L. J. Fraim. Scomp: A solution to the multilevel security problem. Computer, pages 26--34, July 1983.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... 70s [13] In response, the Air Force sponsored several studies to design and verify secure multilevel operating systems [200] The methodology that grew was founded on the security kernel concept, which was based on the reference monitor model of 12 security [2] These operating systems, such as [183, 78, 167, 84, 93, 141, 27], were based on more formal approaches to design and verification. Conventional database systems were also addressed, as with integrity issues, or the inference aggregate problems in statistical databases[60, 79] Also in the 1970s, with the onset of networking, new efforts were launched toward ....

....Secure Operating System (KSOS) 141, 27] and the Provably Secure Operating System (PSOS) 78] Many other efforts have since taken place, such as in operating systems, database systems, and networks. Examples include UCLA Secure UNIX [199] the Honeywell Secure Communications Processor (SCOMP) [23, 84] (now certified at TCSEC Class A1 [67, 158] the SeaView multilevel secure relational database system targeted at TCSEC Class A1 [203, 62, 61] the VERDIX Multi Level Secure LAN [143] and [37] Good overview discussions of the existing formal specification and verification techniques are given ....

Fraim, L. Scomp: A solution to the multilevel security problem. IEEE Computer 16, 7 (July 1983), 26--34.

....definition of what these processes are supposed to do. Without a precise specification it becomes somewhat pointless to try and verify them. It is possible for enforcement mechanisms in the security kernel to help us increase the level of confidence in these trusted functions. For instance SCOMP [12] uses integrity labels for this purpose while SAT [4] provides a type enforcement mechanism. Of course, neither of these can guarantee the correctness of trusted functions. The controls increase our confidence by making it more difficult to plant Trojan Horses in trusted code as well by limiting ....

Fraim, L.J. "Scomp: A Solution to the Multilevel Security Problem." Computer 16(7):26-34 (1983).

....initial portion of this sequence of goals. The goals were met with varying degrees of success. Many security kernel projects are reported in the literature: PSOS [Feiertag 79, Neumann 77] KSOS [McCauley 79, Berson 79] UCLA Secure Unix project [Popek 79, Walker 80] KVM 370 [Gold 79] and SCOMP [Fraim 83] The Secure Ada Target (SAT, now called LOCK) Boebert 85] is an ongoing project at Honeywell. Landwehr [Landwehr 83] gives a useful summary of the state of the art circa 1983. Rushby criticizes the kernel approach to system security [Rushby 81b] We do not repeat his argument, but point out ....

L. Fraim. Scomp: A Solution to the Multilevel Security Problem. Computer 16(7):26-34, July, 1983.

....that we describe to implement this approach is a software architecture termed a safety kernel, a concept directly analogous to the security kernel used in security applications. Security kernels have been covered extensively in the literature and have been implemented with a number of systems [2,15,22,45]. Safety kernels, on the other hand, have been proposed by a number of groups [33,38,44] but the development of the safety kernel concept has been limited and to the best of our knowledge, none of the proposed systems has been implemented. Given the relative novelty of the idea, the goal of this ....

....whether the required security was guaranteed. Over time however, concepts have been developed that have made the development of secure systems more general, repeatable, and more amenable to verification. One technique employed in developing secure systems is based on the use a security kernel [2,15,22,45]. The concept behind a security kernel is to enforce basic security policies using a relatively simple central mechanism. The typical security problem is to monitor the access of users to objects (typically information) The security kernel approach is to require all references to objects to be ....

Fraim, L. J., "Scomp: A Solution to the Multilevel Security Problem," IEEE Computer, Vol. 16-7 (July 1983) pp. 26-34.

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L. J. Fraim. Scomp: A solution to the multilevel security problem. Computer, pages 26--34, July 1983.

No context found.

L. Fraim. Scomp: A Solution to the Multilevel Security Problem. Computer 16(7):26-34, July, 1983.

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