P. Henrici, Applied and Computational Complex Analysis, Vol 1, Wiley and Sons, 1974.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....trees may also be linked to each other, where the top level event of one tree may be a bottom level event of another tree. The security engineering community use a similar technique called attack trees. In an attack tree, the events are goals and the leaf nodes are ways of achieving the goals [Schneier 1996]. The tree can be annotated with measures of risk, and the overall risk of the root event occurring can be calculated by traversing the tree and combining risks according to functions associated with the logical operations. For example, assuming independent probabilities can be assigned to leaf ....

B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1996.

....setup attacks as a new threat that can be used to victimize Crowds, Onion Routing, and Mix net users so that they are falsely accused of being initiators of connections. Our work shows that attacks against DC Net are extremely low cost when participants are arranged in a logical ring (see [15]) Additionally, we argue that although attacks against DC Net [4] where participants are fully connected requires unreasonable resources on the part of the attacker, DC Net has overhead that does not scale well with the number of participants. Moreover, DC Net most easily falls subject to ....

....of DC Net would not allow less than all pairs of participants exchanging coin ips. Otherwise, topology reformations provide attackers with opportunities to gain information. Because data exchange with all participants can become prohibitive, DC Net as a ring is described by Chaum [4] and others [15]. In his Ph.D. thesis, Martin describes an implementation of ring based DC Net within the context of a local network [9] In the ring version of DC Net each participant shares two secret coin ips, one with each of her neighbors. In this section, we show how the attack detailed in Section 4 can ....

B. Schneier. Applied Cryptography. J. Wiley and Sons, 1996.

....and authentication codes and digital signatures provide integrity against the same class of intruders. Secret sharing can be seen as error masking for confidentiality, too [Shamir 1979, Simmons 1991] and there are now many more types of cryptographic primitives and protocols (see, e.g. [Schneier 1996] for an informal overview) Certain error detection mechanisms are designed for accidental as well as intentional faults (e.g. memory access protection techniques) and approaches have been put 10 The term exception , due to its origin of coping with exceptional situations not only errors ....

..... Encryption can prevent the eavesdropping of events. Such techniques apply not only to transmission but also to storage. Should the logs be stored in a potentially vulnerable location, we can use well known cryptographic techniques that provide so called forward secrecy [Menezes et al. 1996, Schneier 1996] 4.3 Interpretation of core fault tolerance concepts We now consider intrusions in the broader context of intrusion tolerance. We re examine the notion of fault tolerance as defined in the core dependability concepts (Section 2.4) Those concepts make a distinction between: a) error ....

B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1996.

....of DC Net would not allow less than all pairs of participants exchanging coin ips. Otherwise, topology reformations provide attackers with opportunities to gain information. Because data exchange with all participants can become prohibitive, DC Net as a ring is described by Chaum [4] and others [8]. In the ring version of DC Net each participant shares two secret coin ips, one with each of her neighbors. An natural extension of this idea is to have a torus a mesh whose ends wrap around in both dimensions. Other topologies are possible. In this section, we show how the attack detailed in ....

B. Schneier. Applied Cryptography. J. Wiley and Sons, 1996.

....queue length process generated by (6) couples within a time that is nite P a.s. to a process which is stationary ergodic. Proof. Since the Markov chain fZ n g is Harris recurrent (by Lemma 3.1, in view of Remark 3.1) it couples within a time that is nite P a.s. to a stationary ergodic regime ([5] p. 157) In view of the fact that the queue dynamics (6) is a G G 1 queue, and that E Delta n 0, it again follows from standard results as in the proof of Theorem 3.1, that the queue length process couples in a time that is nite P a.s. to a stationary ergodic regime. 4 Simulation Results We ....

S. Asmussem, Applied Probability and Queues. J. Wiley and Sons, 1987.

....assumption is that 10 6 keys per second can be considered by a single processor and at this rate a 40 bit key may be found in roughly ten days. However, with the use of special purpose 1 We presume the reader is familiar with the basics of cryptographic protocols; two good sources for this are [12, 8]. 1 hardware it is possible to check far more than 10 6 keys second: Blaze et al. 3] suggest that RC4 keys could be checked at the rate of 3 10 7 keys per second with FPGA s and at the rate of 8 10 8 keys per second with custom VLSI chips. For parallel attacks, using multiple machines, ....

B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, J.Wiley and Sons, New York, 1996. 15

....a class of examples where the interarrival times fTng have long range dependence. For this model with a non renewal input process, the distribution of X1 has a heavy right tail. Contrast this with the classical stable G M 1 queue where the stationary queue length distribution is geometric (Asmussen, 1987, page 204) The presence of dependence can indeed have a dramatic effect on system performance and this is illustrated by the dramatic effects the long range dependence in the input has on the queue size distribution. Section 4 presents a simulation of the fTng process discussed in Section 3 and ....

.... 1, we have as n 1 Xn ) X1 d = 1 j=0 j X i=1 K i : The symbols and stand, as usual, for the max and min operators and we follow the convention that P 0 i=1 K i = 0: The limit random variable X1 is finite because of the assumption EK i 0. Proof. As in the classical case (Asmussen, 1987, page 80; Resnick, 1992, page 514) induction yields Xn = maxfX 0 n X i=1 K i ; n X i=2 K i ; Kn ; 0g: If the sequence fKn g is reversible, which means for all integers m (K 1 ; Km ) d = Km ; K 1 ) then with X 0 = 0 Xn d =maxf n X i=1 K i ; n Gamma1 X ....

Asmussen, S., Applied Probability and Queues, J. Wiley and Sons, New York, 1987.

....queue length process generated by (5) couples within a time that is nite P a.s. to a process which is stationary ergodic. Proof. Since the Markov chain fZng is Harris recurrent (by Lemma 2.1, in view of Remark 3.1) it couples within a time that is nite P a.s. to a stationary ergodic regime ([4] p. 157) In view of the fact that the queue dynamics (5) is a G G 1 queue, and that E Delta n 0, it again follows from standard results as in the proof of Theorem 2.1, that the queue length process couples in a time that is nite P a.s. to a stationary ergodic regime. 3 Simulation Results We ....

S. Asmussem, Applied Probability and Queues. J. Wiley and Sons, 1987.

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P. Henrici, Applied and Computational Complex Analysis, Vol 1, Wiley and Sons, 1974.

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P. Henrici, Applied and Computational Complex Analysis, Vol 1, Wiley and Sons, 1974.

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B. Schneier. Applied Cryptography. J. Wiley and Sons, 1996.

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B. Schneier, Applied Cryptography, J.Wiley and Sons, New York, 1996. 14

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B. Schneier. Applied Cryptography. Second Edition. Wiley and Sons. 1996.

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Asmussen,S., Applied Probability and Queues, J. Wiley and Sons, New York, 1987.

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Henrici, P., Applied and Computational Complex Analysis, Vol. 1, Wiley and Sons, 1974.

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S. Asmussen. Applied Probability and Queues. J. Wiley and Sons, 1987.

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