David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84-88, 1981.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....communication protocols can achieve any two, but not all three of these critical properties. Past work can be grouped into three categories: source rewriting systems, broadcast protocols, and DC nets. Source rewriting systems Source rewriting systems provide anonymity via packet reshu#ing. Mixes [1] work by removing the timing correlation between arriving packets and outgoing packets. A mix is a forwarder node that queues incoming packets for a period of time 0 t T such that, when finally sent, the packets appear as if they may have originated from any one of the nodes that contacted ....

D. Chaum. Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84--88, 1981.

....Return addresses ro, r,o Forwarder: Each of the forwarders (take a0 as an example) receives the mes sage, finding an encrypted share h0 ko, a key k0 and a random number v0 and the publisher s return address. He then picks a storer 80 to store the share and This is a technique first described in [Cha81]. A (standard) onion for destination d with mes sage M and peer sequence so. sn is Sl . d, M a =n . o which is sent to so. si is the address of the server and ka is its public key. A return address is a kind of onion which, if included in an anonymous message, can be used to reply to ....

....and peer sequence so. sn is Sl . d, M a =n . o which is sent to so. si is the address of the server and ka is its public key. A return address is a kind of onion which, if included in an anonymous message, can be used to reply to that message without revealing the original sender (see [Cha81] for details) a number v which the storer would associate the share with. He constructs an onion for delivering these to the storer. Thus, he puts the encrypted share, v, as well as its own anonymous return address rao into the onion as the message and sends it off (see Figure 2a) He remembers ....

D. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the A. C.M., 24(2):84 88, 1981.

....Finally, we look at dummy traffic and SG mLxes as other promising ways of protecting against the attacks, point out potential weaknesses in existing designs, and suggest improvements. I Introduction Many modern anonymity systems are based on mixes. Chaum first introduced the concept in 1981 [2], and since then researchers and developers have described many mix variations, e.g. 8, 9, 11] These have different aims and approaches, yet we still fail to understand the performance and anonymity tradeoffs between them. In fact, some of the mixes used in well known fielded systems such as ....

....the adversary from learning the details of message flow, but at the same time it allows a compromised mLx to manipulate message flow, for example by delaying a message until it s ready to launch a trickle attack on the downstream hop. Many basic mix verification schemes, such as that proposed in [2] where senders observe the batches exiting a mix to confirm it processed their messages, require schemes where the messages come out with the next mix flush. More complex robustness schemes [9] enforce timely message processing if the adversary does not own a threshold of participating mLxes. The ....

David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84 88, 1981.

....communication such as preventing the attacker from embedding URLs pointing to the attacker s webpage in messages in the hope that the victim s browser opens them automatically. Instead, we focus on examining ways of analysing the anonymity of a messages going through mix based anonymity systems [Cha81] in which all network communication is observable by the attacker. In such a system, the sender, instead of passing the message directly to the recipient, forwards it via a number of mixes. Each mix waits for n messages to arrive before decrypting and forwarding them in a random order, thus hiding ....

D. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the A.C.M., 24(2):84-88, 1981.

....centers, in order to decide whether the input (the secret) is valid or not. AMPC is a new approach for Anonymity without Cryptography, suggested by Malkhi Pavlov [MP01] In an AMPC, there are several levels (rows) of players, each row basically serving as the analog of one MixNet server [Cha81]. To use AMPC, users split their input into several shares, and submit each share to one of the players in the the rst (top) row. The top row players permute the input shares they receive (using an agreed upon permutation) Then each player splits his share into several sub shares, and passes ....

D. Chaum. \Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms". Communications of the ACM 24(2):84-88, 1981.

....mix server from 4(k 1)N to 4N , where k is the number of mix servers, and N is the (large) number of senders. Thus the modi ed protocol outperforms the original by a factor k 1, with complexity essentially independent of k. 1 Introduction The notion of a mix net was invented by Chaum [3], and further developed by a number of people. Properly constructed a mix net enables a set of senders to send messages anonymously. A mix net can be viewed as an electronic analog of a tombola; messages are put into envelopes, the envelopes are mixed, and nally opened. It is impossible to tell ....

....attempt to cheat is detected and defeated. Availability and eciency are the general requirements on any system run on an open network. A mix net consists of a number of mix servers, i.e. servers, that collectively execute a protocol. The basic idea of a mix net, present already in Chaum s work [3], is that each mix server receives a list of encrypted messages, transforms them, using partial decryption or random re encryption, reorders them, We improve the analysis of the original protocol from (5 10k)N to 4(k 1)N . and then outputs the transformed and reordered list. It should be ....

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D. Chaum, Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudo-nyms, Communications of the ACM - CACM '81, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 84-88, 1981.

....is essentially independent of the number of mix centers. Currently there exist no security proofs of our construction, but we describe the underlying ideas of the design. Keywords: mix net, anonymous channel, electronic voting. 1 Introduction The notion of a mix net was invented by Chaum [2], and further developed by a number of people. Properly constructed a mix net enables a set of senders to send messages anonymously. A mix net can be viewed as an electronic analog of a tombola; messages are put into envelopes, the envelopes are mixed, and nally opened. It is impossible to tell ....

....attempt to cheat is detected and defeated. Availability and eciency are the general requirements on any system run on an open network. A mix net consists of a number of mix centers, i.e. servers, that collectively execute a protocol. The basic idea of a mix net, present already in Chaum s work [2], is that each mix center receives a list of encrypted messages, transforms them, using partial decryption or random re encryption, reorders them, and then outputs the transformed and reordered list. It should be dicult to nd an element in the input list and an element in the output list that ....

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D. Chaum, Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudo-nyms, Communications of the ACM - CACM '81, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 84-88, 1981.

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David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84-88, 1981.

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D. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84--88, 1981.

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CHAUM, D. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24, 2 (1981), 84--88.

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D. Chaum. Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 4(2), February 1982.

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D. Chaum. Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84--88, 1981.

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D. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communication of the ACM, 2(24), February 1981.

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David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communication of the ACM, 24(2):84-90, February 1981.

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CHAUM, D. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24, 2 (1981), 84--88.

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CHAUM, D. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24, 2 (1981), 84--88.

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David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84-88, 1981.

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CHAUM, D. L. Untraceable Electronic Mail, Return Addresses and Digital Pseudonyms. In CACM (1981).

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Chaum, D.: Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM 24 (1981)

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D.L. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84--90, 1981.

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David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84-88, 1981.

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David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84--88, 1981.

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David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84-88, 1981.

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David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84--88, February 1981. 68.

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David Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses and digital pseudonyms. Communications of the ACM, 24(2):84--88, 1981.

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