R. Fagin, M. Naor and P. Winkler, "Comparing common secret information without leaking it", Communications of the ACM, submitted for publication, 1994.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....small probability. Although it is possible to solve the OVCS problem through such proofs, the resulting solution when based on a general computational assumption is much less e#cient and elegant than the above. The OVCS problem has also been extensively studied by Fagin, Naor and Winkler [14] who provided a large number of scenarios where the problem may be considered. From the cryptographic point of view only one of their solutions is secure: a solution based on the existence of a simple cryptographic tool called one out of two Oblivious Transfer [13] This solution is covered in ....

....this argument may be found in [12] In conclusion, except with probability # the above protocol is a secure implementation of 2 . 4 An O(n ) protocol for OVCS We are now ready to consider a first solution to the OVCS problem based on Oblivious Transfer due to Fagin, Naor and Winkler [14]. In the GGM solution above, the string # was used as a seed to define the pseudo random function; here # is used as a set of indices to access random information chosen by through OT 2 . Bob s data and Alice s data. They use the data they get from the other and the data they ....

Fagin, R., M. Naor and P. Winkler, "Comparing Common Secret Information without Leaking it", submitted for publication, Communications of the ACM, 1994.

....small probability. Although it is possible to solve the OVCS problem through such proofs, the resulting solution when based on a general computational assumption is much less efficient and elegant than the above. The OVCS problem has also been extensively studied by Fagin, Naor and Winkler [14] who provided a large number of scenarios where the problem may be considered. From the cryptographic point of view only one of their solutions is secure: a solution based on the existence of a simple cryptographic tool called one out of two Oblivious Transfer [13] This solution is covered in ....

....in [12] In conclusion, except with probability ff n the above protocol is a secure implementation of Gamma 2 1 Delta OT n 2 . 4. An O(n 2 ) protocol for OVCS We are now ready to consider a first solution to the OVCS problem based on Oblivious Transfer due to Fagin, Naor and Winkler [14]. In the GGM solution above, the string OE was used as a seed to define the pseudo random function; here OE is used as a set of indices to access random information chosen by Alice and Bob through Gamma 2 1 Delta OT 2 . Alice uses OE A to access some of Bob s data and Bob uses OE B to ....

R. Fagin, M. Naor and P. Winkler (1994) Comparing Common Secret Information without Leaking it, submitted for publication, Communications of the ACM, 1994.

....small probability. Although it is possible to solve the OVCS problem through such proofs, the resulting solution when based on a general computational assumption is much less e#cient and elegant than the above. The OVCS problem has also been extensively studied by Fagin, Naor and Winkler [14] who provided a large number of scenarios where the problem may be considered. From the cryptographic point of view only one of their solutions is secure: a solution based on the existence of a simple cryptographic tool called one out of two Oblivious Transfer [13] This solution is covered in ....

....# n the above protocol is a secure implementation of 2 1 OT n 2 . for the 10th anniversary of the CWI Crypto course. 7 4 An O(n # ) protocol for OVCS We are now ready to consider a first solution to the OVCS problem based on Oblivious Transfer due to Fagin, Naor and Winkler [14]. In the GGM solution above, the string # was used as a seed to define the pseudo random function; here # is used as a set of indices to access random information chosen by Alice and Bob through 2 1 OT 2 . Alice uses # A to access some of Bob s data and Bob uses # B to access ....

Fagin, R., M. Naor and P. Winkler, "Comparing Common Secret Information without Leaking it", submitted for publication, Communications of the ACM, 1994.

....0 c t of his choice. It must be impossible for B to obtain information on more than one w i and for A to obtain information about which secret B learned. Andos has applications to mental poker [10] voting [38] zero knowledge proofs [2, 33, 41] exchange of secrets [7] and identification [21, 17], to name just a few. The main contribution of [6] was a reduction of ( t 1 ) OT k 2 to ( 2 1 ) OT 2 , i.e. an efficient twoparty protocol to achieve andos based on the assumption of the existence of a protocol for the simpler type of oblivious transfer. The fact that the more general andos ....

R. Fagin, M. Naor and P. Winkler, "Comparing common secret information without leaking it", Communications of the ACM, submitted for publication, 1994.

....or ideal Oblivious Transfer. In the current paper, we consider a situation where two parties, Alice and Bob, share a common secret string and would like to mutually check their knowledge of that string without disclosing it. This problem has been extensively studied by Fagin, Naor and Winkler [14] who provide a large number of scenarios where the problem may be considered. From the cryptographic point of view only one of their solutions may be considered secure: a solution based on the existence of a one out of two Oblivious Transfer [13] which uses Omega (n 2 ) Transfers to do the job ....

....quantum oblivious transfer has been shown secure against a large set of measurements[21] Basing our identification scheme on such primitives gives more freedom on the codes while, at the same price, providing security against any quantum measurements. Oblivious transfer has already been used by [14] to solve the problem of identification. In the next section, we present a different solution based on quantum oblivious transfer and theorem 6. 4 The Final Protocol No existing family of codes meets the four conditions above. One way around this problem is to drop condition 1. To do so we need a ....

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Fagin, R., M. Naor and P. Winkler, Comparing Common Secret Information without Leaking it, submitted for publication, Communications of the ACM, 1994.

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R. Fagin, M. Naor and P. Winkler, "Comparing common secret information without leaking it", Communications of the ACM, submitted for publication, 1994.

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