J. P. M. G. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images," in 2nd Int. Workshop on Information Hiding, IH'98 (D. Aucsmith, ed.), vol. 1525 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (Portland, OR, USA), pp. 258--272, Springer Verlag, April 1998.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....Next, to achieve a sufficiently small error probability, WM length may need to be quite large, increasing detection complexity and delay. Finally, the most significant deficiency of both schemes is that by breaking a single player (debugging, reverse engineering, or the sensitivity attack [12]) one can extract the secret information (the SS sequence or the hidden quantizers in QIM) and recreate the original (in the case of SS) or create a new copy that induces the QIM detector to identify the attacked content as unmarked. While an effective mechanism for enabling asymmetric SS ....

J.P. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images," in Proc. Inform. Hiding Workshop, Portland, OR, Apr. 1998, pp. 258472.

....Next, to achieve a sufficiently small error probability, WM length may need to be quite large, increasing detection complexity and delay. Finally, the most significant deficiency of both schemes is that by breaking a single player (debugging, reverse engineering, or the sensitivity attack [16]) one can extract the secret information (the SS sequence or the hidden quantizers in QIM) and recreate the original (in the case of SS) or create a new copy that induces the QIM detector to identify the attacked content as unmarked. While an effective mechanism for enabling asymmetric SS ....

Linnartz, J.P., van Dijk, M.: Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images. Information Hiding Workshop, Portland, OR., (1998).

....If one of them does not intersect with the boundary curve, then it is classified to the corresponding hypothesis. Here it should be emphasized that the boundary curve is stored at the detector and it should be kept secret. Figure 3. Detector operation There is a similar approach proposed in [6] using a probabilistic approach. However, the fundamental difference is that in our case there is no uncertainty in the decision, i.e. it is a pure deterministic operation. Also the attacker in [6] needs a linear number of iterations (with the signal size) to estimate the decision criterion. For ....

....and it should be kept secret. Figure 3. Detector operation There is a similar approach proposed in [6] using a probabilistic approach. However, the fundamental difference is that in our case there is no uncertainty in the decision, i.e. it is a pure deterministic operation. Also the attacker in [6] needs a linear number of iterations (with the signal size) to estimate the decision criterion. For our detector the boundary is non differentiable anywhere (at least theoretically) and hence estimating it using tangents as described in [6] will not work, and the estimation will not be linear ....

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Linnartz J., and Dijk M., "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images", Proc. 2nd International Workshop on Information Hiding, pp.258-272, 1998.

.... using: SS [4] or quantization index modulation (QIM) 3] It is important to review the disadvantages that both methods exhibit: the marked signal and the watermark (WM) have to be perfectly synchronized at WM detection, by breaking a single player (e.g. debugging, the sensitivity attack [8]) one can extract the secret information (the SS WM or the hidden quantizers in QIM) and recreate the original (in case of SS) or create a new copy that induces the QIM detector to treat the content as unmarked. While a relatively e#ective mechanism for enabling asymmetric SS WM systems has been ....

Linnartz, J.P., van Dijk, M.: Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images. Information Hiding Workshop, Portland, OR, (1998).

....of some information hiding systems A number of broad claims have been made about the robustness of various digital watermarking or fingerprinting methods. Unfortunately the robustness criteria and the sample pictures used to demonstrate it vary from one system to the other, and recent attacks [100], 101] 102] 103] 104] show that the robustness criteria used so far are often inadequate. JPEG compression, additive Gaussian noise, low pass filtering, rescaling, and cropping have been addressed in most of the literature but specific distortions such as rotation have often been ignored ....

J.-P. M. G. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images." In Aucsmith

....hidden information. Since most objects to be protected by watermarking or ngerprinting consist of audio or image data, these domains have received the most attention so far. A number of hiding techniques and domain speci c models have been developed for robust, imperceptible information hiding [4, 8, 14]. Ettinger [11] models active adversaries with game theoretic techniques. A general model for information hiding with active adversaries was formulated by Mittelholzer [16] but its hiding property also relies on the similarity of stegodata and coverdata in terms of a distortion measure. Z ollner ....

J.-P. M. G. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, \Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images," in Information Hiding, 2nd International Workshop (D. Aucsmith, ed.), vol. 1525 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 258-272, Springer, 1998.

....applications in control of illegal copying of Digital Video Disks DVDs [14,15] Kalker recently established [16,17] that if the watermark detector is a linear correlator it is always possible to remove the watermark from an image if the black box watermark detector is available. Linnartz et al. [14,18] present an iterative method for removing the watermark based on the behavior of the watermark detector at the detection threshold. By carefully adjusting the gray levels of individual pixels at the threshold, one can estimate the partial derivatives of the detector function at an image that is ....

....matrices on its input and outputs one bit of information. It is assumed that the complete design of the detector and the corresponding watermarking scheme are known except a secret key, and that an attacker has one watermarked image at his disposal. The latest attacks on public watermark detectors [14 18] indicate that it is not clear if a secure public watermark detector can be built at all. It has been proven that all watermark detectors that are thresholded linear correlators can be attacked using a variety of techniques [16 18] Kalker [16,17] describes a simple statistical technique using ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

J.P. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images", in Proceedings of the 2 nd Workshop on Information Hiding, Portland OR, April 15--17, 1998.

....Digital watermarking, benchmark, attacks. A number of broad claims have been made about the robustness of various digital watermarking or fingerprinting methods. Unfortunately the criteria and the sample pictures used to demonstrate it vary from one system to the other, and recent attacks [1], 2] 3] 4] 5] show that the robustness criteria used so far are often inadequate. JPEG compression, additive Gaussian noise, low pass filtering, rescaling, and cropping have been addressed in most of the literature but specific distortions such as rotation have often been ignored [6] 7] ....

