Daniel C. Dennett. Minds, Machines and Evolution: Philosophical Studies, chapter Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of A.I. Cambridge University Press, 1984. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited in the following contexts:
Formalising the Common Sense of a Mobile Robot - Santos (1998) (Correct)
....Since most events leave most facts untouched, most axioms in the system will be of this tedious kind. Most steps of a proof involving dynamical situations like this will be aimed at proving that something is still true in a given state of the world by stringing together such axioms. Dennett [10] gives the following characterization to the frame problem: for this problem concerns how to represent all that hard won empirical information a problem that arises independently of the truth value, probability, warranted assertability, or subjective certainty of any of it. The empirical ....
Daniel C. Dennett. Minds, Machines and Evolution: Philosophical Studies, chapter Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of A.I. Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Common Sense of a Mobile Robot and the Consistency of Event.. - Santos (1999) (Correct)
....Since most events leave most facts untouched, most axioms in the system will be of this tedious kind. Most steps of a proof involving dynamical situations like this will be aimed at proving that something is still true in a given state of the world by stringing together such axioms. Dennett [1] gives the following characterization to the frame problem: for this problem concerns how to represent all that hard won empirical information a problem that arises independently of the truth value, probability, warranted assertability, or subjective certainty of any of it. The empirical ....
Daniel C. Dennet. Minds, Machines and Evolution: Philosophical Studies, chapter Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of A.I. Cambridge University Press, 1984.
Formalising the Common Sense of a Mobile Robot - Santos (1998) (Correct)
....Since most events leave most facts untouched, most axioms in the system will be of this tedious kind. Most steps of a proof involving dynamical situations like this will be aimed at proving that something is still true in a given state of the world by stringing together such axioms. Dennett [10] gives the following characterization to the frame problem: for this problem concerns how to represent all that hard won empirical information 6 a problem that arises independently of the truth value, probability, warranted assertability, or subjective certainty of any of it. The empirical ....
Daniel C. Dennett. Minds, Machines and Evolution: Philosophical Studies, chapter Cognitive Wheels: The Frame Problem of A.I. Cambridge University Press, 1984.
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