Bratman, M.: Intention, Plans, and Practical Reasoning. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA., USA (1987)  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....and (b) state directed intentions (Intention that) involving the achievement of some state of affairs by performing some action. Like Grosz and Kraus [42] we believe that both types of intention commit an agent not to adopt conflicting intentions, and constrain replanning in case of failure [12]. And like Grosz and Kraus, we take Intention that to be a fundamental means to correctly mesh collaborating agents plans. However, in contrast to Grosz and Kraus, we believe that it is an Intention that, rather than an Intention to, that represents the basic intention operator that commits an ....

....When an agent intends that a state of affairs holds, then it is committed to doing something to attain a world in which the intended state holds. Hence, an Intention that commits an agent to find out, to decide, through practical reasoning, the appropriate means to attain a state of affairs [12]. Therefore, as in this paper we are primarily concerned with formalising agents practical reasoning processes, our focus will be exclusively on Intention that. The modal operator Int(a i ; t i ) is used to represent agent a i s intention that proposition holds at time t i . Like desires ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

M. E. Bratman. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

....and (b) state directed intentions (intention that) involving the achievement of some state of affairs by performing some action. Like Grosz and Kraus [42] we believe that both types of intention commit an agent not to adopt conflicting intentions, and constrain replanning in case of failure [12]. And like Grosz and Kraus, we take Intention that to be a fundamental means to correctly mesh collaborating agents plans. However, in contrast to Grosz and Kraus, we believe that it is an Intention that, rather than an Intention to, that represents the basic intention operator that commits an ....

....15 When an agent intends that a state of affairs holds, then it is committed to doing something to attain a world in which the intended state holds. Hence, an Intention that commits an agent to find out, to decide, through practical reasoning, the appropriate means to attain a state of affairs [ 12]. Therefore, as in this paper we are primarily concerned with formalising agents practical reasoning processes, our focus will be exclusively on Intention that. The modal operator Int(a, 0) tO is used to represent agent ai s intention that proposition 0 holds at time ti. That is, it means that ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

M.E. Bratman. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning, Harvard University Press, 1987.

....and (b) state directed intentions (Intention that) involving the achievement of some state of affairs by performing some action. Like Grosz and Kraus [42] we believe that both types of intention commit an agent not to adopt conflicting intentions, and constrain replanning in case of failure [12]. And like Grosz and Kraus, we take Intention that to be a fundamental means to correctly mesh collaborating agents plans. However, in contrast to Grosz and Kraus, we believe that it is an Intention that, rather than an Intention to, that represents the basic intention operator that commits an ....

....When an agent intends that a state of affairs holds, then it is committed to doing something to attain a world in which the intended state holds. Hence, an Intention that commits an agent to find out, to decide, through practical reasoning, the appropriate means to attain a state of affairs [12]. Therefore, as in this paper we are primarily concerned with formalizing agents practical reasoning processes, our focus will be exclusively on Intention that. The modal operator # ##### # # is used to represent # s intention that proposition # holds at time # # . Like desires and goals, ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

M. E. Bratman. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

....state directed intentions (Intentions that) involving the achievement of some state of affairs by performing some action. As indicated by Grosz and Kraus (1996) both types of intention commit an agent not to adopt conflicting intentions (Werner 1989) and constrain replanning in case of failure (Bratman 1987). However, since our main concern in this paper is with the agent s decision making apparatus, in what follows we will restrict our attention to Intentions that because they represent the basic attitudes that commit the agent to practical reasoning and, therefore, are inherently intertwined with ....

....constructs. As such, they cannot be regarded as (sub cognitive) agents, because they do not have the capacity to perform actions and, therefore, they are unable to affect the external world in order to reduce the discrepancy between the world and their regulatory internal representations (Bratman 1987). For example, roles may be endowed with goals, but do not have the capacity to pursue them. Only an agent, by adopting a role based goal, can bring about a state of the world in which the goal is attained. Our attempt to develop a cognitive model of roles is not entirely new in the literature. ....

