| Shafi Goldwasser and Leonid A. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Alfred Menezes and Scott A. Vanstone, editors, Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer-Verlag, 1991. |
....by means of existence of an idealized protocol Q such that for any adversary M , the interactions between M and P have the same observable behavior as the interactions between M and Q. The idea of expressing security properties in terms of some comparison to an ideal protocol goes back at least to [15, 6, 5, 20]. Here we emphasize a formalization of this idea by using ob servational equivalence, a standard notion from programming language theory. That is, two protocols P and Q are observationally equivalent if any program C[P ] has the same observable behavior as the program C[Q] with Q instead of P . ....
....way of formulating the requirement that a given protocol satisfy some security property or ful lls a cryptographic objective or task is by relating the given protocol to an ideal protocol that clearly satis es the property or ful lls the task. This idea appears in various forms already in [15, 6, 5, 20]. In our approach [22, 23, 17] motivated by [28, 29, 1] we formulate the relationship between the given and the ideal protocol by means of observational equivalence. It is also very useful, especially for security properties that allow protocol participants to behave in an adversarial way toward ....
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Crypto'90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77-93. Springer-Verlag, 1990.
....proofs. The typical solution is a distributed definition of scheduling which allows machines that have been scheduled to schedule certain (statically fixed) other machines themselves. Based on these requirements, several general definitions of secure protocols were developed over the years, e.g. [15, 28, 7, 23, 35, 18, 11, 37, 12], which are all potential candidates for such a framework. To allow for a faithful analysis of cryptographic protocols, it is well known that such models not only have to capture probabilistic behaviors, but also complexity theoretically bounded adversaries as well as a reactive environment of the ....
....specifications and cryptographic implementations, i.e. abstractions which can be shown to simulate a given implementation in a particular sense are known to be sound with respect to the security definitions of cryptography. Simulatability was first invented for multi party function evaluation [42, 15, 7, 28, 11], i.e. systems with only one initial input set and only one output set. An extension to a reactive scenario, where participants can make new inputs many times, e.g. start new sessions like key exchanges, was first fully defined in [34] with extensions to asynchronous systems in [37, 12] Each ....
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer, 1990.
....the integers. Finally, perhaps the most useful notion of BP is the special case of deterministic BP, where each input induces at most one accepting paths. A deterministic BP may be viewed as a mod q CBP or NBP with an arbitrary q 2. 2. 3 Secure Multiparty Computation The reader is referred to [8, 16, 22, 15, 2] for formal definitions of secure computation. We emphasize though that the issues addressed in this paper are quite insensitive to the exact notion of security. Our results provide information theoretic reductions from the task of securely computing a general function f , represented by a formula ....
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. In CRYPTO '90, LNCS 537, Springer-Verlag, 1990.
....composition. Our Results As we have described, in this work we consider the case of a single pair of parties running the same protocol, in the setting of m bounded concurrent composition. The definition of security that we use is a natural extension of the ideal model based definitions of [26, 33, 5, 7] for the standalone setting. We present both negative and positive results relating to the feasibility of (bounded) concurrent secure two party computation in the plain model, under this definition. We begin by stating our negative result, which is actually a black box lower bound: Negative ....
....model of concurrency is of great importance, irrespective of e#ciency. 2 Definitions: m Bounded Concurrent Secure Computation In this section we present the definition for m bounded concurrent secure two party computation. The basic description and definition of secure computation follows [26, 33, 5, 7]. We denote computational indistinguishability by and the security parameter (and, for simplicity, the lengths of the parties inputs) by n. Two party computation. A two party protocol problem is cast by specifying a random process that maps pairs of inputs to pairs of outputs (one for each ....
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. In CRYPTO'90, Springer-Verlag (LNCS 537), pages 77--93, 1990.
