Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting Routing Infrastructures from Denial of Service Using Cooperative Intrusion Detection. In The 1997.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....the network. Some authors view denial of service attacks solely as an attacker s consumption of resources that prevents legitimate users from using those resources [1] 2] Others present attacks that deny service by causing network devices required for packet delivery to function incorrectly [3]. Still others present attacks that can result in denial of service when information required for proper operation is corrupted or not available [4] 5] While each of these attacks clearly result in services being denied, they seem only related in results, rather than in structure. The purpose ....

....this way might be a serious problem, there is also a denial of service aspect involved, because if packets are delivered to the incorrect destination, they are not being delivered to the correct destination. An example of incorrect operation of routing devices was presented by Cheung and Levitt [3]. They examine the problem of how to identify a misbehaving network router and locate routes around it. These authors cite examples of inadvertent denial of service that occurred when erroneous routing updates were transmitted by a faulty router. The authors show that a malicious router could have ....

S. Cheung and K. Levitt, \Protecting Routing infrastructures from Denial of Service Using Cooperative: Intrusion Detection, " in Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms Workshop (NSPW-97), (New York), pp. 94-106, ACM, Sept. 23-26 1997.

....built into the routing protocol itself. In Cisco White Papers [21] several techniques have been mentioned to detect bad malicious packets. However, though the techniques are able to prevent looping, the problem of malicious LSA source (mentioned before) cannot be solved using those techniques. In [22], the authors applied the concept of system level diagnosis [23] to detect malicious routers. The overhead of such a scheme is very high and is not scalable. Related techniques such as checking the Maxage variable in OSPF (a link state protocol) are discussed in [8] 14] In this paper, we ....

Steven Cheung, and K. N. Levitt, "Protecting Routing Infrastructures from Denial-of-Service using Co-operative Intrusion Detection, " in Proc. New Security Paradigms Workshop, Sept. 1997.

....recognition of new and variant attacks, and reducing the dependence on humangenerated expert rules. Embedded IDS: Security is becoming ever more of an issue on all levels of networking. Building IDS capabilities into network devices, such as routers, switches and firewalls is becoming an issue [Cheung97]. Application of IDS techniques in non network environments: Examples include the use of IDS techniques to monitor telephone traffic and credit card transactions. Anderson98] Adapting IDS to new technologies: New networking protocols and products are continually being developed, affecting ....

S. Cheung, K. N. Levitt, "Protecting Routing Infrastructures from Denial of Service Using Cooperative Intrusion Detection" Proc. New Security Paradigms Workshop 1997, Cumbria, UK, September 23-26, 1997. http://seclab.cs.ucdavis.edu/papers/nsp.pdf

....We showed that, under SDS CD, many types of Insider RSV P attacks can be handled in a flexible, secure and efficient way. 9 SDS CD still can not handle the RSVP message dropping attacks, which probably are not preventable. We have developed different intrusion detection techniques (e.g. CL97] in locating the dropping point. We believe that the combination of various prevention and detection schemes together will hopefully provide a strong solution in protecting network QoS. Acknowledgments Liang Li and Steve Nadas from IBM RTP have generously provided us a beta implementation of ....

S. Cheung and K.N. Levitt. Protecting Routing Infrastructure from Denial of Service Using Cooperative Intrusion Detection. In New Security Paradigms Workshop, Cumbria, UK, September 1997.

....protocol; however, that approach builds on a periodic protocol, and such protocols tend to have higher overhead than on demand protocols and may not be suitable in highly mobile networks. Routing protocol intrusion detection has also been studied as a mechanism for detecting misbehaving routers [6, 10, 36]. 9. CONCLUSIONS This paper has presented the design and evaluation of Ariadne, a new ad hoc network routing protocol that provides security against one compromised node and arbitrary active attackers, and relies only on efficient symmetric cryptography. Ariadne operates ondemand, dynamically ....

Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting Routing Infrastructures from Denial of Service Using Cooperative Intrusion Detection. In The 1997.

....a leap frog cryptographic signing protocol that uses secret key cryptography. While the research referenced so far focuses on preventing attacks, a complementary approach to the problem of securing the routing infrastructure focuses on detecting attacks [1, 5, 8] For example, Cheung et al. [3, 4] present solutions to the denial of service problem for the routing infrastructure using intrusion detection. Another example is a protocol called WATCHERS described by Bradley et al. 2] The protocol detects and reacts to routers that drop or misroute packets by applying the principle of ....

S. Cheung and K. Levitt. Protecting Routing Infrastructures from Denial of Service Using Cooperative Intrusion Detection. In Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms Workshop, September 1997.

....protocol; however, that approach builds on a periodic protocol, and such protocols tend to have higher overhead than on demand protocols and may not be suitable in highly mobile networks. Routing protocol intrusion detection has also been studied as a mechanism for detecting misbehaving routers [6, 10, 35]. 9. CONCLUSIONS This paper has presented the design and evaluation of Ariadne, a new ad hoc network routing protocol that provides security against one compromised node and arbitrary active attackers, and relies only on efficient symmetric cryptography. Ariadne operates ondemand, dynamically ....

Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting Routing Infrastructures from Denial of Service Using Cooperative Intrusion Detection. In The 1997.

....protocol; however, that approach builds on a periodic protocol, and such protocols tend to have higher overhead than on demand protocols and may not be suitable in highly mobile networks. Routing protocol intrusion detection has also been studied as a mechanism for detecting misbehaving routers [6, 10, 36]. 9. CONCLUSIONS This paper has presented the design and evaluation of Ariadne, a new ad hoc network routing protocol that provides security against one compromised node and arbitrary active attackers, and relies only on efficient symmetric cryptography. Ariadne operates ondemand, dynamically ....

Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting Routing Infrastructures from Denial of Service Using Cooperative Intrusion Detection. In The 1997 New Securi_ty Paradigms Workshop, pages 9&106, September 1998.

....[25, 26] or OSPF [27] Perlman [28] designed the Network layer Protocol with Byzantine Robustness (NPBR) which addresses denial of service at the expense of flooding and digital signatures. The problem of byzantine nodes that simply drop packets (black holes) in wired networks is explored in [29, 30]. The approach in [29] is to use a number of trusted nodes to probe their neighbors, assuming a limited model and without discussing how probing packets are disguised from the adversary. A di#erent technique, flow conservation, is used in [30] Based on the observation that for a correct node the ....

....Perlman [28] designed the Network layer Protocol with Byzantine Robustness (NPBR) which addresses denial of service at the expense of flooding and digital signatures. The problem of byzantine nodes that simply drop packets (black holes) in wired networks is explored in [29, 30] The approach in [29] is to use a number of trusted nodes to probe their neighbors, assuming a limited model and without discussing how probing packets are disguised from the adversary. A di#erent technique, flow conservation, is used in [30] Based on the observation that for a correct node the number of bytes ....

S. Cheung and K. Levitt, "Protecting routing infrastructures from denial of service using cooperative intrusion detection," in New Security Paradigms Workshop, 1997.

....bootstrapping, presented in Section 6.7, present an approach that requires minimal offline bootstrapping and no public key operations after initialization. Routing protocol intrusion detection has been studied in wired networks as a mechanism for detecting misbehaving routers. Cheung and Levitt [17] and Bradley et al. 11] propose intrusion detection techniques for detecting and identifying routers that send bogus routing update messages. In this paper, we attempt to authenticate packets before processing them, instead of relying on the delayed reaction of an intrusion detection system. ....

Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting routing infrastructures from denial of service using cooperative intrusion detection. In The 1997.

.... used to filter out DNS messages destined for a protected server that may cause violations of our 3 An earlier version of this message authentication work was published as [14] 4 An earlier version of this work for protecting routing infrastructures from denial of service was published as [15]. 5 security goal. Based on the specification of the DNS wrapper, we implemented a DNS wrapper prototype and evaluated its performance. Our experimental results show that the DNS wrapper is effective against cache poisoning attacks and certain spoofing attacks, and the wrapper does not have a ....

S. Cheung, and K.N. Levitt, "Protecting Routing Infrastructures from Denial of Service Using Cooperative Intrusion Detection." Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms Workshop, Cumbria, UK, September 23-26, 1997, pp.94-106.

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Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting Routing Infrastructures from Denial of Service Using Cooperative Intrusion Detection. In The 1997.

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Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting Routing Infrastructures from Denial of Service Using Cooperative Intrusion Detection. In The 1997.

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S. Cheung and K. Levitt. Protecting routing infrastructures from denial of service using cooperative intrusion detection. In New Security Paradigms Workshop, 1997.

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Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting routing infrastructures from denial of service using cooperative intrusion detection. In New Security Paradigms Workshop, 1997.

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Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting routing infrastructures from denial of service using cooperative intrusion detection. In New Security Paradigms Workshop, 1997.

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Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting routing infrastructures from denial of service using cooperative intrusion detection. In New Security Paradigms Workshop, 1997.

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Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting routing infrastructures from denial of service using cooperative intrusion detection. In New Security Paradigms Workshop, 1997.

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S. Cheung and K. Levitt. Protecting routing infrastructure from denial of service using cooperative intrusion detection. In Proc. New Security Paradigms Workshop, Cumbria, UK, September 1997.

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S. Cheung and K. Levitt, "Protecting routing infrastructures from denial of service using cooperative intrusion detection," in New Security Paradigms Workshop, 1997.

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Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting routing infrastructures from denial of service using cooperative intrusion detection. In New Security Paradigms Workshop, 1997.

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Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting Routing Infrastructures from Denial of Service Using Cooperative Intrusion Detection. In The 1997.

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S. Cheung and K. Levitt. Protecting routing infrastructure from denial of service using cooperative intrusion detection. In Proceedings of New Security Paradigms Workshop, Great Langdale, Cumbria, UK, September 1997.

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Steven Cheung and Karl Levitt. Protecting Routing Infrastructures from Denial of Service Using Cooperative Intrusion Detection. In The 1997.

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S. Cheung and K.N. Levitt, "Protecting Routing Infrastructures from Denial of Service Using Cooperative Intrusion Detection," Proc. Workshop on New Security Paradigms, ACM Press, New York, 1997, pp. 94-106.

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