J.-P. M. G. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images." In Aucsmith

....OF SOME INFORMATION HIDING SYSTEMS A number of broad claims have been made about the robustness of various digital watermarking or fingerprinting methods. Unfortunately, the robustness criteria and the sample pictures used to demonstrate it vary from one system to the other, and recent attacks [102] [106] show that the robustness criteria used so far are often inadequate. JPEG compression, additive Gaussian noise, low pass filtering, rescaling, and cropping have been addressed in most of the literature but specific distortions such as rotation have often been ignored [81] 107] In some ....

J.-P. M. G. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images," in Information Hiding: 2nd Int. Workshop (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), vol. 1525, D. Aucsmith, Ed. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 1998, pp. 258--272.

....makes no attempt to deal with the issue of malicious attacks, that is distortions performed by would be pirates with the sole intention of removing the watermark. Distortions of this type, especially those designed using detailed knowledge of the algorithm (for examples, see [CL97, CL98, Kal98, KLvD98, LvD98] are extremely di#cult to analyze, and are not be covered in the present article. However, several malicious attacks are actually pathalogical examples of processes that might otherwise occur with normal processing (for example, see [PAK98] The analysis based on our model of distortion ....

....no attempt to deal with the issue of malicious attacks, that is distortions performed by would be pirates with the sole intention of removing the watermark. Distortions of this type, especially those designed using detailed knowledge of the algorithm (for examples, see [CL97, CL98, Kal98, KLvD98, LvD98] are extremely di#cult to analyze, and are not be covered in the present article. However, several malicious attacks are actually pathalogical examples of processes that might otherwise occur with normal processing (for example, see [PAK98] The analysis based on our model of distortion ....

J.-P. M. G. Linnartz and Marten van Dijk. Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images. In Workshop on Information Hiding, Portland, OR, 15-17 April, 1998.

....of n, and in the case of non original image based schemes, the choice of n is itself constrained by the ability to find n sufficiently distinct watermarks which all trigger the detector. Another security issue is that the revealed watermark can be fed into a detector, which, by the method of [7] can be used as an oracle to direct the watermarked image through image space into a region containing no detectable marks. It is unclear if this attack will work, because one must remove considerably more watermarks than were inserted in the first place. Still another issue is that one can not ....

J. M. G. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the Sensitivity Attack against Electronic Watermaks in Images," in Information Hiding II, Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science v 1525 (April 1998), pp 258--272.

.... DVD, since it is necessary that the user s DVD player be able to recognize marked or unmarked DVDs to allow for copy or not) When such a mark detector is available, then the attacker benefits from a measure of quality of his attacks and therefore may improve the speed to converge to a false mark [8, 18, 26]. 4 Protecting the new Multimedia documents An abundant literature covers the protection of audio signals [7, 43] still images, graphics and texts [37, 38, 29, 30, 49] video signals hart:97 a,hart:97 b,macq:95,swan:97, but the new multimedia products appear as especially exposed to piracy, ....

J.P. Linnartz and M. van Dijk. Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images. In 2nd Workshop on Information Hiding, Portland, April 1998. Springer Verlag - LNCS (?).

....consumer devices can verify the watermark, but not erase the watermark from the content. Watermarks can only be embedded by agencies that have access to the embedding (algorithm and its) keys. However, Linnartz et al. have shown that such solution potentially is vulnerable to a sensitivity attack [6], in which the tamper proof detector box is used as an oracle that reveals up to one bit of information about the watermark secret per experiment. The most basic and most common approach is record control. The recording device detects the presence of a watermark and inhibits copying this content. ....

J.P.M.G. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images", Workshop on Information Hiding, Portland, OR, 15-17 April, 1998.

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J. P. M. G. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images," in 2nd Int. Workshop on Information Hiding, IH'98 (D. Aucsmith, ed.), vol. 1525 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (Portland, OR, USA), pp. 258--272, Springer Verlag, April 1998.

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J. P. M. G. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images," in 2nd International Workshop on Information Hiding, IH'98, D. Aucsmith, ed., Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1525, pp. 258--272, Springer Verlag, (Portland, OR, USA), April 1998.

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J. P. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, `Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images,' Proc. of The Information Hiding Workshop, Portland, Oregon, April 1998.

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J. P. M. G. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images," presented at the 2nd International Information Hiding Workshop, Portland, OR, Apr. 1998.

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Linnartz JP, van Dijk M (1998) Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images. Second international workshop on data hiding, pp 258--272

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J.-P. M. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images," in Information Hiding: Second International Workshop, D. Aucsmith, Ed. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag, 1998,pp. 259--273.

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Jean-Paul Linnartz and Marten van Dijk. Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images. In David Aucsmith, editor, Information Hiding: Second International Workshop, volume 1525 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 258-272. Springer Verlag, December 1998.

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J.M.G.Linnartz and M.van Dijk, "Analysis of Sensitivity Attack Against Electronic Watermarks in Images ", Proc. of the 2nd International Workshop on Information Hiding, Portland, Oregon, USA, 15-17 Apr 1998, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol.1525, Springer-Verlag, David Aucksmith (Ed.).

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J. P. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks," Proc. Second International Workshop on Information Hiding 1525, pp. 258--272, April 1998.

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Workshop #1998# #19# J.-P. M.G. Linnartz and M. Van Dijk, #Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images," Preliminary Proceedings of the Second International Information Hiding Workshop #1998#.

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J. P. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images", Proc. of the Workshop on Information Hiding, Portland, April 1998. Submitted.

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J. P. Linnartz and M. van Dijk, "Analysis of the sensitivity attack against electronic watermarks in images", Proc. of the 2 nd Information Hiding Workshop, Portland, Oregon, April 15--17, 1998.

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