Citations: IP encapsulating security payload

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R. Atkinson and S. Kent, IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). Request For Comments 2406, November 1998.

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Information Survivability for Mobile Wireless Systems - Parks, Weinstein (2000) (Correct)

....for the source and destination computers, similar to the return address and destination address on the envelope of a letter sent through the mail. The payload contains the data to be delivered to the destination, similar to the letter inside an envelope. Security protocols that use encryption [8 10] can protect against eavesdropping and, to a lesser extent, traffic analysis. Encryption prevents an adversary from reading the payload of intercepted packets, but any parts of the header left unencrypted, such as the destination address, can potentially provide useful information to an adversary. ....

.... RTP 12 IP 20 and the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) Audio and video applications often use the Real Time Transport Protocol (RTP) which adds 12 bytes to the header [11] Using a security protocol such as the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol adds another 18 bytes to the header [10]. Packets in real time, interactive audio streams can carry as few as 18 bytes of data in the payload. Thus headers of 28, 40, or 58 bytes can introduce significant overhead compared to the size of the packet s payload. Figure 1 compares the sizes of these headers to an 18 byte payload. Figure 2 ....

S. Kentand R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload," Request for Comments2406,IETFNetworkWorkingGroup, Nov. 1998, <ftp://ietf.org/rfc/rfc2406.txt>.

Transparent Authentication and Confidentiality for Datagram.. - Zuquete, Guedes (Correct)

....and swIPe [7] are examples of system level solutions for network security, providing security at the IP level. SKIP is a key management scheme for use in conjunction with a session less datagram protocol like IPv4 or IPv6. It has been designed to work with the IP Security Protocols AH and ESP [8, 9, 10], specified for both IPv4 and IPv6. In order to implement SKIP, each IP based source and destination must have an authenticated Diffie Hellman [3] public value in order to compute a shared secret (pairwise key) with any other IP node. Several policies and algorithms may be used to authenticate ....

R. Atkinson. IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). RFC 1827, Naval Research Laboratory, August 1995.

A Modular, STREAMS based IPSEC for Solaris 2.x Systems - Aalto, Nikander (Correct)

....specific security solutions. However, there is a strong need for a system level security componenent that would be available for all applications on all platforms. The Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC) is the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standard for the network layer security [1, 2, 3]. It is defined both for the current IP (IPv4) and the future IP (IPv6) The implementation of IPSEC is optional for IPv4 and mandatory for IPv6. The IP security offers a system level security component available on all platforms. It provides security services to protect client protocols of IP, ....

....with well defined interfaces to key management, encryption and decryption mechanisms (either hardware or software) to the host s TCP IP protocol stack, and to the application layer. The prototype described implements IPSEC Authentication Header (AH) 2] and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [3] security mechanisms, the associated control logic, and mandatory encryption algorithms, as a set of Solaris 2.5 STREAMS [16] device drivers in the IPv4 framework. Operating system dependent parts have been identified and isolated. The prototype supports both host oriented and user oriented keying ....

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Atkinson, R., IP Encapsulating Security Payload, RFC 1827, Naval Research Laboratory, 1995

A Discussion of Internet Research Focusing on Mobility and Next.. - Mackrell (Correct)

....increased security. IPv4 has various security problems and lacks effective privacy and authentication mechanisms. In IPv6 these shortcomings are addressed by two integrated options for security services [Atk95c] the IPv6 Authentication Header [Atk95a] and the IPv6 Encapsulating Security Header [Atk95b] The authentication header is a security mechanism for providing integrity, authentication and replay protection for IP datagrams between two Internet hosts. The authentication mechanism involves inserting an authentication header between the IP header and the IP data. The authentication header ....

....or only the upper layer protocol data) inside an encapsulated security payload (ESP) The payload is encrypted using secure keys, and either tunnelled using a new IP header, or forwarded using a clear text IP header. This mechanism should guard against snooping by insecure hosts along the route [Atk95b] Both of these mechanisms have performance costs at the sender and receiver. For the encapsulation security header, there are hardware mechanisms for handling the encryption of the ESP which can speed things up considerably. The authentication header requires increased computation at the sender ....

R. Atkinson. IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). Internet Draft, IPv6 Working Group, IETF, August 1995.

Filtering Postures: Local Enforcement for Global Policies - Guttman (1997) (17 citations) (Correct)

....services are modeled, so other notions of service can be incorporated. In addition, other packet attributes can be added, beyond the orientation attribute; for instance, an attribute could be used to indicate whether the header was authenticated, or whether the body is a tunneled, encrypted packet [1, 2]. We regard an abstract packet as a single item in our mathematical model, even though it represents many concrete ip packets. These ip packets are simply indiscernible, as far as we are concerned, so our theory identifies them into a single abstract packet. Since the policy in our corporate ....

....themselves, as opposed to using the routers to protect the hosts on the various network areas. Some extra machinery would allow us to model this in a natural way. Third, current interest in authenticated headers [3, 1] and in using tunneled, encrypted packets to support virtual private networks [2] will call for 9 some extensions to the methods described here. There are also some extensions of larger scope under development, namely specifications of service and router security testing. A network service policy is dual to a network access control policy. It characterizes the minimum ....

R. Atkinson. IP encapsulating security payload (ESP). Internet Request for Comments 1827, August 1995. Available at http://ds.internic.net/rfc/rfc1827.txt.

