Thomas Y. C. Woo and Simon S. Lam. `Authentication' revisited. Computer, 25(3):10, March  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....led) to vulnerabilities. By applying JLKNM to the RV logic, we can reveal the Needham Schroeder public key protocol flaw that was discovered by Lowe [Low96] which traditional BAN analysis did not (and cannot) expose. We can also check that an optimized version of the Woo Lam protocol [WL92a, WL92b] with fewer messages and less encryption than the original version preserves honesty, secrecy, and belief properties of the original protocol; BAN analysis would be insufficient to demonstrate the safety of the improved protocol. Like other belief logics, RV takes a constructive approach to ....

Thomas Y. C. Woo and Simon S. Lam. `Authentication' revisited. Computer, 25(3):10, March

....examination. For example, if security violation is detected, a log can be used to reconstruct the sequence of interactions that led up to the violation. Among these problems, authentication is the most basic, as well as the most studied one. Much work has recently been done on authentication [3, 6, 9, 19]. Its main issues are fairly well understood. In fact, several implementations of distributed authentication are already available, e.g. Kerberos from MIT [5, 17] which has also been integrated as part of the OSF DCE Security Service [16] SPX [18] from DEC, and KryptoKnight [12] from IBM. On ....

....of which one to use depends on many factors. We have structured our design in a modular way. Thus, any mutual authentication protocol that provides an authenticated, integrity protected and secret channel would suffice. Indeed, any of the existing authentication systems could have been used (e.g. [12, 17, 18, 19]) 5.2 Authenticated Delegation The basic idea of an authenticated delegation is fairly straightforward. Consider two processes P and Q. After performing mutual authentication, P and Q share a secret channel k. 17 If P wants to delegate to Q, it can generate a new secret key k d and send it ....

T.Y.C. Woo and S.S. Lam. Authentication for distributed systems. Computer, 25(1):39--52, January 1992. See also "Authentication" revisited. Computer, 25(3):10--10, March 1992.

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T.Y.C. Woo and S.S. Lam. "Authentication" revisited. Computer, 25(3):10, March 1992.

....on Authentication Protocol Design Thomas Y.C. Woo Simon S. Lam Department of Computer Sciences The University of Texas at Austin Austin, Texas 78712 1188 1 Introduction The purpose of this note is to describe a useful lesson we learned on authentication protocol design. In a recent article [9], we presented a simple authentication protocol to illustrate the concept of a trusted server. The protocol has a flaw, which was brought to our attention by Mart in Abadi of DEC. In what follows, we first describe the protocol and its flaw, and how the flaw was introduced in the process of ....

T.Y.C. Woo and S.S. Lam. Authentication for distributed systems. Computer, 25(1):39--52, January 1992. See also "Authentication" revisited. Computer, 25(3):10--10, March 1992.

....of these basic protocols and addresses weaker environment assumptions, stronger postconditions, or both. Also, a realistic protocol may use both symmetric and asymmetric cryptosystems. The protocols presented in the balance of this paper have been slightly revised from the ones published in [16]. The revisions ensure that they follow a design principle for authentication protocols called the Principle of Full Information as expounded in [18] According to the principle, a principal should, in an authentication exchange, include in each outgoing encrypted message all of the information it ....

....negotiation can be performed the first time a principal is contacted. The peer authentication protocol in our framework is shown in Figure 6. It actually consists of two separate protocols, one for connection establishment and one for connection release. 2 This protocol was first introduced in [16]. An implementation of the protocol to provide a secure socket service was reported in [15] Its design principles and correctness proof were presented in [17] The protocol assumes that the public key of each principal is known by all other principals. For example, Q knows k P and kA , the ....

T.Y.C. Woo and S.S. Lam. Authentication for distributed systems. Computer, 25(1):39--52, January 1992. See also "Authentication" revisited. Computer, 25(3):10, March 1992.

....SNP s implementation, it is helpful to first briefly describe our implementation of GSS API. The authentication protocol underlying our GSS API implementation is shown in Figure 6 (I denotes the initiator, R the responder and AS the authentication server) The protocol was initially published in [22], and later verified in [20, 23] The mapping of this protocol to GSS API is quite straightforward, and is described in [23] The key point to note is that the communications with AS (steps (CE4) CE6) are completely encapsulated within GSS API, and are not observable by the SNP layer. ....

T.Y.C. Woo and S.S. Lam. "Authentication" revisited. Computer, 25(3):10, March 1992.

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Thomas Y. C. Woo and Simon S. Lam. `Authentication' revisited. Computer, 25(3):10, March

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