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An Operating Environment For Large Scale Virtual Reality - Pettifer (1999) (2 citations) (Correct)
.... often imputed upon quite flimsy evidence is quite remarkable and is well reported in the literature on perception [BG90] Gib66] It is evidenced in perceptual illusions (by definition) and even in such solid phenomena as the presence of the foveal blind spot, which comes as a surprise to many [Den91] The main criticism of the naive model of perception is that the act of perceiving is itself inherently subjective, at least to the extent of involving subjects with their own unique viewpoint on the world, and yet still enables consistent and coherent interaction with the environment and its ....
....the constraints of total synchronisation in virtual environments, whilst maintaining apparent coherence of experience for the participants. The argument is this: since there are inherently subjective areas of phenomenal experience on the basis of which objective experience is largely imputed [Den91] there are corresponding aspects of presentation that need not be fully objectified (i.e. synchronised ) in virtual environments. In such cases we can rely instead upon the aforementioned mechanism of imputation to fill in for loss of objective consistency. That this can be exploited is easy to ....
D. C. Dennett. Consciousness explained. Penguin Books, 1991.
Consciousness as Self-Function - Donald Perlis Department (Correct)
....many distinct ways; it is Block s P consciousness i.e. phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experiential awareness that is the subject of our concern. It is worth noting that Block, along with Crick Ur is used here in the sense of prototypical or fundamental or primitive. Dennett [7] however is hard to pin down. He undoubtedly agrees that the brain achieves an amazing feat of information processing, and that this is all there is to consciousness. But he also argues that consciousness is an illusion, leaving the impression that once all detail is worked out nothing so very ....
D. Dennett. Consciousness explained. Little, Brown, 1991.
Modelling Bounded Rationality Using Evolutionary Techniques - Edmonds, Moss (1997) (Correct)
....mechanism. It then takes that action and notes the effects in the environment for future use. The setup is illustrated below in figure 1. The development of these models (i.e. the learning) is modelled by an evolutionary process on this population of internal models (similar to that described in [4]) Important restrictions on such agents include the fact that it may have only limited information gained as the result of inter action with its environment and that any action costs it so that it can not indulge in an extensive exploratory search without this being weighed against the benefit ....
Dennett, D.C. (1995). Consciousness Explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53, 889-892.
Action Selection methods using Reinforcement Learning - Humphrys (1996) (39 citations) (Correct)
....its actions and occasionally rising up to block them. Where all this is leading is away from the simplistic idea of a single thread of control. Any complex mind should have alternative strategies constantly bubbling up, seeking attention, wanting to be given control of the body. As Dennett [Dennett, 1991] says, the Cartesian Theatre may be officially dead, but it still haunts our thinking. We should not be so afraid of multiple unexpressed behaviors: We can suppose that all of this happens in swift generations of wasteful parallel processing, with hordes of anonymous demons and their hopeful ....
....but it still haunts our thinking. We should not be so afraid of multiple unexpressed behaviors: We can suppose that all of this happens in swift generations of wasteful parallel processing, with hordes of anonymous demons and their hopeful constructions never seeing the light of day . [Dennett, 1991, 8.2] The concept of ideas having to fight for actual expression is of course not original. The idea of competition between selfish sub parts of the mind is at least as old as William James and Sigmund Freud. But what I have tried to do in this thesis is to provide some fully specified and ....
Dennett, Daniel C. (1991), Consciousness Explained, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press.
Des boucles Perception-Action à l'imitation: Une.. - Gaussier, Moga, Banquet (Correct)
....d aller vers son professeur meme si celui ci ne bouge pas. Cette approche ascendante de l apprentissage par imitation pourrait expliquer comment un animal peut apprendre a reconnaitre un de ses cong en eres [11] et pourrait s appliquer au probl eme d apprendre a avoir conscience de soi meme [29, 15] : ceci est mon bras car je peux pr edire ce qu il va faire Le sch eme repr esentant mon bras reste stable. Une autre question philosophique li ee a ce type d exp eriences est la suivante : dans notre cas le robot ne savait pas qu il etait en train d imiter. Avons nous besoin de r ealiser ....
