U. Feige and A. Shamir: Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge in Two Rounds, Proceedings of Crypto '89, Springer Verlag LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 526--544.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....private. Step 2 : The verifier V gives a witness hiding proof of knowledge of the trapdoor to the prover P . Step 3 : Protocol (P 0 ; V 0 ) is executed using the commitment scheme instance just generated, where P and V play the roles of P 0 and V 0 , respectively. The idea is taken from [16]. The protocol as shown here has 6 moves, but this can be condensed to 4 moves in the same way as in [16] The proof of soundness remains essentially the same, but note that in order to fool V , the prover P still has to break the commitment scheme, as follows from the proof of Theorem 3. In the ....

....P . Step 3 : Protocol (P 0 ; V 0 ) is executed using the commitment scheme instance just generated, where P and V play the roles of P 0 and V 0 , respectively. The idea is taken from [16] The protocol as shown here has 6 moves, but this can be condensed to 4 moves in the same way as in [16]. The proof of soundness remains essentially the same, but note that in order to fool V , the prover P still has to break the commitment scheme, as follows from the proof of Theorem 3. In the case of trapdoor commitments we have required that breaking the commitment scheme is essentially as ....

U. Feige and A. Shamir: Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge in Two Rounds, Proceedings of Crypto '89, Springer Verlag LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 526--544.

....advocate as the most significant contribution here. We would like to stress that the concept has been applied implicitly before, prior to [16] 16] is the first paper applying the ideas to verifier directed proofs, however. We know of at least one example, namely the protocol of Feige and Shamir [12] for bounded round general zero knowledge proofs. There, the prover commits to a witness for the NP statement to be proved using an unconditionally hiding trapdoor commitment scheme, an instance of which is generated by the verifier. Indeed, the proof conducted there can be seen as showing that ....

....of which is generated by the verifier. Indeed, the proof conducted there can be seen as showing that the NP statement is true, or that the prover knows the verifier s trapdoor To get the designated verifier proofs for general languages, postulated in [16] but not given, we can use the result of [12] and make sure that verifiers instances of the trapdoor commitment scheme are independently generated. In our setting, we restrict ourselves to the problem of identification, and attempt to formulate a very efficient solution to the problem of identification in the presence of an adaptive ....

U. Feige and A. Shamir: Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge in Two Rounds, Proceedings of Crypto '89, Springer Verlag LNCS, vol. 435, pp. 526--544.

....a given access from a user, electronically proves its identity to another computer. 2) a human user identifies himself herself to a computer in scenarios such as network access, electronic commerce, and transactions over telephones. The development of zero knowledge based identification protocols [1, 4, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10] makes it possible to solve the identification problem among computers with a reasonable complexity. However, most of these protocols do not apply to the second case for the identification between a human user and a machine, largely because a human user has a very limited capacity in memorizing ....

U. Feige and A. Shamir: Zero Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge in Two Rounds. Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'89 , Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1990,pp526-545.

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U. Feige and A. Shamir: Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge in Two Rounds, Advances in Cryptology -- Crypto89 (proceedings), pp. 526--544, 1990.

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