Dennett, D. C. (1982). Beyond Belief. In A. Woodfield (Ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
Seeing Things as People: Anthropomorphism and Common-Sense.. - Watt (1998) (1 citation) (Correct)
....is as set of propositional attitudes. A propositional attitude has three degrees of freedom: the agent holding the attitude, the type of the attitude, and the proposition. An example would be Stuart (the agent) believes that (the attitude type) she likes shortbread (the proposition) But as Dennett (1982) points out, it is far from clear even what a proposition is. Dennett describes three different ways of seeing a proposition: first, as a syntactic sentence like form; second, as a set of possible worlds; and third, as structures of properties and objects in the world. What these all have in ....
....attitudes discussed earlier; while identical propositional attitudes can describe different mental states, different sentential attitudes can describe the same mental state. Both kinds of attitude can be less than useful as a tool for studying and comparing people s mental states. For this reason, Dennett (1982) retreats from both the propositional and sentential interpretations to find a way of capturing the similarity in different people s beliefs which deals with the implicit environmental references in propositional attitudes, and which deals with the problems of syntactic equivalence in sentential ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Dennett, D. C. (1982). Beyond Belief. In A. Woodfield (Ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
The Components of Content - Chalmers (1995) (1 citation) (Correct)
....believes, such a world could be actual. As long as there is such a world, satisfying the notional content of all Pierre s thoughts that is, as long as the notional contents of his thoughts are compatible his rationality is not in danger. This brings out the relation between this account and Dennett s (1981) suggestion that the narrow content of a thought is reflected in the notional world of the thinker. The notional world we can take to be a world (really a class of worlds) in which all of a thinker s beliefs (or as many as possible, in cases of irrationality) would be true. 25 A notional world ....
Dennett, D.C. 1981. Beyond Belief. In (A. Woodfield, ed.) Thought and Object. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Seeing Things as People: Anthropomorphism and Common-Sense.. - Watt (1997) (Correct)
....attitudes. A propositional attitude has three degrees of freedom: the agent holding the attitude, the type of the attitude, and the proposition. An example would be Stuart (the agent) believes that (the attitude type) she likes shortbread (the proposition) 22 Chapter 2 But as Dennett (1982) points out, it is far from clear even what a proposition is. Dennett describes three different ways of seeing a proposition: first, as a syntactic sentence like form; second, as a set of possible worlds; and third, as structures of properties and objects in the world. What these all have in ....
....attitudes discussed earlier; while identical propositional attitudes can describe different mental states, different sentential attitudes can describe the same mental state. Both kinds of attitude can be less than useful as a tool for studying and comparing people s mental states. For this reason, Dennett (1982) retreats from both the propositional and sentential interpretations to find a way of capturing 24 Chapter 2 the similarity in different people s beliefs which deals with the implicit environmental references in propositional attitudes, and which deals with the problems of syntactic equivalence ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
Dennett, D. C. (1982). Beyond Belief. In A. Woodfield (Ed.), Thought and Object. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room - Chalmers (1992) (9 citations) (Correct)
....(1980) and Burge (1984) among many others. 3. It should be noted that an internalist view on content does not preclude content from being a referential notion. A mental state may possess internalist semantic content by virtue of reference to some object or concept in a subject s notional world (Dennett, 1982), rather than by virtue of reference to the external world (as is the case for externalist content) A subject s notional world will usually match up quite well with the external world, but need not, as evidenced by the case of the brain in the vat. 3 Symbolic and Connectionist AI 3.1 Symbolic ....
Dennett, D. C. (1982). Beyond belief. In A. Woodfield (Ed.), Thought and object (pp. 1--95).
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