Rubinstein, A. (1998). Modeling Bounded Rationality. The MIT Press. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Cognitive Uncertainty in Games - Thorsten Clausing University (Correct)
....to the relation between what a player believes about the consequences of different strategies and which strategy he chooses. It does not refer in any way to how he comes to hold his beliefs. In particular and contrary to what is sometimes called the rational man paradigm in economics (confer [5]) a rational player is not assumed to be a perfect reasoner who never makes mistakes. He might make reasoning mistakes, and he is aware of this possibility. In this sense, players with cognitive uncertainty are boundedly rational. Consequently, the cognitive uncertainty framework is related to ....
Rubinstein, A.: Modeling Bounded Rationality. Cambridge MA (1998)
Towards a Theory of Negotiation Strategy - Rahwan, McBurney, Sonenberg (2003) (1 citation) (Correct)
....in the real world, agents may be resource constrained, malicious or whimsical, or simply badly coded, so that participant behaviour may not conform to the assumptions of rational choice theory. Recently, research on bounded rationality in game theory has started to address some of these issues [23]. In cases where it is not possible to reach the optimal outcome (for example due to resource limitations) some heuristics have been devised. Heuristics are rules of thumb that produce good enough outcomes, and are mainly based on empirical testing and evaluation. In heuristic based ....
A. Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 1997.
A Language for Descriptive Decision and Game Theory - Pfeffer, Gal (2002) (Correct)
.... an economic point of view, bounded rationality dictates a complete deviation from the utility maximizing paradigm, in which concepts such as optimization and objective functions are replaced with satisficing and heuristics [7] These concepts have recently been formalized by Rubinstein [1]. From an AI point of view, an agent exhibits bounded rationality if its program is a solution to the constrained optimization problem brought about by limitations of architecture or computational resources [16] Our language is capable of modeling bounded rational ity in several ways. Agents ....
A.Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press, 1998.
An Alternating Offers Bargaining Model for Computationally.. - Larson, Sandholm (2002) (8 citations) (Correct)
....an agent can use, there is a risk that an agent is motivated to use some other strategy. Even if that strategy happens to be close to the desired one, the social outcome may be far from desirable. Game theorists have also realized the significance of computational limitations (see, for example [13]) but the models that address this issue have mostly had a different focus, instead looking at such things as the complexity of computing strategies [5] both memory limitations and limited uniform depth lookahead capability in repeated games [4] and showing that allowing choice in computation ....
A. Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press, 1998.
Bargaining with Limited Computation: Deliberation Equilibrium - Larson, Sandholm (2001) (8 citations) (Correct)
....a basis for deciding on an agent s best response strategy: what deliberation actions and negotiation actions (offers, acceptances, and rejections) the agent should execute at any point in the game. Game theorists have also realized the significance of computational limitations (see, for example, [25]) but the models that address this issue have mostly analyzed how complex it is to compute the rational strategies [14] rather than the computation impacting the strategies) memory limitations in keeping track of history in repeated games via deterministic finite automata or Turing machines ....
A. Rubinstein, Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998.
Multiagent Cooperative Search for Portfolio Selection - Parkes, Huberman (2 citations) (Correct)
....are unable to compute optimal investment strategies directly. The agents in our model use a firstorder approximation to a worst case optimal portfolio selection rule, which is similar to the approach to bounded rationality in game theory, placing a static constraint on the complexity on agents [47]. In comparison, economic models of metadeliberation select a level of deliberation within a decisiontheoretic framework, based on the expected value of further deliberation [22, 54, 48] In contrast to the recent literature on bounded rational learning in games [32, 44] we assume in the ....
Ariel Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1998.
Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally.. - Larson, Sandholm (2000) (1 citation) (Correct)
.... computational limitations, but the models that address this issue have mostly analyzed how complex it is to compute the rational strategies (rather than the computation impacting the strategies) Koller, Megiddo, Stengel 1996) or memory limitations in keeping track of history in repeated games (Rubinstein 1998), or limited uniform depth lookahead capability in repeated games (Jehiel 1995) or showing that allowing the choice between taking one computation action or not undoes the dominant strategy property in a Vickrey auction (Sandholm 1996) On the other hand, in this paper, the limited rationality ....
Rubinstein, A. 1998. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press.
Costly Valuation Computation in Auctions - Larson, Sandholm (2001) (7 citations) (Correct)
....happens to be close to the desired one, the social outcome may be far from desirable. Game theorists have also realized the significance of computational limitations, but have focussed on how complex it is to compute the rational strategies [9] memory limitations in keeping track of history [17], or limited uniform depth lookahead capabilities in repeated games [7] Instead, we are interested in settings where agents limited rationality stems from the complexity of the agents optimization problems, a setting which is ubiquitous in practice [22] Game theory is a useful tool to help ....
....is a useful tool to help in the design of bidding agents for auctions. There is a vast literature describing rational agents optimal bidding strategies in different types of auctions [13] However, economic models for bounded rational agents have often been descriptive rather than prescriptive [23, 17]. In order to provide a prescriptive model, Larson and Sandholm proposed incorporating deliberation actions into agents strategies in order to analyze, game theoretically, bounded rational agents in a 2 agent bargaining game [11] In auctions there has been work on both bounded rational ....
Ariel Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press, 1998.
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 22 (2004).. - Michael Bowling Bowling (Correct)
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Rubinstein, A. (1998). Modeling Bounded Rationality. The MIT Press.
The State of the Art in Automated Negotiation Models of the.. - Buettner (2006) (Correct)
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New Mathematics and Natural Computation - World Scientific Publishing (Correct)
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Constraint Satisfaction Techniques for Negotiating Agents - Monique Calisti And (Correct)
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A. Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press, 1998.
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: a critical survey - Shoham, Powers, Grenager (2003) (11 citations) (Correct)
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Partiality and Games: Propositional Logic - Sandu, Pietarinen (2001) (Correct)
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Solving Optimization Problems among Selfish Agents - Ronen (2000) (6 citations) (Correct)
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Ariel Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press, 1998.
A Language for Modeling Agents' Decision Making Processes in.. - Gal, Pfeffer (2003) (5 citations) (Correct)
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A.Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press, 1998.
Methodological Foundations for Bounded Rationality as a.. - Modarres-Mousavi (2002) (Correct)
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Rubinstein, Ariel (1998). Modeling Bounded Rationality. Zeuthen Lecture Book Series, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, Second printing.
A Language for Descriptive Decision and Game Theory - Pfeffer, Gal (Correct)
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A.Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press, 1998.
Partiality and Games: Propositional Logic - Sandu, Pietarinen (2001) (Correct)
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Rubinstein, A.: (1998) Modeling Bounded Rationality, Cambridge: MIT Press.
On the Computational Complexity of Designing Bounded Agents - Laurence, Dunne, Wooldridge (2003) (Correct)
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A. Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. The MIT Press: Cambridge, MA, 1998.
Computationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms - Nisan, Ronen (2000) (78 citations) (Correct)
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Ariel Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press, 1998.
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A. Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1998.
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Playing Large Games using Simple Strategies - Lipton, Markakis, Mehta (2003) (10 citations) (Correct)
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A. Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1998.
Questions and Answers in Cooperative and Non-cooperative settings - van Rooy (2001) (Correct)
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Rubinstein, A. (1998), Modeling Bounded Rationality, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
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