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Krebs, J. R., & Dawkins, R. (1984). Animal signals: Mind reading and manipulation. In Krebs, J. R., & Davies, N. B. (Eds.), Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (Second edition), pp. 380--402. Blackwell, Oxford.

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Adaptive Factors in the Evolution of Signalling Systems - Noble, Di Paolo, Bullock   (Correct)

....likely have been replaced by some other system that was stable. Since signalling systems are so prevalent and so widespread, it is hard to imagine that each is unstable in a state of evolutionary ux, poised at the brink of collapse (although some have pursued this idea, Dawkins Krebs, 1978; Krebs Dawkins, 1984). However, there is nothing to prevent an evolving system from admitting of several di erent evolutionary stable situations. In fact, it is becoming clear that many if not most interesting evolutionary systems feature multiple equilibria of this kind. Evolutionary simulation models are ....

....blu ers. According to this perspective, there is no room in the arena of animal contests for the co operative exchange of arbitrary signals; the aggressive displays observed in nature are either unfakeable because of physical constraints, or are the uninformative result of a manipulative arms race (Krebs Dawkins, 1984). On the other hand, some theorists have argued that, in e ect, competing animals share enough of a common interest in avoiding serious injury that honest signalling can be evolutionarily stable. Enquist (1985) presents a game theoretic model in which contestants are either strong or weak, and ....

Krebs, J. R., & Dawkins, R. (1984). Animal signals: Mind reading and manipulation. In Krebs, J. R., & Davies, N. B. (Eds.), Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (2nd edition)., pp. 380-402. Blackwell, Oxford.


Co-operation, Competition and the Evolution of Pre-Linguistic.. - Noble (2000)   (2 citations)  (Correct)

....members demonstrate their allegiance to the common cause by performing a costly ritual act, and this allows the rest of the group to believe their potentially fakeable signals in future. Knight s argument relies in part on a view of communication presented in the behavioural ecology literature by Krebs and Dawkins (1984). Krebs and Dawkins do not define animal communication in terms of information transmission but as a method whereby one animal exploits the muscle power of another. They outline two possibilities for the coevolution of signalling and response behaviour (see section 3) one that leads to costly, ....

....to have resulted from the second process, and that motivates his hypothesis that ritual was the key to creating the necessary co operative context. 2 Simulating the evolution of communication Interesting as Knight s work is, the goal of this chapter is to explore not his theory but that of Krebs and Dawkins (1984), using game theory and computer simulations of evolution. The sceptical reader may need convincing, however, that Krebs and Dawkins s ideas are relevant to the evolution of language. It is true that their work is most easily applied to simple animal signalling systems, and it is certainly true ....

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Krebs, J. R., & Dawkins, R. (1984). Animal signals: Mind reading and manipulation. In Krebs, J. R., & Davies, N. B. (Eds.), Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (Second edition)., pp. 380--402. Blackwell, Oxford.


Cooperation, Conflict and the Evolution of Communication - Noble   (Correct)

....Conflict and the Evolution of Communication Jason Noble In press in the journal Adaptive Behavior Abstract This paper presents a general model that covers signalling with and without conflicts of interest between signallers and receivers. Krebs and Dawkins (1984) argued that a conflict of interests will lead to an evolutionary arms race between manipulative signallers and sceptical receivers, resulting in ever more costly signals; whereas common interests will lead to cheap signals or conspiratorial whispers . Previous simulation models of the ....

....costly in a particular way. However, the handicap principle has recently received overwhelming theoretical attention (see for example Grafen, 1990; Iwasa, Pomiankowski, Nee, 1991; Hurd, 1995; Bullock, 1997) and will only be treated tangentially here. 1. 1 Manipulative and cooperative signalling Krebs and Dawkins (1984) provide another possible answer, and in so doing challenge the default notion that animal communication is about information transmission. They suggest that propaganda and advertising make better metaphors for animal communication than does the 3 cooperative use of language to share information. ....

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Krebs, J. R., & Dawkins, R. (1984). Animal signals: Mind reading and manipulation. In Krebs, J. R., & Davies, N. B. (Eds.), Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (Second edition)., pp. 380--402. Blackwell, Oxford.


Talk is cheap: Evolved strategies for communication and action in.. - Noble (2000)   (2 citations)  (Correct)

....or moving aggressively towards their opponent and thereby attacking them if contact is made. As argued previously (Noble, 1998) a secondary question that can be examined within a model like this concerns intention movements as the evolutionary seeds of aggressive signalling (Tinbergen, 1952; Krebs Dawkins, 1984). An important perceptual input in the model is the movement of the opponent, either towards or away from the focal animal, and it is possible that movements themselves could take on a signalling value, rather than signals being exchanged through the arbitrary, cost free signalling channel ....

Krebs, J. R., & Dawkins, R. (1984). Animal signals: Mind reading and manipulation. In Krebs, J. R., & Davies, N. B. (Eds.), Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (Second edition)., pp. 380--402. Blackwell, Oxford.


Protothought Had No Logical Names - Hurford (2001)   (1 citation)  (Correct)

....of reliability. Even terns presumably sometimes get it wrong. animals respond in mechanical robot like fashion to key stimuli. They can usually be tricked into responding to crude dummies that resemble the true, natural stimulus situation only partially, or in superficial respects. (Krebs and Dawkins, 1984:384) A creature can appear to recognize a particular individual reliably if it gets sensory impressions which are fine grained enough to distinguish this individual from others with which it is likely to come into contact. To manage successfully in recognizing its mother , a creature need not ....

Krebs, John R., and Richard Dawkins 1984 Animal signals: mind-reading and manipulation. In Krebs, J.R. and N.B.Davies (eds) Behavioural Ecology: an Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications.


Something to talk about: Conflict and coincidence of interest in.. - Bullock   (Correct)

.... for some time, and have proposed various attempts to deal with this problem (see Johnstone, 1997, for a recent review of this literature) They have also pointed out that the same con icts of interest prohibit a straightforward reading of meaning in such signalling systems (Dawkins Krebs, 1978; Krebs Dawkins, 1984; Maynard Smith Harper, 1988, 1995) I will argue that even if the problems concerning how honesty may be established and maintained in an evolving system are solved or avoided, the latter problems concerning the semantics of evolved signalling systems remain. I will suggest that a reanalysis of ....

....should be honest, and as a result not clear why their signals should be attended to. Despite this, it appeared that signalling was near ubiquitous across the natural world. Commentators have presented this issue of con icting interests as essentially dichotomous (e.g. Dawkins Krebs, 1978; Krebs Dawkins, 1984; Maynard Smith Harper, 1988, 1995) Either one is like a bee, living in a community enjoying entirely homogeneous interests due to its peculiar genetics, or one lives in a world of con ict stemming from the struggle to out reproduce one s competitors. Whilst the adaptiveness of communication is ....

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Krebs, J. R., & Dawkins, R. (1984). Animal signals: Mind reading and manipulation.


Go ahead, make my day: Robot conflict resolution.. - Vaughan.. (2000)   (2 citations)  (Correct)

....by ghting. Physical combat is undesirable in our robot system as it risks damage to the participants and would be costly in time and energy. Similar costs apply to real creatures and many have evolved stylized aggressive competitions as abstractions of dangerous combat (Maynard Smith, 1982, Krebs and Dawkins, 1984). We are investigating the use of aggressive behaviour to improve the eciency of robot teams; this paper presents our initial simulation experiments. Our eventual goal is to demonstrate these methods running on real robots, so we have tried to keep the simulations and controllers realistic and as ....

Krebs, J. R. and Dawkins, R. (1984). Animal signals: mind reading and manipulation. In Krebs, J. R. and Davies, N. B., (Eds.), Behavioural Ecology: an evolutionary approach, pages 380-402.


The Extent to which Organisms Construct their Environments - Bedau (1996)   (Correct)

....ease with which organisms can still construct their environments even if they do not directly alter any of the physical features of those environments. One way to construct the environment indirectly is to send a signal that causes other animals to change the physical structure of the environment. Krebs and Dawkins (1984), for example, discuss the different kinds of coevolution involved in cooperative and noncooperative communication, and how both are influenced by environmental constraints on signal detectability and discriminability. A much simpler and more pervasive method of indirect environment construction, ....

Krebs, J. R., Dawkins, R. (1984). Animal signals: Mind-reading and manipulation. In J. R. Krebs and N. B. Davies (Eds.), Behavioral Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (2nd ed.). Oxford, England: Blackwell Scientific Publications.


Evolved Signals: Expensive Hype vs. Conspiratorial Whispers - Jason Noble   (Correct)

....9QH, U.K. jasonn cogs.susx.ac.uk Abstract Artificial life models of the evolution of communication have usually assumed either cooperative or competitive contexts. This paper presents a general model that covers signalling with and without conflicts of interest between signallers and receivers. Krebs Dawkins (1984) argued that a conflict of interests will lead to an evolutionary arms race between manipulative signallers and sceptical receivers, resulting in ever more costly signals; whereas common interests will lead to cheap signals or conspiratorial whispers . Simple game theoretic and evolutionary ....

....AL work in an overarching theoretical context. To this end some general models of the evolution of simple signalling systems will be presented; the models will cover situations with and without a conflict of interests between the two interacting agents. Manipulative and cooperative signals Krebs Dawkins (1984) discuss the behavioural ecology of animal signals they view signalling as a typically competitive affair involving mind reading and manipulation. Mind reading consists of one animal exploiting tell tale predictors about the future behaviour of another, e.g. a dog noticing the bared teeth of an ....

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Krebs, J. R., and Dawkins, R. 1984. Animal signals: Mind reading and manipulation. In Krebs, J. R., and Davies, N. B., eds., Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Blackwell, second edition. 380--402.


Co-Evolution Of Language-Size And The Critical Period - Hurford, Kirby (1998)   (2 citations)  (Correct)

....Axel Kowald for their helpful input. 2 Not every property of an organism is adaptive, of course; spandrels do exist. 3 Though not uncontroversial, the idea of gene culture co evolution has been developed in a variety of models, including Lumsden and Wilson (1981) Boyd and Richerson (1985) Dawkins and and Krebs (1984) propose a coevolutionary mechanism at the root of the evolution of signalling systems, and Deacon (1992) discusses human brain language coevolution in detail. critical period for language acquisition, and a property of human cultures, the size of their languages. A gene culture interaction will ....

Dawkins , Richard and John R Krebs, 1984 "Animal signals: Mind-reading and manipulation ", in Behavioral Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (second edition) edited by John R Krebs and Nicholas B Davies, Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford. pp.380-402.


The Evolution of Language and Languages - Hurford   (Correct)

....signals to coordinates in such complex abstract conceptual networks. Deacon s terminology, especially his use of reference in this argument, is likely to confuse, or at least to annoy, linguistic semanticists. 3.2 Social preadaptations. Altruism, cooperation. Communication may arise, as Dawkins and Krebs (1984) claim, from an arms race between mind reading and manipulation. A view (with versions which may be either complementary or opposed to this Machiavellian view) is that a certain degree of altruism and mutual cooperation is a prerequisite for the rise of complex communication systems, in ....

Dawkins, Richard, and Krebs, John R., (1984) `Animal signals: Mind-reading and manipulation ' in Krebs, John R., and Davies, N.B., (Eds) Behavioural Ecology: an Evolutionary Approach (second edition), Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications.


Tough guys don't dance: Intention movements and the evolution of.. - Noble (1998)   (3 citations)  (Correct)

....by a choice of actions and thus may fail to capture critical aspects of real time interactions. There is a second motivation for the work presented here. Whilst the honest signalling of intentions looks unlikely from a game theoretic perspective, it has been cogently argued (Tinbergen, 1952; Krebs Dawkins, 1984) that intention movements (i.e. movements necessarily preceding an action, such as a dog baring its teeth to bite) probably function as seeds in signal evolution. Rather than incorporating an exchange of artificial, discrete signals, the current model seeks 1 0:5v Gamma c v Gamma d, where ....

....(1995) prediction, that the strongest animals would signal their strength and the weakest would attempt to bluff, was not borne out either, although high levels of bluffing were observed. Indeed, the data on bluffing strongly support the conventional game theoretic view (Maynard Smith, 1982; Krebs Dawkins, 1984) that participants in aggressive interactions will eventually come to pay little attention to each other s manipulative signals . For example, in the CFA case (figure 5) the weakest animats start with an aggressive move about a third of the time. These bluffs at least occasionally result in the ....

Krebs, J. R., & Dawkins, R. (1984). Animal signals: Mind reading and manipulation. In Krebs, J. R., & Davies, N. B. (Eds.), Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (Second edition)., pp. 380--402. Blackwell, Oxford.


The Evolution of Animal Comunication Systems: . . . - Noble (1998)   (Correct)

No context found.

Krebs, J. R., & Dawkins, R. (1984). Animal signals: Mind reading and manipulation. In Krebs, J. R., & Davies, N. B. (Eds.), Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach (Second edition), pp. 380--402. Blackwell, Oxford.


Enhancing Game Theory With Coevolutionary Simulation Models.. - Dave Harris Seth   (Correct)

No context found.

J. R. Krebs & R. Dawkins, "Animal signals: Mind-reading and Manipulation," Behavioural Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach, 2 nd Edition, Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford, pp 380-402, 1984.


Learning and the Emergence of Coordinated Communication - Oliphant, Batali (1997)   (10 citations)  (Correct)

No context found.

John R. Krebs and Richard Dawkins. Animal signals: Mind-reading and manipulation. In J. R. Krebs and N. B. Davies, editors, Behavioral Ecology: An Evolutionary Approach, chapter 15, pages 380--402. Blackwell Scientific Publications, Oxford, second edition, 1984.

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