J. Rushby. Noninterference, transitivity and channel-control security policies. Technical report, SRI, 1992.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....use the libraries without appropriate checks, making them vulnerable to using strings read from an untrusted source such as the network. Analyses that nd such format string vulnerabilities in C [22] are similar to integrity only information ow analysis. Intransitive noninterference policies [19,14,18] generalize noninterference to describe systems that contain restricted downgrading mechanisms. The work by Bevier et al. on controlled interference [3] is most similar to this work in allowing policies for information released to a set of agents. 6 Conclusions Security typed languages are a ....

John Rushby. Noninterference, transitivity and channel-control security policies. Technical report, SRI, 1992.

....and Liskov [15] define a form of selective declassification that can be checked at compile time, based on the authority of the declassifying process. However, these efforts provide only limited characterization of the safety of the declassification process. Intransitive noninterference policies [19, 17, 18] generalize noninterference to describe systems that contain restricted downgrading mechanisms. The work by Bevier et al. on controlled interference [3] is most similar to this work in allowing the specification of policies for information released to a set of agents. Their notion of agent largely ....

J. Rushby. Noninterference, transitivity and channel-control security policies. Technical report, SRI, 1992.

....policy are explicit in the labels appearing in the program; others are implicit in the declassifications and endorsements made in the program text. There has been some work on specifying end to end security for systems containing downgrading, such as the work on intransitive noninterference [38, 34] and on robust declassification [52] Jif and secure program partitioning are complementary to current initiatives for privacy protection on the Internet. For example, the recent Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) 32] provides a uniform system for specifying users confidentiality policies. ....

John Rushby. Noninterference, transitivity and channel-control security policies. Technical report, SRI, 1992.

....policy are explicit in the labels appearing in the program; others are implicit in the declassifications and endorsements made in the program text. There has been some work on specifying end to end security for systems containing downgrading, such as the work on intransitive noninterference [38, 34] and on robust declassification [49] Jif and secure program partitioning are complementary to current initiatives for privacy protection on the Internet. For example, the recent Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) 32] provides a uniform system for specifying users confidentiality policies. ....

John Rushby. Noninterference, transitivity and channel-control security policies. Technical report, SRI, 1992.

....and Liskov [15] define a form of selective declassification that can be checked at compile time, based on the authority of the declassifying process. However, these efforts provide only limited characterization of the safety of the declassification process. Intransitive noninterference policies [19, 17, 18] generalize noninterference to describe systems that contain restricted downgrading mechanisms. The work by Bevier et al. on controlled interference [3] is most similar to this work in allowing the specification of policies for information released to a set of agents. Their notion of agent largely ....

J. Rushby. Noninterference, transitivity and channel-control security policies. Technical report, SRI, 1992.

....policy are explicit in the labels appearing in the program; others are implicit in the declassifications and endorsements made in the program text. There has been some work on specifying end to end security for systems containing downgrading, such as the work on intransitive noninterference [38, 34] and on robust declassification [49] Jif and secure program partitioning are complementary to current initiatives for privacy protection on the Internet. For example, the recent Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) 32] provides a uniform system for specifying users confidentiality policies. ....

John Rushby. Noninterference, transitivity and channel-control security policies. Technical report, SRI, 1992.

....(oid 2 dom ffi first(oid ) req ) then lab = ffi oid ) req else lab = invisible 4 Security Analysis Since the actions of the label manager are not mediated by the security kernel we must prove that it is multilevel secure. This is done by using an unwound version of non interference [6, 14] to prove that no series of high level requests to the manager can interfere with what a low level, or disjoint level, user can view. State LabelStore looks the same as state LabelStore 0 , when viewed from security level vl , if the label projections of the objects, whose levels are dominated ....

J. Rushby. Noninterference, transitivity and channel-control security policies. Technical Report SRI-CSL-92-02, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA., December 1992.

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J. Rushby. Noninterference, transitivity and channel-control security policies. Technical report, SRI, 1992.

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J.Rushby: Noninterference, Transitivity and Channel-Control Security Policies. SRI Techical Report (1992)

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J. Rushby. Noninterference, transitivity and channel-control security policies. Technical Report SRI-CSL-92-02, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA., Dec. 1992.

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