Hinde, R. A. (1981). Animal signals: Ethological and games-theory approaches are not incompatible. Animal Behaviour, 29, 535--542.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....system is trivial. Reliable communication requires, on average, honest signallers and trusting receivers, and thus will only develop when PS 0 and PR 0, i.e. when both participants are selected to participate. However, real animals sometimes communicate despite apparent conflicts of interest (Hinde, 1981). Recent models (Grafen, 1990; Bullock, 1997) have established 4 No sig. II II I Low High I II II Pos. Pos. Pos. Pos. Neg. Neg. Neg. Neg. Sig. No sig. Sig. Figure 2: Extended form of the simple signalling game. The shaded cell in each chart icon indexes the relevant payoff value in ....

Hinde, R. A. (1981). Animal signals: Ethological and games-theory approaches are not incompatible. Animal Behaviour, 29, 535--542.

....on S R receiver (P signaller (P ) Figure 1: Possible communication scenarios classified by their effects on the fitness of each participant. 0 and PR 0, i.e. when both agents are selected to participate. However, real animals sometimes communicate despite apparent conflicts of interest (Hinde, 1981). Recent models (Grafen, 1990; Bullock, 1997) have established that, in certain situations where communication would otherwise be unstable, increasing the production costs of the signal can lead to a prediction of evolutionarily stable signalling. Therefore, in the current model, PS and PR refer ....

Hinde, R. A. (1981). Animal signals: Ethological and games-theory approaches are not incompatible. Animal Behaviour, 29, 535--542.

....system is trivial. Reliable communication requires, on average, honest signallers and trusting receivers, and thus will only develop when PS 0 and PR 0, i.e. when both agents are selected to participate. However, real animals sometimes communicate despite apparent conflicts of interest (Hinde 1981). Recent models (Grafen 1990; Bullock 1997) have established that, in certain situations where communication would otherwise be unstable, increasing the production costs of the signal can 1 The term agent is used to refer to an entity that may be playing a signalling or a receiving role. II ....

Hinde, R. A. 1981. Animal signals: Ethological and games-theory approaches are not incompatible. Animal Behaviour 29:535--542.

....in red deer) then it will be evolutionarily stable for animals to use the signal to settle contests, escalating only when opponents are well matched. However, the similar use of fakeable signals is not expected to be stable. This latter conclusion is apparently at odds with the ethological data (Hinde, 1981). Sometimes animals do seem to pay attention to threat displays that could be (and are) faked, as when a mantis shrimp, its exoskeleton soft and vulnerable after moulting, successfully drives off an intruder that could in fact defeat it in combat. Several authors have tried to address this ....

Hinde, R. A. (1981). Animal signals: Ethological and games-theory approaches are not incompatible. Animal Behaviour, 29, 535--542.

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Hinde, R. A. (1981). Animal signals: Ethological and games-theory approaches are not incompatible. Animal Behaviour, 29, 535--542.

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Robert A. Hinde. Animal signals: Ethological and games-theory approaches are not incompatible. Animal Behavior, 2:535--542, 1981.

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