....in the literature use only intuitive and ad hoc notions of security, and rigorous security analysis was virtually non existent. Eventually, several general definitions of security for cryptographic protocols have appeared in the literature. Most notable are the works of Goldwasser and Levin [gl90], Micali and Rogaway [mr91] Beaver [b91] Canetti [c00] and Dodis and Micali [dm00] that concentrate on the task of secure function evaluation [y82,y86,gmw87] and Pfitzmann and Waidner [pw94] Pfitzmann Schunter and Waidner [psw00] and Canetti [c00a] that discuss general reactive tasks) In ....
S. Goldwasser, and L. Levin, "Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority", CRYPTO '90, LNCS 537, Springer-Verlag, 1990.
....a single execution of the protocol takes place. This model allowed for relatively concise problem statements, and simpli ed the design and analysis of protocols. Indeed, this relatively simple model is a natural choice for the initial study of protocols. Some of the many works in this model are [43, 4, 25, 36, 47, 33, 28, 3, 15, 2, 34, 38, 44, 31]. IBM T.J. Watson Research Center, PO Box 704, Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA. email: canetti watson.ibm.com Department of Computer Science, The Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot 76100, Israel. email: lindell wisdom.weizmann.ac.il Telcordia Technologies, MCC 1C357B, 445 South ....
....[10] The framework allows de ning the security properties of cryptographic tasks so that security of protocols is preserved under a general composition operation with an unbounded number of copies of arbitrary protocols running concurrently in the system. As in other general de nitions (e.g. [34, 40, 1, 42, 9]) the security requirements of a given task (i.e. the functionality expected from a protocol that carries out the task) are captured via a set of instructions for a trusted party that obtains the inputs of the participants and provides them with the desired outputs (in one or more iterations) ....
S. Goldwasser, and L. Levin, Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority, CRYPTO 1990.
....is run in a system concurrently with an unbounded number of other arbitrary protocols. This composition operation is called universal composition, and tasks that ful ll the de nitions of security in this framework are called universally composable (UC) As in other general de nitions (e.g. gl90, mr91, b91, pw00, c00] the security requirements of a given task (i.e. the functionality expected from a protocol that carries out the task) are captured via a set of instructions for a trusted party that obtains the inputs of the participants and provides them with the desired outputs (in ....
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. In CRYPTO'90, Springer-Verlag (LNCS 537), pages 77-93, 1990.
.... less than n=2) may be achieved in a constant number of rounds using the protocol of Beaver, Micali and Rogaway [6, 33] Secure mpc with dishonest majority (i.e. where up to n 1 players may be corrupted) can be achieved in O(n) rounds using the protocols of Beaver, Goldwasser, and Levin [5, 26]. Actually, these works show a protocol requiring O(k n) rounds where k is the security parameter. Using the techniques of [30] however, this may be improved to O(n) Canetti, et al. 11] give a protocol tolerating adaptive adversaries controlling a dishonest majority in a model in which a ....
....how to achieve mpc for arbitrary functionalities given a protocol for secure coin ipping. 2 De nitions Our de nition of security for mpc is taken from the works of Canetti [8] and Goldwasser and Lindell [27] which in turn follow a long line of work on de ning security of protocols (e.g. [24, 26, 31, 4, 23]) More recently, a stronger de nition of universally composable (uc) computation has been proposed [9] however, ucmpc is known to be impossible in the presence of a dishonest majority without the prior assumption of a common random string [10] Since we wish to avoid a setup assumption of this ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
S. Goldwasser and L. A. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology | CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77-93. Springer-Verlag, Aug. 1990.
....t n 2, and no more ( 21, 3, 11] All of these protocols rely on verifiable secret sharing as a basic tool. Our solution draws most heavily on the techniques of Chaum, Crepeau and Damgard [8] Beyond these basic protocols, much work has focused on finding proper definitions of security, e.g. [15, 4, 18, 20, 6]. We adopt a simple definition based on the initial definitions of Canetti. Quantum Secret Sharing. Relatively little work exists on multi party cryptographic protocols with quantum data. Secret sharing with a quantum secret was first studied by Cleve et al. 10] who showed an equivalence with ....
S. Goldwasser and L. A. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In A. J. Menezes and S. A. Vanstone, editors, Proc. of CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of LNCS, pages 77--93. IACR, Springer-Verlag, 1991.
No context found.
Shafi Goldwasser and Leonid A. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Alfred Menezes and Scott A. Vanstone, editors, Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer-Verlag, 1991.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser, and L. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. CRYPTO '90, LNCS 537, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Proc. CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of LNCS, pages 77--93. Springer, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser, L. Levin, Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority, Crypto '90, LNCS 537, pp. 77-93, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin, "Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority", Advances in Cryptology: Crypto '90 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 77 -- 93.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer, 1990.
No context found.
Shafi Goldwasser and Leonid A. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Alfred Menezes and Scott A. Vanstone, editors, Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer-Verlag, 1991.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser, and L. Levin, "Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority", CRYPTO, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of LNCS, pages 77--93. Springer, 1990.
No context found.
Shafi Goldwasser and Leonid Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Alfred Menezes and Scott A. Vanstone, editors, CRYPTO, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer, August 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of LNCS, pages 77--93. Springer, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser, L. Levin, Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority, Crypto '90, LNCS 537, Springer-Verlag, 1991, 77--93
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin, Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority, Crypto '90, LNCS 537, Springer-Verlag, 1991, 77--93 5
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. In CRYPTO'90, Springer-Verlag (LNCS 537), pages 77--93, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L.A. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. In Crypto90, Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 537), pages 77--93.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L.A. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. In Crypto90, Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 537), pages 77-93.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of LNCS, pages 77--93. Springer, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. A. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology | CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77-93. Springer-Verlag, Aug. 1990.
No context found.
Shafi Goldwasser and Leonid Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Alfred J. Menezes and Scott A. Vanstone, editors, Advances in Cryptology - Crypto '90, pages 77--93, Berlin, 1990. SpringerVerlag. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume 537.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser, L. Levin, Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority, Crypto '90, LNCS 537, pp. 77-93, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser, L. Levin, Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority, Crypto '90, LNCS 537, Springer-Verlag, 1991, 77--93
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin, Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority, in Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '90 (A. J. Menezes and S. A. Vanstone, eds.), Vol. 537, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 1991.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. In CRYPTO'90, Springer-Verlag (LNCS 537), pages 77--93, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. In CRYPTO'90, Springer-Verlag (LNCS 537), pages 77--93, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. A. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer-Verlag, Aug. 1990.
No context found.
Shafi Goldwasser and Leonid A. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. In Alfred Menezes and Scott A. Vanstone, editors, Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer-Verlag, 1991.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in the Presence of Immoral Majority. Adv. in Cryptology --- Crypto 1990, LNCS vol. 537, SpringerVerlag, pp. 77--93, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. In CRYPTO'90, Springer-Verlag (LNCS 537), pages 77--93, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L.A. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. In Crypto90, Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 537), pages 77--93.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. A. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology --- CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer-Verlag, Aug. 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. In CRYPTO'90, Springer-Verlag (LNCS 537), pages 77--93, 1990. 41
No context found.
S. Goldwasser, L. Levin, Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority, Crypto '90, LNCS 537, Springer-Verlag, 1991, 77--93
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority. In Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '90, volume 537 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 77--93. Springer, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority, In CRYPTO '90, pp. 77-93, Springer-Verlag, 1991.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser, L. Levin, Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority, Crypto '90, LNCS 537, pp. 77-93, 1990.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin, Fair computation of general functions in presence of immoral majority, in Advances in Cryptology: CRYPTO '90 (A. J. Menezes and S. A. Vanstone, eds.), Vol. 537, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, 1991.
No context found.
S. Goldwasser and L. Levin. Fair Computation of General Functions in Presence of Immoral Majority. In CRYPTO'90, Springer-Verlag (LNCS 537), pages 77--93, 1990.
First 50 documents Next 50
Online articles have much greater impact More about CiteSeer.IST Add search form to your site Submit documents Feedback
CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC