Australian Department of Defence, Australian Defence Standard Def(Aust) 5679: Procurement of Computer-based Safety Critical Systems. 1998.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....of acceptable safety, prior to system operation. Although many current and emerging safety standards mandate construction and evaluation of a Safety Case for software based systems, such as IEC 1508 [IEC1508] MOD 00 56 [MOD56] MIL STAN 882C [MIL882C] Australian Draft Defence Standard DR 5679 [DR5679], and RTCA DO178B [DO178B] there is little guidance in the literature on how to construct and present the technical aspects of Safety Cases for computer based systems. Building on work from the High Integrity Systems Group at the University of York, this paper proposes an approach to presenting a ....

....structuring of the overall Safety Case. 2 Approach The aim of the Safety Case is to provide a clear and defensible argument of a system s acceptable safety. The approach taken to the construction of a Safety Case proposed in this section corresponds to recent recommendations, for example [DR5679], by suggesting that the 2 Safety Case should be centred around a high level argument which references supporting documentation. The following sections introduce an approach to structuring the safety argument, and describe elements of the supporting evidence, for a simple architecture of a ....

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Australian Department of Defence. The procurement of computer-based safety critical systems. Draft Australian Defence Standard DR 5679, 1997.

....7. 2 Annotated bibliography The following list is not intended to be definitive, but gives some pointers to useful literature on the use of formal methods: ffl Use of formal methods on Safety Critical Systems: 2, 6, 7] ffl Standards calling up formal methods: [29, 30] ffl Case studies of applications of formal methods: 8, 11, 19, 23] ffl Industry experience reports: 14, 16, 17, 34] ffl Reference books on particular formal methods: Z [33] VDM [21] B [1, 24] Object Z [12] for object oriented specifications refinement of specifications to ....

Australian Department of Defence. Procurement of computer-based safety critical systems. Australian Defence Standard DEF(AUST) 5679, July 1998.

....constraints of individual components, and to introduce internal timing constraints during system refinement. 1 Introduction The need for formal methods in the development of safety critical software systems is now well accepted. Current standards for the development of such systems (e.g. [2, 7, 15]) mandate the use of formal methods for high levels of safety assurance. Most safety critical systems are embedded systems which can cause harm (i.e. loss of life or injury) by failure to correctly interact with their environment. Since such failures are often of a time related nature, there is a ....

Australian Department of Defence. The procurement of computer-based safety critical systems, 1998. Australian Defence Standard 5679.

....and, where the failure modes relate to software, complementary safety requirements are typically derived. Assurance of software safety is then generated by demonstrating that the software specification satisfies the derived safety properties and that the specification is implemented correctly [24] [25] 26] Application of hazard analysis is typically a manual process but some work has been done using formal specifications as the basis for partial automation of hazard analysis [14] 27] These techniques typically use the causal relationships implicit in a specification to derive a ....

Australian Department of Defence, Def(Aust) 5679 The procurement of computer-based safety critical systems, 2.0 ed: Codification and Standardisation Authority, 1998.

....standards in its existing contracts. The DefSafe team is also providing advice to Defence on the general approach to procurement and on certification and regulation issues. The research aspects of the DefSafe Project are focused on further development of the Australian Standard DEF (AUST) 5679 [1], written by DSTO and recently published by the Army Engineering Agency. This Standard provides requirements and guidance for the development and assessment of safety critical computerbased systems, focusing on requirements for the system safety case. Under DefSafe, research will be carried out ....

....about the choice of safety standards for safety critical computer based Defence systems. 2. 1 International trends The SVRC has carried out an extensive survey of international safety standards [2] drawing on existing surveys [3] 4] covering the following standards: DEF (AUST) 5679 [1] . MIL STD 882C [5] NATO StanAgs 4404 [6]and 4452 [7] UK Defence Standards 00 54 [8] 00 55 [9] and 00 56 [10] ARP Standards 4754 [11] and 4761 [12] RTCA DO 178B [13] IEC 61508 [14] There are some clear trends emerging in these standards. The system nature of safety is clearly ....

Australian Department of Defence, DEF (AUST) 5679 The Procurement of Computer-Based Safety Critical systems: Army Standardisation (AEA), 1999.

....2. Identification of the system boundary and description of the system environment. 3. Capacity to provide logical means of problem decomposition. 4. Suitability for review for consistency completeness correctness. Structured design techniques are recommended by most safety standards, e.g. [Std5679], Std4404] Std00 56] and [Std61508] Structured design techniques support methodical construction of test cases. Example structured design techniques include Booch [Booch94] Jackson System Development [Jackson83] and MASCOT [Simpson86] Software design guidelines such as those described in ....

....Safety Standards Various approaches to safe architectural design are included in international safety standards. The standards recognise that the system architecture can influence the required integrity of system software components and offer advice on how this might be achieved. Def (Aust) 5679 [Std5679] highlights independence as the key requirement for safe design. Two approaches for safe design are suggested: redundancy and safety kernels. Redundancy includes functional, data and design. However, design redundancy is prohibited as sufficient mitigation of software faults. Safety kernels are ....

Australian Department of Defence, Def (Aust) 5679, The Procurement of Computer-Based Safety Critical Systems, 1998

....have the potential to cause death or injury. A major challenge for Defence is to have sufficient assurance that such systems meet their critical requirements so that they are suitable for installation and use. A number of civilian and Defence standards have been published or are in preparation [1 6]. An important concept that is emerging in these standards is the notion of Safety Integrity Level (SIL) which represents the level of criticality of a system component, and is a measure of the level of development and analysis effort that is required to provide assurance of safety. For the ....

Australian Department of Defence. Draft Def(Aust) Standard DR5679 (Version 2.0): The Procurement of Computer-Based Safety Critical Systems, June, 1998.

....timing constraints of individual components, and to introduce internal timing constraints during system refinement. 1 Introduction The need for formal methods in the development of safety critical software systems is now well accepted. Current standards for the development of such systems (e.g. [Australian Department of Defence, 1998; International Electrotechnical Commission, 1995; U.K. Ministry of Defence, 1995] mandate the use of formal methods for high levels of safety assurance. Most safety critical systems are embedded systems which can cause harm (i.e. loss of life or injury) by failure to correctly interact with ....

Australian Department of Defence (1998). The procurement of computer-based safety critical systems. Australian Defence Standard 5679.

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Australian Department of Defence, Australian Defence Standard Def(Aust) 5679: Procurement of Computer-based Safety Critical Systems. 1998.

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