SMITH, J. M. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, 1982. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Time to Absorption in Discounted Reinforcement Models - Pemantle, Skyrms (2003) (Correct)
.... as interactive models in which collective learning takes place in the form of network formation or adaptation of strategies: sociologists studying the small world network phenomenon [WS98, BW00] formation of dyads of reciprocal approval [FM96] economists studying evolutionary game theory [MS82], strategic learning [RE95] FK93] or its interaction with network structure [Ell93, AI97] These models are designed to explore mechanisms by which agents with limited information, rationality or sophistication may nevertheless achieve advantageous social structures via the application of simple ....
Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Network Formation by Reinforcement Learning: The Long and.. - Pemantle, Skyrms (2003) (Correct)
....of Suppes and Atkinson. Macy [Mac90, Mac91] applies multi player reinforcement to study collective action problems from a bounded rationality viewpoint. Borgers and Sarin [BS97] draw a connection between multi agent Bush Mosteller dynamics and the replicator dynamics of evolutionary game theory [MS82], showing that the two coincide in a certain limit. Perhaps the greatest impulse to this direction of study was the widely cited 1995 paper of Roth and Erev [RE95] They proposed a multi agent reinforcement model based on Herrnstein s linear reinforement and response. Here and in subsequent ....
Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Comparing Equilibria for Game-Theoretic and Evolutionary.. - Fatima, Wooldridge (2003) (Correct)
....against a perfectly rational agent or a boundedly rational person. This divergence led to the use of evolutionary methods for studying the bargaining behavior of boundedly rational agents [18, 9, 4, 17, 1, 3] Although for certain games the game theoretic and evolutionary equilibria coincide [17, 16], in general, it has been shown that the game theoretic outcome may not always be valid when playing against boundedly rational agents [2] For instance, 18] and [4] show this in their evolutionary model for the Nash demand game, as do Binmore et al. [1] in their evolutionary analysis of ....
J. M. Smith. Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.
Game Theory and Agents - Johansson (1999) (Correct)
....to solve with game theory. The belief that an interaction only will affect the agents that are participating directly in the A strategy or mix of strategies is evolutionary stable if an infinite homogeneous population adopting it cannot be invaded by mutants under the action of natural selection[64]. A good beginners introduction to Markov models is given in An Introduction to Natural Computation, pp 215 227 [9] interaction is in general a coarse simplification, done in order to decrease the size of the game. Also, the number of possible actions are often reduced, e.g. by simplifying a ....
....the cost of being a chicken (and hence their payoff is lower, see payoff matrix in table 2.1b) In the game matrices we use ordinal numbers IV III II I to represent the different . 2.3. 3 The Hawk and Dove Game The HDG is described as a struggle between birds for a certain resource [65] [64]. The birds can either have an aggressive hawk behavior, or a non fighting dove behavior. When two doves meet, they will equally share the resource with a small cost or without any costs for sharing, but when meeting a hawk, the dove leaves all of the resource to the hawk without a fight. However, ....
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J. Maynard Smith. Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Modeling Strategies as Generous and Greedy in.. - Johansson, Carlsson.. (Correct)
....a social science point of view to explain observed cooperation, while in multi agent systems (MAS) it may be used to try to create systems with a predicted cooperative behavior. In section 2 we look at prisoner s dilemma like games and the Tit for Tat (TfT ) strategy. In evolutionary game theory [16], the focus has been on evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) The agent exploits its knowledge about its own payoffs, but no background information or common knowledge is assumed. An evolutionary game repeats each move, or sequence of moves, without a memory. In many MAS, however, agents ....
J. Maynard Smith. Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Replicator Dynamics in Combinatorial Optimization - Pelillo Self-citation (Smith) (Correct)
....DYNAMICS IN COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION Replicator equations are a class of dynamical systems developed and studied in the context of evolutionary game theory, a discipline pioneered by J. Maynard Smith [36] which aims to model the evolution of animal behavior using the principles and tools of game theory. Because of their dynamical properties, they have been recently applied with significant success to a number of combinatorial optimization problems. It is the purpose of this article to provide a ....
MAYNARD SMITH, J.: Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982.
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SMITH, J. M. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, 1982.
A dynamic model of interaction between reliance on automation .. - Gao, Lee, Zhang (2006) (Correct)
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Smith, J.M., 1982. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, New York.
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Maynard Smith, J. (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
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Maynard Smith, John (1982). Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Michie, D. (1961). Trial and error. In Science Survey, part 2, pages 129--145. Penguin.
Forthcoming In International Journal Of Logistics Management - Intelligent Product Agents (Correct)
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Maynard Smith, John, Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, 1982
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Maynard Smith, J. "Evolution and the Theory of Games", Cambridge U.P., 1982.
From Selfish Nodes to Cooperative Networks - Emergent Link-based.. - Hales (2004) (Correct)
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J. Maynard Smith. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1982.
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MAYNARD SMITH, J. Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.
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Maynard Smith, J.: Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Great Britain (1982) ISBN: 0-521-28884-3.
DNA Starts to Learn Poker - Wood, Bi, Kimbrough, Wu, Chen (Correct)
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Maynard Smith, J.: Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Great Britain (1982) ISBN: 0-521-28884-3.
Robust Incentive Techniques for Peer-to-Peer Networks - Feldman, Lai, Stoica, Chuang (2004) (6 citations) (Correct)
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SMITH, J. M. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Issues in Rational Planning in Multi-Agent Settings - Gmytrasiewicz (2003) (Correct)
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J. M. Smith. Evolution and the theory of games. Cambrigde University Press, 1982.
Learning versus Evolution in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma - Hingston, Kendall (2004) (Correct)
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Maynard Smith, J. "Evolution and the Theory of Games", Cambridge U.P., 1982.
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J. M. Smith. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1982.
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Maynard Smith, J. (1982) Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Automated trading agents verses virtual humans: An.. - Phelps, Parsons.. (2004) (Correct)
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J. M. Smith. Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge University Press, 1982.
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J. Maynard Smith, "Evolution and the Theory of Games", Cambridge University Press, 1982.
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J. Maynard Smith. Evolution and the theory of games. Cambridge University Press, 1982.
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