Boden, M. A. (1988). Computer Models of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Seeing Things as People: Anthropomorphism and Common-Sense.. - Watt (1998) (1 citation) (Correct)
....rather dubious implications. However, following the majority of cognitive scientists, I will simply claim that artificial intelligence techniques form a useful complement although not a replacement to the more established approaches from philosophy and psychology (Miller, 1981; Boden, 1988). This project will, though, stop short of Searle s strong artificial intelligence , in that I do not want to claim that the model I will build in any sense is a common sense psychology in its own right. That is, I do not pretend that this model will offer a causal account; instead, I only want ....
....in some sense, because it must be the system as a whole that has the understanding. So, while we may accept the reply, it isn t particularly informative or helpful, and I will move on to the replies which are more directly relevant to the case for common sense psychology. A second reply (e.g. Boden, 1988; Harnad, 1991) is the robot reply , which transplants the room into the head of a robot. Now, instead of questions being asked, Searle in the robot receives input from sensors connected to the world. The philosophical argument underpinning this reply is that this gives the Chinese symbols on the ....
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Boden, M. A. (1988). Computer Models of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Seeing Things as People: Anthropomorphism and Common-Sense.. - Watt (1997) (Correct)
....rather dubious implications. However, following the majority of cognitive scientists, I will simply claim that artificial intelligence techniques form a useful complement although not a replacement to the more established approaches from philosophy and psychology (Miller, 1981; Boden, 1988). This project will, though, stop short of Searle s strong artificial intelligence, in that I do not want to claim that the model I will build in any sense is a common sense psychology in its own right. That is, I do not pretend that this model will offer a causal account; instead, I only want ....
....systems reply in some sense, because it must be the system as a whole that has the understanding. So, while we may accept the reply, it isn t particularly informative, and I will move on to the replies which are more directly relevant to the case for common sense psychology. A second reply (e.g. Boden, 1988; Harnad, 1991) is the robot reply, which transplants the room into the head of a robot. Now, instead of questions being asked, Searle in the robot receives input from sensors connected to the world. The philosophical argument underpinning this reply is that this gives the Chinese symbols on the ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Boden, M. A. (1988). Computer Models of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
A Logic of Vision - van der Does, van Lambalgen (1997) (Correct)
.... Here, we base ourselves on an abstract account of Marr s theory of vision (1982) Of course, basing one s semantics on an empirical theory brings with it the danger that the empirical theory is wrong; indeed, it has been claimed that Marr s views are almost completely wrong (Mayhew, as quoted in Boden 1988, 74) Nevertheless, we hope to convince the reader that Marr s theory is extremely suggestive from a model theoretic point of view. In particular Marr s idea of a hierarchy of three dimensional models has a good model theoretic correlate; good in the sense that the associated preservation and ....
Boden, M. A. 1988. Computer Models of Mind. Problems in Behavioural Sciences, Vol. 4.
Creative Conceptual Change - Ram, Moorman, Santamaría (1993) (2 citations) (Correct)
....knowledge and processes that underlie conceptual change and their commonalities across different performance tasks, domains, and levels of expertise of the reasoners. Furthermore, our theory of the functions, mechanisms, and knowledge involved in conceptual change will be a computational one (see Boden, 1988, 1991, and Simon Halford, 1995, for a discussion of the importance and role of computational modeling in psychological inquiry) Such models provide a computational or information processing account of conceptual change and suggest an explanation for the observed behaviors and properties of ....
Boden, M.A. (1988). Computer Models of Mind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Perception and Experience in Problem Solving - Furse, Nicolson (1993) (Correct)
....which the CMS is designed for. Anderson has concentrated on modelling how knowledge becomes proceduralised, but does not address the question of how the initial knowledge is learned in the first place. Newell defined learning as search within a problem space, but as both Norman (1991) and Boden (1988), have remarked, this seems an impoverished view of learning. Pure mathematics cannot be represented as a problem space since new constructs are continually being introduced in a relatively ad hoc manner. SOAR appears to want the domain to be precharacterised as a problem space in advance, before ....
Boden, M. (1988) Computer models of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dynamics of Arithmetic - A Connectionist View of Arithmetic Skills - Dallaway (1994) (2 citations) (Correct)
....which means that Sierra reaches impasses. Different errors are observed depending on what kind of repair is carried out. Sierra is a successful model, and the mistakes children make they do seem to derive from following faulty rules. How could a connectionist build a model of this behaviour As Boden (1988, p. 167) notes: It is not clear that processes of relaxation using multiple constraints, powerful though they may be for pattern matching, are well suited to modelling conscious planning or cryptarithmetic or even mere arithmetic, for that matter. Chapter 5 explains the approach taken in ....
....of arithmetic will benefit from such ideas. In selecting production systems, one is typically forced to build models that rely on the methods of symbolic AI. Rules, frames, plans, searching, and so on, have a role to play, but the space of computational possibilities has hardly been entered (Boden 1988, p. 260) This leaves the following open question: what kinds of computations are going to be useful in modelling the mind VanLehn has placed his bet on symbolic AI, and this has no doubt influenced the development of his theory of arithmetic. But as Pylyshyn (1984, p. xvi) states: We cannot ....
Boden, M. A. (1988). Computer Models of Mind. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
The Broad Conception Of Computation - Copeland (1997) (Correct)
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Boden, M.A. 1988. Computer Models of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Is Computer Vision Still AI? - Fisher (Correct)
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Boden, M. A. 1988. Computer Models of Mind. Cambridge,UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.
Space Mapping And Navigation For A Behaviour-Based Robot.. - Gat (Correct)
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M.A. Boden, Computer Models of Mind, Cambridge Press 1988.
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