Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, 1993.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... Furthermore, estimating and guaranteeing available bandwidth in a wireless environment is difficult [31] Other wired network protocols have secured periodic routing protocols with asymmetric cryptography, such as Kent et al. [30] Perlman s link state NPBR,Kumar s secure link state protocol [34], and Smith et al. [50, 51] However, nodes in an ad hoc network may not have sufficient resources to verify an asymmetric signature; in particular, an attacker can trivially flood a victim with packets containing invalid signatures, but verification can be prohibitively expensive for the victim. ....

B. Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

.... Furthermore, estimating and guaranteeing available bandwidth in a wireless environment is difficult [30] Other wired network protocols have secured periodic routing protocols with asymmetric cryptography, such as Kent et al. [29] Perlman s link state NPBR, Kumar s secure link state protocol [33], and Smith et al. [49, 50] However, nodes in an ad hoc network may not have sufficient resources to verify an asymmetric signature; in particular, an attacker can trivially flood a victim with packets containing invalid signatures, but verification can be prohibitively expensive for the victim. ....

B. Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

.... Furthermore, estimating and guaranteeing available bandwidth in a wireless environment is difficult [31] Other wired network protocols have secured periodic routing protocols with asymmetric cryptography, such as Kent et al. [30] Periman s link state NPBR, Kumar s secure link state protocol [34], and Smith et al. [50, 51] However, nodes in an ad hoc network may not have sufficient resources to verify an asymmetric signature; in particular, an attacker can trivially flood a victim with packets conraining invalid signatures, but verification can be prohibitively expensive for the victim. ....

B. Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. S1GSAC Review, 11(2):1835, 1993.

....enough, or when network bandwidth is insufficient, these protocols may not be suitable. A number of research groups have developed protocols for securing periodic protocols based on asymmetric cryptography, such as Kent et al. 42] Periman s link state NPBR, Kumar s secure link state protocol [47], and Smith et al. 84, 85] In addition to the disadvantages of on demand protocols based on asymmetric cryptography, these protocols may suffer in some scenarios because periodic protocols may not be able to cope with high rates of mobility. Kumar also discusses threats to both distance vector ....

B. Kumar. Integration of security in network routing protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2): 18-25, 1993.

....network, or after a node has used most of its available hash chain elements, it can pick a new random x, generate a new hash chain from this x, and send the new generated h value to a trusted entity or an alternative authentication and distribution service, as de scribed above. 4. Attacks Kumar [23] and Smith et al. [41] discuss attacks against distance vector routing protocols. In addition, in prior work we presented some attacks against ad hoc network routing protocols [16] In this section, we summarize relevant attacks. An attacker can attempt to reduce the amount of routing information ....

....28 longer than at pause time 0 (for DSDV SQ, the average route length at pause time 900 was about 33 longer than at pause time 0) This increased route length, together with SEAD s increased overhead, created additional congestion at higher pause times in the simulations. 7. Related work Kumar [23] discusses attacks against distance vector routing protocols, and describes mechanisms to secure them using Message Authentication Codes. Although these mechanisms ensure the integrity of router to router communications, they do not withstand node compromise. In particular, they do not secure the ....

Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11 (2): 185, 1993.

....OSPF, ISIS) is clear text passwords. The sniffer attacks demonstrate that clear text passwords are not strong enough protection. Cryptographic protection of source authenticity and message integrity provides stronger protection. Considerable work has been done to secure various routing protocols [30, 37, 17, 10, 24, 36, 18, 35]. In many of these approaches, public key digital signatures are used to provide authenticity and integrity of routing messages. Using digital signatures by itself does not protect against the internal threat of a faulty router. However, it does protect routing information against faulty ....

B. Kumar, Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols, SIGSAC Reviews, 11(2):18-25, 1993.

....traffic (e.g. multicast) and the use of routing protocols that strongly limit the influence a router can have on routes chosen by other routers. In broad strokes, the results of Finn s analysis are similar to ours, although the recommended countermeasures differ due to a different focus. In [11] Kumar analyzes the security requirements of network routing protocols, and discusses the general measures needed to secure the distance vector and link state routing protocol classes. He identifies two sources of attacks: subverted routers, and subverted links. Since attacks by subverted routers ....

Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. ACM SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, Spring 1993.