D.C. Dennett. Consciousness Explained. Brown, Boston, Massachusetts, 1991.
Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness - Cunningham (Correct)
....problem of philosophy, the concept of consciousness itself is well enough recognised for it to be an ordinary word of our language. A conscious individual is aware, and knowing; the unconscious condition is normally recognisable. Numerous popular and contemporary books by Aleksander [1] Dennett [4], Searle [13] and others, show its explication to be contentious and a challenge to our suppositions on reality, a hazardous topic indeed for a would be engineer of artificial intelligence. Yet we must admit the possibility that consciousness has utilitarian function, evolved to ensure survival. ....
D. Dennett. Consciousness Explained. Penguin, 1991.
Coming to Our Senses: Reconnecting Mathematics.. - Pasztor, Hale-Haniff (Correct)
....into a builder of cognitive structures intended to solve such problems as the organism perceives or conceives (von Glasersfeld, 1987, p. 5) Traditional views of reason as disembodied and objective, mind as a symbol manipulating machine, and intelligence as computation (Simon, 1984; Minsky, 1986; Dennett, 1991) have given way to a more contemporary view of reason as embodied and imaginative (Lakoff, 1987, p. 368) and inseparable from our bodies; mind as an inseparable aspect of physical experience (Damasio, 1994; Pert, 1997; Varela, Thomson, Rosch, 1991) 7 Human concepts are not passive ....
....of subjective experience. Chalmers (1995) seminal paper set a new direction in cognitive science research, drawing on a great number of publications and giving rise to even more on the so called hard problems of consciousness (Churchland Sejnowski, 1992; Crick, 1994; Baars,1988; Calvin, 1990; Dennett, 1991; Edelman, 1989; Jackendoff, 1987; Nagel,1986; McGinn, 1991; Chalmers, 1996; Flanagan, 1992; Globus, 1995; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff Johnson, 1999; Searle, 1992; Varela, 1996; Varela, 1996a) which basically situates the 14 study of subjective experience outside of the scope of standard methods ....
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little Brown.
Implicit Learning and Consciousness: A Graded, . . . - Cleeremans (2001) (Correct)
.... is no reason to dispute the claim that plants should be considered as extremely slow animals whose experiences are overlooked because of our temporal scale chauvinism (Dennett, 1996) or that libraries should be taken as cognitive systems that use researchers as tools to reproduce themselves (Dennett, 1991). While this conclusion strikes many of us as bluntly absurd, perhaps its absurdity should be taken as an indication that we need to revisit the notion of experience and, in so doing, attempt to carefully delineate what it entails. Indeed, if learning is a fundamental element of what it takes ....
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston, MA.: Little, Brown & Co.
Vision and Attention - Harris, Jenkin (2001) (1 citation) (Correct)
....rejected out of hand is dealt with transiently by autonomous mechanisms The essence is that awareness implies continuity. It is only possible to have an awareness of the present in the context of a past and an anticipation of a future. Awareness then becomes intimately associated with memory (see Dennett, 1991). Memory links the awareness of the present moment to past experience in a way that is necessary for true, context laden awareness to occur. Further, awareness of the present moment viewed in the context of previous experience allows prediction of the future. Awareness can thus be seen as an ....
Dennett, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little Brown.
Vision and Cognition: how do they connect? - Pylyshyn (Correct)
....happened. No Thompson should try reading the vast literature on vision (for example, in introductory texts) and the even more egregious literature on mental imagery, where the dominant view is that both perception and imagery consist in constructing pictures in the head which are viewed in what Dennett (1991) calls the Cartesian theater because that s what it feels like (see the excellent critique of this view in O Regan, 1992, and for that matter see my critique of the mental imagery research in Pylyshyn, 1973, 1981) No Thompson themselves draw conclusions based on certain beliefs about ....
Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown & Company.
Seeing Things as People: Anthropomorphism and Common-Sense.. - Watt (1998) (1 citation) (Correct)
.... of these notional worlds is a kind of phenomenology not the phenomenology of Brentano and Husserl who used it introspectively to construct a first person notional world but a third person heterophenomenology constructed from the outside through the intentional stance (Dennett, 1982; Dennett, 1991). So the interpretation of behaviour can t only be in the mind of the beholder: there must be something there for the beholder to recognise as a point of view, and the beholder has to recognise it as such. The beholder must believe that to some extent she shares the same notional attitudes as the ....
.... natural we 124 Chapter 7 often forget to ask ourselves how and why we do it, and we find ourselves asserting, as Dennett does, that these analogical narratives should be accepted tentatively pending further discoveries as accurate accounts of what it is like to be the creature in question (Dennett, 1991). Hofstadter and Dennett push the point further with an extensive variety of questions in the what is it like format (Hofstadter Dennett, 1981) Their point is, quite simply, that the same problem arises in other cases where there is a similar barrier to experience. And the problem doesn t go ....
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Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown, and Company.
Computation, Reduction, and Teleology of Consciousness - Sun (2001) (Correct)
....content, or knowledge representation. In contrast to these two systems views, there are also views that insist on the unitary nature of the conscious and the unconscious; that is, they hold that the conscious and the unconscious are di erent manifestations of the same underlying system or process (Dennett 1991). The di erence is thus that of di erent processing modes in the same system. For instance, Anderson (1983) posits in his ACT model that there are two types of knowledge; declarative knowledge is represented by semantic networks, and it is consciously accessible; procedural knowledge is ....
D. Dennett, (1991), Consciousness Explained. Little Brown.
A Technique for Maintaining Continuity of - Experience In Networked (Correct)
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Dennett DC. Consciousness explained, Penguin Books, London, 1991.
The Evolution of Animal Comunication Systems: . . . - Noble (1998) (Correct)
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Dennett, D. C. (1991a). Consciousness Explained. Allen Lane, London.
Consciousness: Drinking from the Firehose of Experience - Revised And Expanded (Correct)
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Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness Explained. Little, Brown & Co.
Brain-Inspired Conscious Computing Architecture - Duch (2003) (Correct)
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Dennett, D. C. (1991). Consciousness explained. Boston: Little-Brown.
Platonic Model of Mind as an Approximation to Neurodynamics - Duch (1997) (Correct)
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Dennett D.C, Consciousness explained (Little Brown, Boston 1991)
Why Computers Will Never Be People - Keith Price Duffy (Correct)
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Dennett, D. C. (1991) Consciousness Explained, Penguin, London.
Towards an Axiomatic Theory of Consciousness - Cunningham (2001) (Correct)
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D. Dennett. Consciousness Explained. Penguin, 1991.
Languaging: How Babies and Bonobos Lock on to Human Modes of Life - Cowley (Correct)
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D. Dennett, (1991a), Consciousness Explained. Little Brown & Co, Boston.
The Emergence Of Contentful Experience - Mark Bickhard University (Correct)
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Dennett, D. C. Consciousness Explained. (Little, Brown, Boston, 1991).
Conceptor: a Model of selected Consciousness Features.. - Fialkowski, Szymanski (Correct)
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Dennett D. C. 1992. Consciousness Explained. Allen Lane the Penguin Press.
Representation without Reconstruction - Edelman (1994) (1 citation) (Correct)
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D.C. Dennett. Consciousness explained. Little, Brown & Company, Boston, MA, 1991.
Computation and Consciousness: In and Out of the Armchair - Oberlander (2000) (Correct)
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Dennett, D. C. (1991) Consciousness Explained. London: Penguin.
Virtual Reality: Consciousness Really Explained - Iglowitz (1995) (Correct)
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Dennett, Daniel. "Consciousness Explained". Little, Brown, and Company. 1991 293
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