McInnes, J., "Cryptography Using Weak Sources of Randomness," Tech. Report 194/87, U. of Toronto, 1987.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....suffice to use such outdated methods as the linear congruential method or the middle square method which Knuth describes [10] For cryptographic purposes this may not be enough. Reeds [14] may have been the first to point out that stronger properties are needed for cryptographic purposes. McInnes [13] went on to show that weak sources of randomness are not cryptographically secure, even though the suffice for randomized algorithms. Surely, a PRBG suitable for cryptographic use will be suitable for randomized algorithms. Hence, the remainder of this paper will focus on randomness for ....

....we would like our seeds to be as random as possible. But due to practical considerations, this may not always be the case. Any bias in the seeds of a PRBG can be amplified in the output. So it is reasonable to ask what condition should be placed on the seed given to a PRBG. McInnes results [13] suggests that slightly random sequences, both from the S. V. model and the PRB model, are insufficient as input to a PRBG. However, the same does not hold for quasi randomness. Yao [19] proposed the idea of a perfect PRBG, that is, one which produces output polynomially indistinguishable from ....

J. L. McInnes. Cryptography Using Weak Sources of Randomness. University of Toronto, Department of Computer Science. Technical Report 194, January 1987.

....sources that nevertheless possess a certain amount of entropy have been made; these sources model the imperfect physical sources of randomness, such as Geiger counter noise and Zener diodes, that would have to actually be utilized in real life. See [Blum84] SV86] V87] VV85] CG88] and [McIn87]. One of our main technical lemmas, Lemma 4.8) can be viewed as a hashing lemma which is used to manipulate entropy in various ways: it can be viewed as a method for extracting close to uniform random bits from a slightly random source using random bits as a catalyst. 1.2. Outline. An outline ....

....function. Let X 2D f0; 1g n , Y 2U f0; 1g n , and Z 2U f0; 1g mn Gamma2e n . Then L 1 (hh Y (X) Y i; hZ; Y i) 2 Gamma(e n 1) This lemma is a generalization of a lemma that appears in [S83] There, D is the uniform distribution on a set S f0; 1g n with ]S = 2 mn . The papers [McIn87] and [BBR88] also proved similar lemmas. For the special case of linear hash functions, this lemma can be derived from [GL89] by considering unlimited adversaries. A generalization to a broader class of hash functions appears in [IZ89] The lemma can be interpreted as follows: The universal hash ....

McInnes, J., Cryptography Using Weak Sources of Randomness, Tech. Report 194/87, U. of Toronto, 1987.

....possess a certain amount of entropy have been made; these sources model the imperfect physical sources of randomness, such as Geiger counter noise and Zener diodes, that would have to actually be utilized in real life. See [Blum : 84] SV : 86] Vaz : 87] VV : 85] CG : 88] and [McIn : 87] One of our main technical lemmas, Lemma 4.5.1) can be viewed as a hashing lemma which is used to manipulate entropy in various ways: it can be viewed as a method for extracting close to uniform random bits from a slightly random source using random bits as a catalyst. 1.2 Outline An outline ....

....X 2D f0; 1g n , Y 2 U f0; 1g n , and Z 2 U f0; 1g mn Gamma2e n . Then L 1 (hh Y (X) Y i; hZ; Y i) 2 Gamma(e n 1) 21 This lemma is a generalization of a lemma that appears in [Sip : 83] There, D is the uniform distribution on a set S f0; 1g n with ]S = 2 mn . The papers [McIn : 87] and [BBR : 88] also proved similar lemmas. For the special case of linear hash functions, this lemma can be derived from [GL : 89] by considering unlimited adversaries. A generalization to a broader class of hash functions appears in [IZ : 89] The lemma can be interpreted as follows: The ....

McInnes, J., "Cryptography Using Weak Sources of Randomness," Tech. Report 194/87, U. of Toronto, 1987.

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McInnes, J., "Cryptography Using Weak Sources of Randomness," Tech. Report 194/87, U. of Toronto, 1987.

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McInnes, J., "Cryptography Using Weak Sources of Randomness," Tech. Report 194/87, U. of Toronto, 1987.

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