmons [Sim85] many other works on covert channels are also relevant to our definitions of channels. A typical use of Trojan horse programs is to steal information that is entered into the keyboard (e.g. passwords) Such password snatching programs often operate by patching system interrupts (like a ....

G. J. Simmons. The Subliminal Channel and Digital Signatures. In Advances in Cryptology---EUROCRYPT '84, pages 51-57, Berlin, 1985. Springer-Verlag.

....is carried out without letting the users know that the cryptosystem in question is contaminated, and without giving any advantage to those who discover the contamination. Related Work Gus Simmons has pioneered the research in the area of subliminal channels and their inclusion in cryptosystems [Sim85]. He has published channels in the OngSchnorr Shamir, ElGamal, Esign, and DSA digital signature schemes. Another channel was discovered by Desmedt [Des90] Killian and Leighton [KL95] showed how a key distribution channel containing a subliminal channel can be exploited by attackers that agree on ....

G. J. Simmons. The Subliminal Channel and Digital Signatures. In Advances in Cryptology---EUROCRYPT '84, pages 51-57, Berlin, 1985. Springer-Verlag.

No context found.

G. J. Simmons. The subliminal channel and digital signature. In Proc. of Eurocrypt '84, LNCS 209, SpringerVerlag, 1996. pp. 364--378.

No context found.

G. J. Simmons. The subliminal channel and digital signature. In Proc. of Eurocrypt '84, LNCS 209, Springer-Verlag, 1996. pp. 364--378.

No context found.

G. J. Simmons. The subliminal channel and digital signature. In Proc. of Eurocrypt '84, LNCS 209, SpringerVerlag, 1996, pp. 364--378.

No context found.

G. J. Simmons. The subliminal channel and digital signatures. In T. Beth, N. Cot, and I. Ingemarsson, editors, Proceedings of Eurocrypt 1984, volume 0209 of LNCS, pages 364--378. Springer-Verlag, Apr 1984.

No context found.

G. J. Simmons. "The subliminal channel and digital signatures". Proc. of EUROCRYPT '84, LNCS 209, pages 364--378, 1985.

No context found.

G. Simmons, \The Subliminal Channel and Digital Signatures," Advances in Cryptography | EUROCRYPT '84 Proceedings, SpringerVerlag, 1985, pp. 51-57.

No context found.

G. J. Simmons. "The subliminal channel and digital signatures". Proc. of EUROCRYPT '84, LNCS 209, pages 364--378, 1985.

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