R. Anderson, M. Kuhn, "Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations," Proc. 2nd Workshop on Information Hiding, Springer, 1998.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....information about intermediate values during the computation [25, 26] and this has led to practical attacks on smartcards. Electromagnetic radiation [33, 16, 34] compromising emanations [36] crosstalk onto the power line [37, 35] return signals obtained by illuminating electronic equipment [3, 35], magnetic fields [32] cache hit ratios [24, 30] and even sounds given off by rotor machines [23] can similarly give the attacker a window of visibility on internal values calculated during the computation. Also of interest is the probing attack, where the attacker places a metal needle on a ....

R. Anderson, M. Kuhn, "Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations," Proc. 2nd Workshop on Information Hiding, Springer, 1998.

....used outside the military and diplomatic worlds. To provide some degree of protection to those with smaller budgets, Kuhn and Anderson developed softTempest fontsthatmaketextinformationhardtodetectandreconstructby removing high frequency components and putting random variations into characters [Kuhn98]. PGP 6 contains a secure viewer that uses these fonts to display particularly sensitive information. Kuhn suggests that their techniques could be implemented on graphics cards, providing protection for all software running on a machine. It would also be easy to add to display drivers or fonts, ....

M. G. Kuhn and R. J. Anderson. Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations. Proc. Second Workshop on Information Hiding, April 1998.

.... 3 4] after a careful reading of unclassi ed sources, we believe this refers to the side channel that results when cryptographic hardware is illuminated by a nearby radio transmitter (e.g. a cellphone) thereby modulating the return signal with information about what the crypto gear is doing [AK98]. Using side channels to break cryptographic primitives is such a powerful notion that it is reasonable to expect intelligence organizations to have built on the successes alluded to in the previous paragraph. By continuing to research both the collection of side channel data and the ....

R. Anderson and M. Kuhn, \Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations," Proc. 2nd Workshop on Information Hiding, Springer, 1998.

.... 3 4] after a careful reading of unclassified sources, we believe this refers to the side channel that results when cryptographic hardware is illuminated by a nearby radio transmitter (e.g. a cellphone) thereby modulating the return signal with information about what the crypto gear is doing [AK98]. Using side channels to break cryptographic primitives is such a powerful notion that it is reasonable to expect intelligence organizations to have built on the successes alluded to in the previous paragraph. By continuing to research both the collection of side channel data and the ....

R. Anderson and M. Kuhn, "Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations," Proc. 2nd Workshop on Information Hiding, Springer, 1998.

.... using a simple modified TV set at several hundred meters distance [97] Many military organizations use especially shielded Tempest certified equipment to process classified information, in order to eliminate the risk of losing secrets via compro1068 mising emanations [98] We have shown in [99] how software can hide information in video screen content in a form that is invisible to the user but that can easily be reconstructed with modified TV receivers. More sophisticated ways of broadcasting information covertly from PC software use spread spectrum techniques to embed information in ....

M. G. Kuhn and R. J. Anderson, "Soft tempest: Hidden data transmission using electromagnetic emanations." In Aucsmith

.... using a simple modified TV set at several hundred meters distance [99] Many military organizations use especially shielded Tempest certified equipment to process classified information, in order to eliminate the risk of losing secrets via compromising emanations [100] We have shown in [101] how software can hide information in video screen content in a form that is invisible to the user but that can easily be reconstructed with modified TV receivers. More sophisticated ways of broadcasting information covertly from PC software use spread spectrum techniques to embed information in ....

M. G. Kuhn and R. J. Anderson, "Soft tempest: Hidden data transmission using electromagnetic emanations," in Information Hiding: 2nd Int. Workshop (Lecture Notes in Computer Science), vol. 1525, D. Aucsmith, Ed. Berlin, Germany: SpringerVerlag, 1998, pp. 124--142.

....which had a 1.5 MHz clock; a radio tuned to this frequency in the machine room would emit a loud whistle. A colleague wrote a set of subroutines of di#erent lengths such that by calling them in sequence, the computer could be made to play a tune. A modern re implementation of this is described in [25]: a PC monitor with a pixel frequency of 70 MHz can be fed video signals which implement a 10 MHz radio signal, amplitude modulated with different tones. This can be used to attack computers that are not connected to networks and have good physical security: the computer is infected with a virus ....

....a dither pattern in the background; this did not work too well as the jamming signal usually ended up modulated fairly conspicuously with the screen contents we were trying to hide. Eventually, we evolved a set of techniques that do appear to work reliably, and these are described in detail in [25, 27]. We will now describe two of the techniques briefly. Figure 1: Standard black on white text image. Figure 2: The same text after horizontal low pass filtering. 2.1 Filtered fonts The technique which has attracted most publicity, and which is already fielded in two commercial security packages ....

