I. J. Cox and J. P. M. G. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks," IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 16, pp. 587--593, May 1998.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....watermarks are not secure against exhaustive search for the embedded sequence. Eigenvector watermarks can be much more secure, if the eigenvector belongs to an eigenvalue of G with a large geometric multiplicity. However, attacks like the sensitivity attack described by Cox and Linnartz in [4] might be successful if good objective quality measurements without reference to the original signal are known. Instead of removing an embedded watermark, an attacker can try to confuse the public watermark detector by adding another signal z with the property Clz = oZ , where 0. The ....

I.J. Cox and J.-P. Linnartz. Some general methods for tampering with watermarks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 16:587 593, May 1998.

....I ) whenever images I and I are dissimilar; 2. W(K, I ) is strongly correlatedwith W(K, I ) whenever I and I are similar (I is the image I after an attack comprising of a rotation, scale, and grayscale modifications) 3. W(K, I ) is uncorrelated with W(K , I ) for KvsK . Linnartz and Cox [5, 6] proposed simila requirements for watermarking digital video disks (DVD) The requirements 1 3 could be satisfied provided we have a robust image digest function H (visual hash function) that returns the same N bits (or almost the same N bits) for all images I that underwent a combination of a ....

I. J. Cox and J.-P. M. G. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks", preprint, 1998.

....watermarks are not secure against exhaustive search for the embedded sequence. Eigenvector watermarks can be much more secure, if the eigenvector belongs to an eigenvalue of # with a large geometric multiplicity. However, attacks like the sensitivity attack described by Cox and Linnartz in [4] might be successful if good objective quality measurements without reference to the original signal are known. Instead of removing an embedded watermark, an attacker can try to confuse the public watermark detector by adding another signal z with the property #z # # z,where #. The ....

I.J. Cox and J.-P. Linnartz. Some general methods for tampering with watermarks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 16:587--593, May 1998.

....and most watermarks can be easily defeated even by simple image manipulations. This reduces the practical usefulness of such watermarks, and leads to the question of whether more robust schemes can be developed. We describe new watermarking algorithms designed to resist a wide variety of attacks [11, 12, 13]. These include both common image processing distortions, such as lossy compression, rescaling, and cropping; and malicious attacks, including watermark distorting software such as StirMark and unZign [14, 15] For embedding and detecting one or more bits in images, we use a standard ....

I. J. Cox and J.-P. M. G. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks," IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 16, no. 4, May 1998.

....illicit copies were made. In another example, the embedded signal could either enable or disable copying by some duplication device that checks the embedded signal before proceeding with duplication. Such a system has been proposed for allowing a copy once feature in digital video disc recorders [2]. Alternatively, a standards compliant player could check the watermark before deciding whether or not to play the disc [3] Other applications include automated monitoring of airplay of advertisements on commercial radio broadcasts. Advertisers can embed a digital watermark within their ads and ....

I. J. Cox and J.-P. M. G. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks," IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun., vol. 16, pp. 587--593, May 1998.

....assert (we believe rightly) to the contrary: that some watermarks should be readily perceptible. Copy protection applications require that a watermark can be read by anyone, even by potential copyright pirates, but nonetheless only the sender should be able to embed and erase the watermark [Cox and Linnartz, 1998]. Other authors concur with this requirement of visibility: By watermarks we mean marks that are readily detectable, even by a casual user, such as a logo or banner that appears to be lightly printed over eachpageofadocument [Kaplan, 1996] The Oxford English Dictionary defines ....

Cox, I. and Linnartz, J.-P. (1998). Some general methods for tampering with watermarks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 16(4):587--593.

....communications (including steganography) 3. ATTACK CATEGORIES Before introducing the various watermarking applications scenarios it might be useful to classify all possible types of attacks on the basis of their effect on the watermark and the way the watermark is interpreted by the detector [12] [14] In this way, four broad categories can be formed [15] Removal attacks: This category includes attacks that aim at removing the watermark without degrading the perceptual quality of the product. These can be unintentional attacks that occur during common processing operations by the ....

I.J. Cox and J.P. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks," IEEE Journal of Selected Areas of Communications, vol. 16, no. 4, May 1998.

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I.J. Cox and J.P.M.G. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks," IEEE J. Select. Areas Comm., vol. 16. no. 4, pp. 587--593, May 1998.

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I.J. Cox and J.P.M.G. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks", IEEE Journ. of Sel. Areas in Comm., Vol. 16. No. 4, May 1998, pp. 587-593.

