| Froscher, J., Kang, M., McDermott, J., Costich, O., and Landwehr, C. E., A Practical Approach to High Assurance Multilevel Secure Computing Service, in Proceedings 10th Computer Security Applications Conference, pp 2-11, Orlando, FL, December 1994. |
....of the information and the reliability, recoverability and good performance of the underlying implementation. The strategy that we adopt for extending JMCIS in a way that ensures these requirements are met is based on the SINTRA (Secure INformation Through Replicated Architecture) paradigm [16]. This paradigm views databases in more classified enclaves as potential replica sites for data from less classified enclaves. Replicated data flows from lower enclaves to higher ones via simple one way connections, yielding a high assurance MLS distributed system. The system high enclaves ensure ....
Judith N. Froscher, Myong Kang, John McDermott, Oliver Costich, and Carl Landwehr. A practical approach to high assurance multilevel secure computing service. In Proc. 10th Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, December 1994.
....information system. Independent systemhigh enclaves are established and sharing is achieved through: manual, sneaker net techniques; automated guards for which no notion of sufficiency or completeness with respect to security policy enforcement can be demonstrated; or replication systems [8]. If the number of access classes to be supported is high, then the use of physical separation becomes cumbersome, costly, and inflexible in terms of both equipment and administration. A solution is the implementation of a COTSdriven LAN supporting a family of high assurance trusted servers [1] ....
....mechanism. In order for the filter to work effectively, information within the PC must be labeled so that the filter can process it appropriately. Anything less will result in an approach to policy enforcement based on heuristics. 4.4. Replication Architectures Replication architectures [8] provide a simple technique to achieve near term multilevel security by copying all information at low security levels to all dominating levels. On a small scale one can expect them to work rather well; on a large scale, their usefulness is rather problematic. The preponderance of information used ....
Froscher, J.N, Kang, M, McDermott, J., Costich, O. and Landwehr, C.E.,.A Practical Approach to High Assurance Multilevel Secure Computing Service, in Proc. 10th Comp. Sec. Appln. Conf, Orlando, FL, 1994, pp. 2-11.
....processing system we present. The first is to create a system composed of several single level TP systems. Each single level system within this conglomeration would process transactions of a given level. Some type of trusted interconnection device, such as the Naval Research Laboratory Pump [3], would be used between these single level systems. This solution becomes unwieldy, if not impractical, when faced with the gazillion problem and a complex, conditional workflow. The second alternative would be to implement a TP system on top of an already developed MLS system, such as the XTS 300 ....
J. Froscher, M. Kang, J. Mcdermott, O. Costich, and C. E. Landwehr. A practical approach to high assurance multilevel secure computing service. In Proceedings 10th Computer Security Applications Conference, pages 2--11, Orlando, FL, December 1994.
....information sharing. SIMPLE TECHNIQUES FOR INFORMATION SHARING Some techniques that facilitate inter enclave information sharing through the use of relatively simple security critical components are: Replication of information from low to high systems, as demonstrated in SINTRA prototypes [2] using COTS replication servers in conjunction with the NRL Pump [3] a reliable, one way flow device. Higher level user access to lower level resources on demand, without the use of special purpose trusted operating systems, as demonstrated by the Australian Starlight Interactive Link [4] ....
Froscher, J. N., M. H. Kang, J. P. McDermott, O. Costich, and C. E. Landwehr, "A Practical Approach to High Assurance Multilevel Secure Computing Service," Proc. Tenth Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, Orlando, FL, Dec., 1994.
....the two systems. Such guard systems, though increasingly prevalent, typically require a human reviewer to monitor traffic they pass, because they have the capability for sending traffic in either direction. Our experience developing SINTRA (Secure Information Through Replicated Architecture)[5] provided us with a different framework in which to consider possible solutions. From the SINTRA perspective, the HIGH CDBS simply needs to include replicas of data residing in the LOW CDBS. Instead of a potentially bi directional guard processor, the SINTRA approach calls for a device that ....
....to exploit system vulnerabilities. The technical difficulty is to ensure the consistency of the replicas without introducing downward information flow. The SINTRA approach, solutions to technical problems, and prototype SINTRA implementations are documented in numerous papers and reports[5, 9, 3, 10]. A SINTRA database can be realized in centralized or distributed configurations. In the centralized case, users at different levels connect to the appropriate databases via a Trusted Front End, which also acts as a replica controller, propagating upwards changes to lower level databases. In a ....
J. N. Froscher, M. Kang, J. McDermott, O. Costich, and C. E. Landwehr. "A Practical Approach to High Assurance Multilevel Secure Computing Service," Proc. 10th Computer Security Applications Conference, Orlando, Florida, Dec. 1994.
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Froscher, J., Kang, M., McDermott, J., Costich, O., and Landwehr, C. E., A Practical Approach to High Assurance Multilevel Secure Computing Service, in Proceedings 10th Computer Security Applications Conference, pp 2-11, Orlando, FL, December 1994.
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