| Kraus, S., and Wilkenfeld, J. A strategic negotiations model with applications to an international crisis, IEEE Trans. on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 23, 1 (1993), 313-323. |
....A4 Cost of Opting Out Over Time: for any t 2 T , U W ( Opt; t) U W ( Opt; t 1) and U A ( Opt; t) U A ( Opt; t 1) 18 For all s 2 S and i 2 Agent, s i is agent i s portion of the resource. 19 t1 and t2 are divided by 2 to make the model similar to our previous one [32, 33, 34] where each iteration took only one time period. 17 Even though agent A prefers to continue the negotiation indefinitely, an agreement will be reached (after a finite number of periods) if the next assumption holds. The reason for this is that agent W can threaten to opt out at any given time. ....
S. Kraus and J. Wilkenfeld. A strategic negotiations model with applications to an international crisis. IEEE Transaction on Systems Man and Cybernetics, 23(1):313---323, 1993.
....of analyzing the outcomes of the models of alternating offers since it puts few restrictions on the outcome ( 49] Therefore, we will use the stronger notion of (subgame) perfect equilibrium (P.E. see [53] which requires that the players strategies induce an equilibrium in any subgame (see [29] for the full definition) 4.3 Zone of Possible Agreement When analyzing the model, the main question is whether a possibility exists that the players will reach an agreement. An important feature of the model that strongly influences the outcome of the game is the preference of a player between ....
S. Kraus and J. Wilkenfeld. A strategic negotiations model with applications to an international crisis. Technical Report UMIACS TR 90-20 CS TR 2407, Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland, 1990.
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Kraus, S., and Wilkenfeld, J. A strategic negotiations model with applications to an international crisis, IEEE Trans. on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 23, 1 (1993), 313-323.
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