A Secure Network Server - Ajay Chitturi Chitturi (Correct)

....local process and operations initiated by the remote process as well. It makes use of the security server provided by Flask for making the access control decisions. The network cryptographic protection module provides encryption and authentication on the network traffic. It uses the IPsec protocol [4, 2, 3] for implementing the cryptographic operations and the ISAKMP protocol [17, 12] for key management. Covert storage channels caused by the use of shared resources such as the port number space will be eliminated by creating a virtualized port number space. To our knowledge there are no systems ....

....transmission between different nodes, then a clear text version is available for perusal at the intermediary node. Also the cost of key distribution could be huge. In addition end to end measures are more naturally suited to users perceptions of their security requirements. Network layer: IPsec [4, 2, 3] provides a standard for IP layer authentication and encryption. The problem with IP layer cryptographic processing is that it does not support security associations between end users in a direct manner. Bellovin in his discussion on the weaknesses of the IP layer security protocols [5] recommends ....

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R. Atkinson. IP encapsulating security payload (ESP). RFC 1827, Internet Engineering Task Force, Aug. 1995.

UNIX and Internet Security - Iyer (1997) (Correct)

....exactly as sent by the sender. The key for authentication is obtained using the security association. 6.3.2 IP Encapsulating Security Payload IPv6 header Other Headers ESP header Encrypted data. Table 6.2: Using ESP in IPv6 ESP is a mechanism to provide data integrity and privacy for packets. R.A95b] A sample secure IP datagram is as given. ESP supports two modes of operation. ffl Tunnel Mode ESP. Here the whole datagram is encrypted and is placed within an ESP frame. This is then placed within another datagram which has un encrypted headers. The information in the un encrypted headers is ....

R.Atkinson. IP encapsulating security payload (ESP). RFC 1827, August 1995.

Formal Characterization and Automated Analysis of.. - Stubblebine, Meadows (3 citations) (Correct)

....of a cryptographic protocol. In Section III, we justify how a semiautomatic technique using the NRL Protocol Analyzer [6] corresponds to our characterization of known pairs and chosen text. In Section IV, we an perform an example analysis of the IP encapsulating security payload (ESP) protocol [1]. Here we rediscover known attacks, and discover new variants of known attacks. In Section V, we conclude. In Appendix A, we give the full specification of the ESP Protocol, while in Appendix B we give the actual queries we presented to the NRL Protocol Analyzer. 2 II. the # Model In this ....

....to the intruder s knowledge. receive R (message) Know #R #M(message # Know R ) 3 Receiving a message has the e#ect of adding the message to the principal s knowledge. We also define the notion of choosing, or creating, a message nondeterministically. choose R (message : message # nd [0, 1] n ) Know #R #M(message # Know R ) For this analysis, we are assuming that only the intruder can perform choose. Other principals may create random messages, but we assume that these are known initially. The main point of the choose transition is to provide help in modelling of chosen ....

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R. Atkinson. IP encapsulating security payload (ESP). Request for Comments (Proposed Standard) RFC 1827, Internet Engineering Task Force, August 1995.

The Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP - Ramakrishnan, Floyd, Black (2000) (43 citations) (Correct)

....and participate in TCP or other compatible congestion control mechanisms. In an ECN Capable environment that is adequately provisioned network, packet losses should occur primarily during transients or in the presence of non cooperating sources. We expect that routers will set the CE bit in response to incipient congestion as indicated by the average queue size, using the RED algorithms suggested in [FJ93, RFC2309] To the best of our knowledge, this is the only proposal currently under discussion in the IETF for routers to drop packets proactively, before the buffer overflows. ....

....been developed and deployed independent of ECN, using packet drops as indications of congestion in the absence of ECN in the IP architecture. 5.1. ECN as an indication of persistent congestion We emphasize that a single packet with the CE bit set in an IP packet causes the transport layer to respond, in terms of congestion control, as it would to a packet drop. The instantaneous queue size is likely to see considerable variations even when the router does not experience persistent congestion. As such, it is important that transient congestion at a router, reflected by the instantaneous ....

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Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload", RFC 2406, November 1998.

Key Recovery System for the Commercial Environment - Nieto, Viswanathan, Boyd.. (Correct)

....low memory, reduced power, distributed systems, such as smart card and mobile instrument based systems, than that of IBM s solution. Due to the resulting increase in eciency, our system will be more suited to network layer (layer 2 and 3 in the OSI model) key recovery applications such as IPSec [1, 2]. ....

R. Atkinson. IP Encapsulating Security Payload. RFC 1827, NRL, August 1995.

Transparent Network Security Policy Enforcement - Keromytis, Wright (2000) (1 citation) (Correct)

....of a host. While work has recently started in the IETF IP Security Policy (IPSP) Working Group, development and deployment of a protocol that would allow security gateway discovery is some years away. 3. 1 OpenBSD IPsec IPsec in the OpenBSD kernel is implemented as a pair of transport protocols [7, 8]. Incoming IPsec packets are switched to the appropriate IPsec protocol for processing by ipv4 input( following the usual packet processing path in the kernel (similar, for example, to TCP or UDP) Note that only packets destined for the local host are handled this way; IPsec packets that are ....

S. Kent and R. Atkinson. IP encapsulating security payload (ESP). Request for Comments (Proposed Standard) 2406, Internet Engineering Task Force, November 1998.

Network Working Group R. Atkinson Request for Comments: 1825.. - Status Of This Self-citation (Atkinson) (Correct)

No context found.

Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload", RFC 1827, NRL, August 1995.

Network Working Group R. Atkinson Request for Comments: 1826.. - Status Of This Self-citation (Atkinson) (Correct)

No context found.

Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload", RFC 1827, NRL, August 1995.

Network Working Group R. Atkinson - Request For Comments Self-citation (Atkinson) (Correct)