....DHSG. 3. Challenges As the copy protection system described above and illustrated in Figure 2 is implemented, an array of challenges related to the watermarking technology have arisen. The issue of watermark removal is often addressed in watermarking literature and remains an important concern [5]. There are a number of other issues, some technical and some non technical, which have also come to play an important role. In the remainder of this section we briefly introduce and discuss the following issues: enforcement, system tampering, detector placement within the system, computational ....

Cox, I.J. and Linnartz J-P., Some General Methods for Tampering with Watermarks, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, Vol. 16, pp. 587-93, 1998.

....DESIGN ISSUES As the copy protection system described in Section II and illustrated in Fig. 2 is implemented, an array of challenges related to the watermarking technology have arisen. The issue of watermark removal is often addressed in watermarking literature and remains an important concern [9]. There are a number of other issues, some technical and some nontechnical, which have also come to play an important role. In this section we briefly introduce and discuss the following issues: computational cost of the detector and embedder; false positive rates; detector placement within the ....

....Minimally, an MPEG parser and dequantizer have to be present because resources cannot be shared with an MPEG decoder. Second, the watermark detector needs logic to recognize the MPEG data type. This task may become challenging since there are a number of possible circumvention strategies [9], including PC device drivers that intentionally read out disk sectors in random order. Increases in DVD drive data rates will place higher demands on such MPEG detection and watermark detection circuitry. 2) Detector Within the Application: An MPEG decoder that implements the watermark detection ....

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I. J. Cox and J.-P. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks," IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun., vol. 16, pp. 587--593, May 1998.

....describe a fully defined and mature system. It must be regarded as a status report from an ongoing discussion. We present our findings from active participation in several forums. Portions of this article have previously appeared as white papers or responses to Calls for Proposals, e.g. 5] [9]. We strongly believe in open, publicly evaluated systems and solutions which have been discussed not only in industrial standardization meetings but also at academic symposia. Some technologies, such as encryption on DVD video discs have been standardized in the Copy Protection Technical Working ....

....features. In particular an integrity mechanism is needed to ensure that the drive and decoder negotiate about the same video data. It would allow the drive to effectuate play control, based on watermarks checked by the decoder. This also prevents the local scrambling or bit inversion attack [9]. Copy Generation Control Having covered the case of content that may never be copied, we must also deal with the much less straightforward implementation of (only) one (generation of) copy allowed. Because of the nature of this Copy Once requirement, information has to be passed along with ....

I.J. Cox and J.P.M.G. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks," IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun., vol. 16, pp. 587-593, May 1998.

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I. J. Cox and J. P. M. G. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks," IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 16, pp. 587--593, May 1998.

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I.J. Cox and J.P.M.G. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks," IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun., vol. 16, pp. 587-593, May 1998.

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I. J. Cox and J.-P. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks," IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun., vol. 16, pp. 587--593, May 1998.

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I. Cox, And J. Linnartz, Some general Methods for Tampering with Watermarks, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 16, 4, May 1998.

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Ingemar Cox and Jean-Paul Linnartz. Some general methods for tampering with watermarks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 16(4):587--593, May 1998.

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I. Cox and J.-P. Linnartz. Some general methods for tampering with watermarks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 16(4):587-593, 1998.

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I. J. Cox and J.-P. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks," IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun. (Special Issue on Copyright and Privacy Protection), vol. 16, pp. 587--593, May 1998.

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I. J. Cox and J. P. M. G. Linnartz, "Some General Methods for Tampering with Watermarks", IEEE Jou. on Selected Areas in Communications, Vol.16, No.4, May 1998, pp.587-593.

No context found.

I. J. Cox and J.-P. M. G. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks," IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun., vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 587-593, May 1998.

No context found.

I.J. Cox and J.-P. M. G. Linnartz, "Some general methods for tampering with watermarks", preprint, 1998.

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I. Cox and J.-P. Linnartz, #Some general methods for tampering with watermarks," IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications #Special issue on Copyright and Privacy Protection# 16, pp. 587#593, May 1998.

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I. Cox, J.-P. Linnartz, \Some general methods for tampering with watermarks", in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, vol. 16, no. 4, 1988, pp. 587-593.

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Ingemar J. Cox; Jean-Paul M. G. Linnartz. Some general methods for tampering with watermarks. IEEE Journal On Selected Areas in Communications, 16(4):587-593, May 1998.

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