....detailed description of this service. Full papers describing the key management service and its underlying proactive secret sharing protocol in asynchronous system are in preparation. 4 Related Work 4. 1 Secure routing Secure routing in networks such as the Internet has been extensively studied [36, 27, 30, 45, 46, 18]. Many proposed approaches are also applicable to secure routing in ad hoc networks. To deal with external attacks, standard schemes such as digital signatures to protect information authenticity and integrity have been considered. For example, Sirios and Kent [45] propose the use of a keyed ....

....signatures to protect messages sent to multiple destinations. Perlman [36] studies how to protect routing information from compromised routers in the context of Byzantine robustness. The study analyzes the theoretical feasibility of maintaining network connectivity under such assumptions. Kumar [27] recognizes the problem of compromised routers as a hard problem, but provides no solution. Other works [30, 45, 46] give only partial solutions. The basic idea underlying these solutions is to detect inconsistency using redundant information and to isolate compromised routers. For example, in ....

B. Kumar. Integration of security in network routing protocols. SIGSAC Reviews, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

....router C,D,E C,D,E B,C,D,E Except destination link cost information. A) Message protection countermeasures B) Update sequence number C) Destination link cost D) Predecessor E) Update digital signature Table 5. 2: Summary of Countermeasure Effectiveness 35 Chapter 6 Related Work Kumar [9] analyzes the security requirements of network routing protocols, and discusses the general measures needed to secure the distance vector and link state routing protocol classes. He identifies two sources of attacks: subverted routers, and subverted links. Since attacks by subverted routers are ....

Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. ACM SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, Spring 1993.

....attribute. Time: The time to perform the computation and verification of the UPDATE message signature. Route Selection: Time: The time to verify signatures for each link. This cost will only be incurred twice for each used link: once for the ADD and once for the DELETE. 5 Related Work Kumar [12] analyzes the security requirements of network routing protocols, and discusses the general measures needed to secure the distance vector and link state routing protocol classes. He identifies two sources of attacks: subverted routers, and subverted links. Since attacks by subverted routers are ....

B. Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. ACM SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, Spring 1993.

....been demonstrated by Garcia Luna Aceves and Murthy, efficient path traversal algorithms add minimal overhead [5] Note that all of the validation actions, which will likely account for a large share of these costs, can be done on a statistical basis to contain time costs. 4. Related work Kumar [6] analyzes the security requirements of network routing protocols, and discusses the general measures needed to secure the distance vector and link state routing protocol classes. He identifies two sources of attacks: subverted routers, and subverted links. Since attacks by subverted routers are ....

B. Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. ACM SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, Spring 1993.

....OSPF, ISIS) is clear text passwords. The sniffer attacks demonstrate that clear text passwords are not strong enough protection. Cryptographic protection of source authenticity and message integrity provides stronger protection. Considerable work has been done to secure various routing protocols [30, 37, 17, 10, 24, 36, 18, 35]. In many of these approaches, public key digital signatures are used to provide authenticity and integrity of routing messages. Using digital signatures by itself does not protect against the internal threat of a faulty router. However, it does protect routing information against faulty ....

B. Kumar, Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols, SIGSAC Reviews, 11(2):18-25, 1993.

....activity: generation and processing of link state updates. Before proceeding with the subject at hand, we first provide a brief sumary of security threats facing modern routing protocols and corresponding countermeasures. An in depth treatment of this subject can be found, e.g. in [19]. Two types of attacks are considered: insider and outsider attacks. Outsider attacks typically involve an intruder masquerading as a router who distributes fabricated, delayed or otherwise incorrect routing information. Attacks such as link and interface jamming as well deleting routing ....

B. Kumar, Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols, SIGSAC Reviews, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

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Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

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Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

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Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

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Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

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Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

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B. Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. In ACM SIGSAC Review, 11(2): 18-25, Spring 1993.

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Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

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Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

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Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. ACM SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18-25, Spring 1993.

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Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

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Kumar, B., "Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols," ACM SIGSAC Review, vol.11, no.2, Spring 1993.

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Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

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B. Kumar, Integration of security in network routing protocols, SIGSAC Review 11 (2) (1993) 18--25.

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Brijesh Kumar. Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols. SIGSAC Review, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

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Brijesh Kumar, "Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols", SIGSAC Review, vol. 11, no. 2, Spring, 1993.

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B. Kumar, Integration of Security in Network Routing Protocols, SIGSAC Reviews, 11(2):18--25, 1993.

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