Michael Butler. Using Refinement to Analyse the Safety of an Authentication Protocol. Technical Report DSSE-TR-98-8, Declarative Systems and Software Engineering Group, Department of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, July 1998. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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Proving Safety of Authentication Protocols: A Minimal Approach - George (1999) (1 citation) (Correct)
..... 19 Introduction 1 1 Introduction There are various approaches to proving the safety of authentication protocols, including special belief logics like BAN [1] model checking [2, 3] and theorem proving. Most theorem proving and model checking has been based on trace histories [4, 5], in particular using CSP and its trace model [6] In this paper we demonstrate that a simpler approach based on sets of events can suffice to prove safety properties of authentication protocols. Sets have some advantages over sequences in that they carry less information. They therefore reduce ....
....His work is considerably more extensive and he discusses other protocols such as Otway Rees. Paulson uses the Isabelle HOL prover and has considerably automated his proofs. For N S he proves the presence of the other agent and our secret1 and secret2 lemmas. These two lemmas are, as Butler [5] points out, the critical properties. But it seems useful to be assured that messages are not being read by third parties, rather than merely to be assured that any such eavesdroppers must be honest. The RAISE justification editor has no facility for replay and only a limited amount of ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Michael Butler. Using Refinement to Analyse the Safety of an Authentication Protocol. Technical Report DSSE-TR-98-8, Declarative Systems and Software Engineering Group, Department of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, July 1998.
A B C D - Automated Validation of Business Critical Systems with.. - Group (1999) (Correct)
.... formal methods for the purpose of creating and verifying software generation tools for smart card operating systems and smart card applications [25] work supported by BT and QC Technology on models of electronic payment protocols [26, 46] work with the DERA on protocols for secure communication [10]; work with hospitals in health care systems [37] Tools and tool integration We have extensive experience of building tools to support the use of formal methods. Significant examples include: an animation tool for business processes modelling [45] an animation tool for operational semantics ....
M. J. Butler. Using refinement to analyse the safety of an authentication protocol. Submitted to Formal Aspects of Computing, 1998.
Proving Safety of an Authentication Protocol: A Minimal Approach - George (1999) (1 citation) (Correct)
....P.O. Box 3058, Macau Introduction 1 1 Introduction There are various approaches to proving the safety of authentication protocols, including special belief logics like BAN [1] model checking [2, 3] and theorem proving. Most theorem proving and model checking has been based on trace histories [4, 5], in particular using CSP and its trace model [6] In this paper we demonstrate that a simpler approach based on sets of events can suffice to prove safety properties of an authentication protocol. Sets have some advantages over sequences in that they carry less information. They therefore reduce ....
....work on other protocols. Paulson uses the Isabelle HOL prover and has considerably automated his proofs. He proves the presence of the other agent and our secret1 and secret2 lemmas. These two lemmas are, as Butler Report No. 154, February 1999 UNU IIST, P.O. Box 3058, Macau Related work 13 [5] points out, the critical properties. But it seems useful to be assured that messages are not being read by third parties, rather than merely to be assured that any such eavesdroppers must be honest. The RAISE justification editor has no facility for replay and only a limited amount of ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Michael Butler. Using Refinement to Analyse the Safety of an Authentication Protocol. Technical Report DSSE-TR-98-8, Declarative Systems and Software Engineering Group, Department of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, July 1998.
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