M. E. Bratman. (1987). Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

....is triggered by perceptions only, the agent is called from the environment with new percepts. Time is considered in a rudimentary manner by increasing an internal count by one. The simple planning agent is obviously inspired by the beliefs, desires, and intention (BDI) model of agent architectures [9]. The attitudes, beliefs, desires, and intentions, comprise an agent s internal state. The external, internal transition, and output function are responsible for updating attitudes and determining suitable (re )actions: The external transition function encodes the reaction of the agent to ....

M.E. Bratman. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987.

....intentions (Intentions that) involving the achievement of some state of affairs by performing some action. As indicated by Grosz and Kraus (1996) both types of intention commit an agent not to adopt conflicting intentions (Werner 1989) and constrain replanning in case of failure (Bratman 1987). However, since our main concern in this paper is with the agent s decisionmaking apparatus, in what follows we will restrict our attention to Intentions that because they represent the basic attitudes that commit the agent to practical reasoning and, therefore, are inherently intertwined with ....

....constructs. As such, they cannot be regarded as (sub cognitive) agents, because they do not have the capacity to perform actions and, therefore, they are unable to affect the external world in order to reduce the discrepancy between the world and their regulatory internal representations (Bratman 1987). For example, roles may be endowed with goals, but do not have the capacity to pursue them. Only an agent, by adopting a role based goal, can bring about a state of the world in which the goal is attained. Our attempt to develop a cognitive model of roles is not entirely new in the ....

M. E. Bratman. (1987). Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

....will extend the base BDI model with new plug ins and will add a number of development and monitoring tools. Belief Desire Intention Agents The BDI agent model supported by JACK v1.2 has its roots in philosophy and cognitive science, and in particular in the work of Bratman on rational agents [1]. A rational agent has bounded resources, limited understanding and incomplete knowledge of what happens in the environment it lives. Such an agent has beliefs about the world and desires to satisfy, driving it to form intentions to act. An intention is a commitment to perform a plan. In general, ....

M. E. Bratman, Intention, Plans, and Practical Reasoning, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA (USA), 1987.

....languages or agent architectures. There is, however, a second, more procedural notion of goal. These goals are also called goals to do, because they specify a plan of action the agent is intending to execute. Also, the motivational concept of intention has been analysed in terms of plans ([1]) In Arti cial Intelligence, moreover, the concept of a plan has since long been recognised as similar to that of an imperative program. From a computational perspective, it is most natural to focus on this second type of goal. Goals in this sense are a kind of imperative program, which given a ....

M.E. Bratman. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987.

....For autonomous agents, most useful plans are not executable programs. According to the plans as intentions model, a plan is a commitment that guides, but does not uniquely determine, the specific actions an agent executes. A number of position papers and books argue persuasively for this model [2, 4, 5, 15, 16, 24, 27, 26, 31]. Several implemented systems actually use some form of plans as intentions to control their behavior [8, 11, 13, 32] Many of the different investigators working with the plans as intentions model share a view of an agent operating in a world of possibilities, using plans to constrain these ....

....as rating criteria [16] used to choose actions. This metaphor lacks explicit recognition of the strong intentional character of plans. In fact, we believe that all of the important intuitions about plans that are not programs can be captured by viewing plans in terms of an agent s intentions [4, 27, 9]. Specifically, we claim that: For autonomous agents, most useful plans are descriptions of intended courses of behavior and most useful plan following is choosing and performing behaviors that are compatible with plans. 3 A Working Model 3.1 Run Time Behavior Our informal characterization of ....

M. E. Bratman. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning. Harvard University Press, 1987.

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Bratman, M.: Intention, Plans, and Practical Reasoning. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA., USA (1987)

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Bratman, M.: Intention, Plans, and Practical Reasoning. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA., USA (1987)

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