MG Kuhn, RJ Anderson, "Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations ", in David Aucsmith (Ed.), Information Hiding, Second International Workshop, Portland, Oregon, USA, 15-17 April, 1998; Springer LNCS v 1525 pp 124--142; http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/ Security/tamper/

....in their pockets which they use once each as they wander around. However, many of the attacks open to a resourceful opponent are independent of the strength of cryptography in use. Equipment can be abused; keyboard sni#ers can be installed in laptops and signal using soft tempest transmitters [10]. If this is impossible, cameras and microphones can be used to observe user input. There may be infrared lasers to measure bidders blood oxygen levels and special toilets to collect biological samples to measure stress. One should bear all this in mind when dismissing anonymous broadcast as ....

Markus G. Kuhn and Ross J. Anderson. Soft tempest: Hidden data transmission using electromagnetic emanations. In David Aucsmith, editor, Information Hiding: Second International Workshop, volume 1525 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 124--142. Springer-Verlag, 1998.

.... community as power analysis and to the military under the codenames Tempest , Hijack and Nonstop , utilises the fact that many encryption devices leak key material electromagnetically, whether by variations in their power consumption [17, 24] or by compromising electromagnetic radiation [19]. Two relevant papers were published at the second AES candidate conference. In the rst, Chari et al. report a successful power analysis attack on the 6805 reference code for Two sh, implemented on an ST16 smartcard [14] this exploits the key whitening process. In the second, Biham and Shamir ....

MG Kuhn, RJ Anderson, \Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations", in Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Information Hiding (Portland, Apr 98), Springer LNCS vol 1525 pp 126-143

No context found.

R. Anderson, M. Kuhn, "Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations," Proc. 2nd Workshop on Information Hiding, Springer, 1998.

No context found.

M. Kuhn and R. Anderson, Soft tempest: Hidden data transmission using electromagnetic emanations, In D. Aucsmith, editor, Information Hiding, vol. 1525 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 124--142. Springer-Verlag, 1998.

No context found.

M. Kuhn and R. Anderson, Soft tempest: Hidden data transmission using electromagnetic emanations, In D. Aucsmith, editor, Information Hiding, vol. 1525 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 124--142. Springer-Verlag, 1998.

No context found.

M. G. Kuhn, and R. J. Anderson, "Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations", in Information Hiding 1998, pp. 124--142, 1998.

No context found.

M. G. Kuhn and R. J. Anderson, Soft tempest: Hidden data transmission using electromagnetic emanations, In Information Hiding---Second International Workshop, LNCS 1525, Springer-Verlag, 1998 73

No context found.

M. Kuhn and R. Anderson, Soft tempest: Hidden data transmission using electromagnetic emanations, In D. Aucsmith, editor, Information Hiding, vol. 1525 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 124--142. Springer-Verlag, 1998.

No context found.

M. G. Kuhn and R. Anderson, "Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations," in Proc. Int. Wkshp. on Information Hiding (IH '98), pp. 124--142, Apr. 1998.

No context found.

M. Kuhn and R. Anderson, Soft tempest: Hidden data transmission using electromagnetic emanations, In D. Aucsmith, editor, Information Hiding, vol. 1525 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 124--142. Springer-Verlag, 1998.

No context found.

Markus G. Kuhn and Ross J. Anderson, "Soft Tempest: Hidden Data Transmission Using Electromagnetic Emanations", in David Aucsmith, ed., "Information Hiding, Second International Workshop, IH'98", Portland, Oregon, USA, 15-17 Apr 1998, LNCS 1525, Springer-Verlag, ISBN 3-540-65386-4, pp. 124-142.

No context found.

M. Kuhn and R. Anderson, Soft tempest: Hidden data transmission using electromagnetic emanations, In D. Aucsmith, editor, Information Hiding, vol. 1525 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 124--142. Springer-Verlag, 1998.

No context found.

Markus G. Kuhn and Ross J. Anderson. Soft tempest: Hidden data transmission using electromagnetic emanations. In Information Hiding 1998.

No context found.

M. Kuhn and R. Anderson, Soft tempest: Hidden data transmission using electromagnetic emanations, In D. Aucsmith, editor, Information Hiding, vol 1525 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp 124-142. Springer-Verlag, 1998.

No context found.

M. Kuhn and R. Anderson, Soft tempest: Hidden data transmission using electromagnetic emanations, In D. Aucsmith, editor, Information Hiding, vol 1525 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp 124-142. Springer-Verlag, 1998.

Online articles have much greater impact   More about CiteSeer.IST   Add search form to your site   Submit documents   Feedback  

CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC