Chaum, D., den Boer, van Heyst, Mjlsnes, S., Steenbeek, A, "Efficient Offline Electronic Checks", Proceedings of Eurocrypt 89, pp. 294-301 (1990)  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... both the security and the privacy was introduced in [8] and a system was proposed that seems to fit the model (although the nature of the system is such that very little can be proven about this) Since then quite some other systems have been proposed using basically the same ideas (see [1, 7, 8, 22, 23, 29, 30, 35]) In that sense, our system is no exception. In the model of [8] there are three distinct types of participant: a set of users fU 1 ; U k g, a set of shops fS 1 ; S l g and a bank B. For reasons related to mathematical rigor, k and l have to be polynomial in the length of the ....

....vector addition chain techniques can be applied, even the verification relations are much more efficient to compute than those of previous systems. Provability) We can prove the correctness of our cash system to a very high degree, which in our view is the main problem with earlier systems ([1, 7, 8, 22, 23, 29, 30, 35]) Specifically, the security of our system seems to be equivalent to some well known hard problem (the Diffie Hellman assumption) under only a single assumption concerning an unspecified hash function that is likely to be weaker than the Diffie Hellman assumption. Extendibility) Our basic cash ....

Chaum, D., Boer, B. den, Heyst, E. van, Mjolsnes, S. and Steenbeek, A., "Efficient off-line electronic checks", Eurocrypt '89, LNCS 434, Springer-Verlag, pages 294--301.

....is offered or not. Payments in a privacy protecting electronic cash system are untraceable and unlinkable, just as ordinary coins are. A fairly large body of cryptographic literature is devoted to the design of privacyprotecting off line electronic cash systems. Almost all of this literature [7, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 25, 28, 29, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39] is concerned with systems that only offer traceability as a security measure against double spending, based on a paradigm of Chaum, Fiat and Naor [11] This measure clearly does not offer a security level that is adequate for practical purposes. If an electronic cash system is to be of practical ....

Chaum, D., Den Boer, B., Van Heijst, E., Mjolsnes, S., Steenbeek, A., "Efficient Offline Electronic Checks," Advances in Cryptology -- EUROCRYPT '89, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, no. 434, Springer-Verlag, pp. 294--301.

....is offered or not. Payments in a privacy protecting electronic cash system are untraceable and unlinkable, just as ordinary coins are. A fairly large body of cryptographic literature is devoted to the design of privacy protecting off line electronic cash systems. Almost all of this literature [7, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 25, 28, 29, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 39] is concerned with systems that only offer traceability as a security measure against doublespending, based on a paradigm of Chaum, Fiat and Naor [11] This measure clearly does not offer a security level that is adequate for practical purposes. If an electronic cash system is to be of practical ....

Chaum, D., Den Boer, B., Van Heijst, E., Mjolsnes, S., Steenbeek, A., "Efficient Offline Electronic Checks," Advances in Cryptology -- EUROCRYPT '89, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, no. 434, Springer-Verlag, pp. 294--301.

....Bank signs many more coins than useful and, by random choice, requests the user to disclose the structure of some of them. The drawback of this technique is that this increases the communication load between the Bank and the user and the space needed to store coins. There were several improvements [9, 20], and in 1993, appeared schemes without the cutand choose methodology [4, 3, 14, 13] More recently, unconditional anonymity has been criticized because of money laundering or other possible crimes [26] and escrow based schemes were put forward as a new direction of the research [18] 1.2 ....

D. Chaum, B. den Boer, E. van Heyst, S. Mjølsnes, and A. Steenbeek. Efficient Off-line Electronic Checks. In Eurocrypt '89, LNCS 434, pages 294--301. Springer-Verlag, 1990.

....improvements are 1 A theoretical, and impractical, offline electronic coin scheme with non interactive purchase is given by De Santis and Persiano [9] as an application of non interactive zero knowledge proofs of knowledge in the shared random string model. given by Chaum et al. [3]. Okamoto and Ohta [14] 15] present complex offline electronic money schemes with more features than our basic coin scheme (i.e. transferability [14] and divisibility [15] Pfitzmann and Waidner [16] building on work of Damgard [7] present an offline payment scheme that adapts the basic ....

D. Chaum, B. den Boer, E. van Heyst, S. Mjolsnes, and A. Steenbeek, "Efficient offline electronic checks," Eurocrypt '89, pp. 294-301.

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Chaum, D., den Boer, van Heyst, Mjlsnes, S., Steenbeek, A, "Efficient Offline Electronic Checks", Proceedings of Eurocrypt 89, pp. 294-301 (1990)

No context found.

David Chaum, Bert den Boer, Eug`ene van Heyst, Stig Mjølsnes, and Adri Steenbeek. Efficient off-line electronic checks. In J.-J. Quisquater and J. Vandewalle, editors, Advances in Cryptology ---EUROCRYPT '89, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 294--301. Springer-Verlag, 1990.

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