B. Kaliski. Timing attacks on cryptosystems. RSA Bulletin, (2), January 1996. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
Computational Alternatives to Random Number Generators - Raïhi, Naccache.. (1998) (Correct)
.... and sends m 0 = w e m mod n to the authority who replies with s 0 = w ed m d mod n that the user un blinds by a modular division (s = s 0 =w = m d mod n) The blinding technique can also be used to prevent timing attacks [15] but it requires again a random blinding factor [14]. More fundamentally, our technique completely eliminates a well known attack on Mc Eleice s cryptosystem [18] where, by asking the sender to re encrypt logarithmically many messages, one can lter out the error vectors (e, chosen randomly by the sender at each encryption) through simple majority ....
B. Kaliski. Timing Attacks on Cryptosystems. RSA Laboratories' Bulletin, 2, January 1996.
SET Secure Electronic Transaction Specification - Book Programmer's Guide (Correct)
....such attacks are theoretically possible, they can be prevented by physical means. Also not addressed are attacks based on the analysis of timing characteristics of SET processing [Koc96] these can be handled through means such as those described in RSA Laboratories bulletin on timing attacks [Kal96]. Book 2: Programmer s Guide SET Secure Electronic Transaction Specification Page 524 May 31, 1997 Version 1.0 General Implementation Guidelines Introduction This section provides general implementation guidelines, which are based on the assumptions discussed in the previous section. These ....
B. Kaliski, Timing Attacks on Cryptosystems, RSA Laboratories Bulletin, No. 2, January 23, 1996. Available from http://www.rsa.com.
Computational Alternatives to Random Number Generators - M'Raïhi, Naccache.. (1998) (Correct)
.... and sends m 0 = w e m mod n to the authority who replies with s 0 = w ed m d mod n that the user un blinds by a modular division (s = s 0 =w = m d mod n) The blinding technique can also be used to prevent timing attacks [15] but it requires again a random blinding factor [14]. More fundamentally, our technique completely eliminates a well known attack on Mc Eleice s cryptosystem [18] where, by asking the sender to re encrypt logarithmically many messages, one can filter out the error vectors (e, chosen randomly by the sender at each encryption) through simple majority ....
B. Kaliski. Timing Attacks on Cryptosystems. RSA Laboratories' Bulletin, 2, January 1996.
Comments on Some New Attacks on Cryptographic Devices - Jr., al. (1997) (10 citations) Self-citation (Kaliski) (Correct)
....must have tamper resistant storage for the keys. These recent attacks serve as a reminder that the devices must also have tamper resistant processing for the cryptographic operations. Conclusion Like the timing attacks on RSA and other cryptosystems observed last year by Paul Kocher [8] see [7] for discussion) the attacks described in this bulletin show again that security involves more than just good algorithms. Indeed, good engineering is essential. The underlying security of RSA, DES and other algorithms has not been questioned, only the security of particular implementations ....
B. Kaliski. Timing attacks on cryptosystems. RSA Laboratories ' Bulletin, No. 2, January 23, 1996. Available from http://www.rsa.com/.
On the Performance, Feasibility, and Use of Forward-Secure.. - Cronin, Jamin, al. (2003) (Correct)
No context found.
B. Kaliski. Timing attacks on cryptosystems. RSA Bulletin, (2), January 1996.
On the Performance, Feasibility, and Use of.. - Cronin, Jamin.. (2003) (Correct)
No context found.
B. Kaliski. Timing attacks on cryptosystems. RSA Bulletin, (2), January 1996.
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