Nancy G. Leveson and Timothy J. Shimeall. Safety assertions for process-control systems. In Proceedings 13th Int'l Symposium on Fault Tolerant Computing, pages 236--240, June 1983.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....our tool. The Monitoring and Assertion tool (MAC) 4] is a formal analysis technique for monitoring symbolic execution traces generated by the Modechart Toolset [5] It provides a mechanism for evaluating properties of the system on a particular execution trace. Leveson s work in the early 1980 s [21] is early recognition of the need for run time checking for hazard prevention. Her synchronous approach, though, requires embedding constraints in the application. On line Application of Query Languages. In Liu and Pu s work on continual queries [22] a client specifies continual querys over ....

Nancy G. Leveson and Timothy J. Shimeall. Safety assertions for process-control systems. In Proceedings 13th Int'l Symposium on Fault Tolerant Computing, pages 236--240, June 1983.

....were static, that is, they required that all constraints be known at compile time. Given the exploratory and what if potential of safety constraints, application of the relational model to hazard detection must be accompanied by adaptation techniques. Leveson s work in the early 1980 s [13] is early recognition of the need for run time checking for hazard prevention. Her synchronous approach, though, requires embedding all constraints in the application. This is not necessary in the Cnet architecture where both synchronous and asynchronous checking may be done. 7 Conclusion and ....

Nancy G. Leveson and Timothy J. Shimeall. Safety assertions for process-control systems. In Proceedings 13th Int'l Symposium on Fault Tolerant Computing, pages 236--240, June 1983.

....monitoring were static, that is, they required that all constraints be known at compile time. Given the exploratory and what if potential of safety constraints, application of the relational model to hazard detection must be accompanied by adaption techniques. Leveson s work in the early 1980 s [12] is early recognition of the need for run time checking for hazard prevention. Her synchronous approach, though, requires embedding all constraints in the application. This is not necessary in the Cnet architecture where both synchronous and asynchronous checking may be done. 7 Conclusion and ....

Nancy G. Leveson and Timothy J. Shimeall. Safety assertions for process-control systems. In Proceedings 13th Int'l Symposium on Fault Tolerant Computing, pages 236--240, June 1983.

....error and not an example of unsafe software [25] 2.2 Safety Critical Applications Various features that could be included in a safety kernel have been built into almost every safety critical system utilizing software. Common techniques include watchdog timers, input and output assertions [32], sequencing checkers [44] fault tolerant data structures [48] software isolation [1] and software self checking [20] These techniques have been incorporated largely in an ad hoc fashion. Some of the systems that are presently the state of art in this area are described below. The control of ....

Leveson, N. G. and T. J. Shimeall, "Safety Assertions for Process-Control Systems, " in Proceedings of 13th International Conference on Fault Tolerant Computing, Milan, Italy, June, 1983.

....In addition, the compiler generates completely platform independent code making it very easy to perform analysis at a remote location (i.e. closer to the source) or for distributing pieces of the analysis tool across heterogeneous machines. In contrast to previous static analysis approaches [LS83] Cnet is designed to support evolving applications. The long running nature of such applications requires that the analysis tool be adaptable to changes in application state or user level knowledge. Cnet is adaptable in that constraints specified over the existing set of extracted state can be ....

....to monitoring were static, that is, they required that all constraints be known at compile time. Given the exploratory and what if potential of safety constraints, applying the relational model to hazard detection must be accommodated by adaption techniques. Leveson s work in the early 1980 s [LS83] is early recognition of the need for run time checking for hazard prevention. Her synchronous approach, however, requires embedding all constraints in the application. This is not necessary in the Cnet architecture where both synchronous and asynchronous checking may be done. 5.7 Summary The ....

Nancy G. Leveson and Timothy J. Shimeall. Safety assertions for process-control systems. In Proceedings 13th Int'l Symposium on Fault Tolerant Computing, pages 236--240, June 1983.

....our tool. The Monitoring and Assertion tool (MAC) 2] is a formal analysis technique for monitoring symbolic execution traces generated by the Modechart Toolset [3] It provides a mechanism for evaluating properties of the system on a particular execution trace. Leveson s work in the early 1980 s [13] is early recognition of the need for run time checking for hazard prevention. Her synchronous approach, though, requires embedding constraints in the application. On line Application of Query Languages. In Liu and Pu s work on continual queries [14] a client specifies continual queries over ....

Nancy G. Leveson and Timothy J. Shimeall. Safety assertions for process-control systems. In Proceedings 13th Int'l Symposium on Fault Tolerant Computing, pages 236--240, June 1983.

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